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Introduction and Abstract
This research proposal introduces an integrated study of action and human conduct
from the perspectives of symbolic interaction and neurophysiology. Because of their
traditionally disparate subject matter, the fields of sociological social psychology and the
neurosciences seldom meet; however, I have found significant common ground to justify
an integrated approach to the study of action. Symbolic interactionists study human group
life and conduct in society. The neurosciences deal with the physiology of the central
nervous system, its structure and functions in behavior, its chemical composition, and
electrochemical activity, and the effects damage has on behavior. Both fields analyze the
same empirical world, and their parameters of study overlap.
Neuroscience studies the central nervous system (CNS) under the assumption that it
evolved according to its usefulness for survival; therefore, the subject matter of the
neurosciences is relevant ultimately if it takes into account the whole of the organism's
active use of the eNS. Human beings use their brains socially in interaction with
themselves and others. Similarly, symbolic interactionism, though a powerful sociological
perspective, has its roots in sociological social psychology.l Interactionists propose that
such capacities as mind, consciousness. meaningful action, thinking, and language, could
not exist without social interaction and a human society which is temporally prior to any
given individual. Interactionists, however. do not isolate the social individual from the
biological organism. They hold a strong conviction that the social phenomena they study
are tied to physiological processes that are consistent with the nature of the empirical world.
There is, therefore, an overlap between neuroscience and symbolic interactionism. If they
study the same empirical world, there should be certain consistencies in their theoretical
approaches and their basic data. This paper explores the possibility that symbolic
interactionism and the neurosciences, particularly neuroanatomy and physiology, can
support consistent perspectives.
I have found that such consistencies do exist, and that there are several significant
links between the symbolic interactionisr conception of human action and the
neurophysiology of the brain. Though I will describe some of these specific links between
these fields, the focus of this proposal is upon their basic theoretical assumptions about the
nature of action, both for humans and other biological organisms. Both symbolic
interactionism and neurophysiology support a consistent "meta-theory" concerning the
nature of an organism's active relationship to an emergent reality, and the processes by
which living things handle reality. These consistencies justify furure efforts to integrate
interactionist and neuroscience approaches toward a more unified understanding of human
conduct and group life.

1 The social psychological roots of symbolic interactionism, however. are quite different from those which
have led to the current psychological perspective of social psychology. Though there may be overlap
between the psychological and sociological schools of social psychology, symbolic interactionism was
formulated by Herbert Blumer (see below) as a sociological theory, and sociologists tend to continue to
claim the perspective as his or her own. The term sociological social psychology reflects the rather
unfortunate distinction between Ihe two schoolsof thought,
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The focus of this study is upon action. encompassing human action and group life,
but also action as a basic process of all living systems. Both the symbolic interactiontst and
neuroscience perspectives embrace the study of action in this holistic sense. The study of
action. then. will provide a medium for our comparison. Focusing upon these goals. this
proposal will be organized in four chapters. The first two chapters will present a general
introduction to symbolic interactionism and neurophysiology focusing upon their
understandings of human action. Chapter one will describe basic concepts of symbolic
interactionism drawing from the works of Herbert Blumer. and especially from George
Herbert Mead. Mead's writings, though rather complicated., present a holistic perspective
of action and reality common to human beings and other life forms, The second chapter
will present a text-book styled tour of human neurophysiology. and will then focus upon
the evolution of the brain and the neural connectivity of the cerebral cortex. These sections
will draw upon the research of Dr. Deepak Pandya and Dr. Edward Yeterian, whose
studies of neocortical evolution, neural connectivity. and information processing provide
the basis for several of the links I have found between neuroscience and interactionism,
The third chapter will describe the general theoretical similarities shared by these
perspectives. The fmal chapter will sample some of the specific comparisons which can be
made between the two fields through an integrated analysis of the act, as described by
George Herbert Mead.
The purpose of presenting a neurophysiological model of action is not to reduce
symbolic interactionism to physiological mechanisms in the central nervous system. As
described above. our purpose is to take a more holistic look at different aspects of human
action. The neurosciences deal with a specific component of action, the physiological
systems which interpret the world and organize the activity by which the organism persists.
Interactionists study human conduct and group life. and the processes by which we
coordinate, or attempt to coordinate, our lines of activity with others. Each focus is
necessary but not sufficient in itself to explain an active organism's relationship to the
world.. Although a fully unified theory is perhaps impossible to achieve, to begin to unify
these perspectives we must look beyond what have evolved as traditional boundaries of
both fields.

Chapter 1: Symbolic Interactionisist Model of Action

The name of this perspective, symbolic interactionism, was coined by the
sociologist Herbert Blumer. Blumer's work and writings. especially those presented in his
book Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. give one of the more
comprehensive descriptions of the tradition of theory and methodology of this perspective.
His description spells out a "distinctive approach to the study of human group life and
human contact" (Blumer, 1969: 1) Symbolic interactionism has its foundations in the
work of W.I. Thomas, Robert E. Park, William James, Charles Honon Cooley, and John
Dewey among others. The concepts of George Herbert Mead, a philosopher of the school
of American pragmatism, played a major role in Blumer's formulation of the perspective.
Blumer developed these theoretical foundations of Mead and others into a perspective and
methodology of sociology and sociological social psychology.
Symbolic interactionists deal with many traditional and non-traditional sociological
issues. These perspectives and methods are used to study a wide variety of topics such as
deviance, power, politics, racism, social organizations, and even trends in clothing styles.
For those following the interactionist approach, Blumer's formulation of
perspective and methods provides a set of guiding concepts or premises about the nature of
human action and group life. One of the virtues of the interactionist approach is that these
guiding concepts can be used to describe the activities of real people interpreting and acting
in an empirical world. Interactionist descriptions encompass both the routine and non
routine events which people encounter in their everyday lives. Examples of actions include
a diplomatic discussion which leads to an argument and a declaration of war, or a scene in a
grocery store where a little girl mistakes a stranger for her mother, or a routine act such as
waiting for a traffic light and then making a left turn. The analysis of action is relevant to
each of these episodes and everything else human beings do. Analyzing these episodes
brings up countless questions. How do these people handle the situations they encounter?
How do they pose and solve problems? How do they define the meanings of their own
actions, those of others, and of the events taking place? How do people communicate their
intentions to one another? How do people plan for future events? These and other such
questions could be asked concerning how and why people go to war, or steal a car, or run
for president, or think about South Africa. These larger issues still describe human beings
individually and collectively acting. interpreting, and dealing with their worlds. Action,
therefore, is ubiquitous, and the study of action and human conduct in its basic form is a
relevant topic of study for both sociology and the neurosciences.
This chapter will describe the basic concepts of symbolic interactionism as they
pertain to human action. As mentioned, I will draw primarily from the work of George
Herbert Mead. The chapter will begin with the interactionisr concept of situation, as an
introduction to the interactionist perspective of reality and human action. I will then
describe Mead's concept of the act, which encompasses the processes by which organism
handle situations. The discussion of objects, meaning and indication will set the ground
for the discussion of symbolic interaction, mind, self. and role-taking, processes
characteristic of human beings, which allowthe conscious control of actions. These
capacities also allow the social coordination of activities through joint action, and the
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development of society. Although it is in the issues of social coordination of action that
symbolic interaction has received the most study, I will emphasize here the basic
assumptions of physiological processes underlying Mead's and Blumer's concepts;
however, I am not attempting to reduce symbolic interaction to psychological mechanisms.
The logic behind their concepts may stand out more clearly in comparison to the
neurophysiological approach if I attempt to bring out their essential assumptions about the
biological aspects of symbolic interaction which other interactionists tend to gloss over.

Situations:
To analyze action we should consider first the reality in which action takes place.
For symbolic interactionists, reality and the organism's relation to reality are encompassed
by the concept of situation. The situation describes an individual's ongoing reality through
time.
The situation has a somewhat different meaning in the interactionist perspective than
in its common use. The situation in everyday use refers to some abstract or specific event
in a cenain place at a certain time. People speak of particular situations by pointing out
some occasion or activity bounded by a particular time and space, such as the "budget
deficit situation" or the "situation in Russia," or more specifically, "that was a tough
situation last night" Interactionists use the term more broadly to include the reality people
experience and their changing relationships to changing situations (Morrione, 1985).
People's actions continue from one situation to a next The descriptions of common
actions above took place in different situations. The girl was experiencing the situation of
looking for her mother, the diplomats were dealing with the situation of a heated debate,
and the driver in the car was in the situation of waiting for a stop light. The people in these
examples are not acting in a vacuum, but in specific contexts and circumstances. They had
a general awareness of where they were and what they were doing. Similarly, the people
did not experience reality as a continuous stream of random sensations. The little girl knew
she was in the store and that her mother was missing and that the woman she saw in front
of her might have been her mother. Using these assumptions, she rugged on the woman's
pants leg. In other words, the girl's reality was organized according to how she interpreted
the situation she was in, and she was prepared to act on the basis of this interpretation.
Situations, then, are not just the reality of the moment, the time and space in which
one exists, but are also the meaning that reality has to those acting within it. People
interpret reality in order to handle the changes each moment brings, whether they do so
succesfully or not. In other words. they deal with reality by making it meaningful.
Meaning includes the orientation of bow one is prepared to act in a particular situation. We
go from moment to moment by bringing something with us from the past by which we
orient toward the future. The girl was oriented toward the immediate scene in front of her
by bringing to it her understanding that she was in a store, and that she was looking for her
mother, and remembered what her mother was wearing, and on this basis, she interpreted
or defined the woman in front of her as her mother.
The continuous interpretive process by which we handle changing situations is the
essence of activity. Herbert Blumer described this interpretive relation of human action to
the situation. "We must recognize that the activity of human beings consists of meeting a
flow of situations in which they have to act and that their action is built on the basis of what
they note. how they assess and interpret what they note, and what kind of projected lines of
action they map out" (Blumer, 1969: 15) An individual's projected line of action,
however, does not determine the exact behavior the person will eventually carry out
Though the little girl was prepared to act on her interpretation of who the woman was in
front of her, her definition of the situation changed abruptly when the girl discovered that
the woman was a stranger. People, therefore, project courses of action into situations
which are continuously changing and presenting new information. Interpreting or defining
the situation does not predetermine what the person will do, because the action must be
carried out in a "now" which is never perfectly predictable. Action, then, is a combination
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of what a person brings to the situation and how the reality of a situation acts back on a
person. to modify or often resist the activity one brings to it. Action. therefore. is situated
in a reality which is continuously changing (Morrione, 1985: 162). Situated activity, then,
does not follow a predetermined course; rather. ongoing activity follows "careers,"
Blumer's term for the course of the line of activity including the fluctuations and
redirections the line of action may take as one confronts the flow of changing situations
(Blumer and Morrione, 1987; Morrione.1988: 8).
Action occurs in situations which consist of the reality people meet which is
unpredictable, yet actively organized by the individual who must interpret reality in order
to anticipate future events. and to construct and guide lines of activity. An analysis of
action. therefore, cannot be separated from the reality of the situations in which they occur.
One purpose of this paper. however, is to present a generic analysis of the nature of action
in which such processes as the meaningful interpretation of situations makes sense. This
analysis cannot be divorced from the reality in which actions occur. In order to proceed.
then. a brief description of the common characteristics of reality as situation and the nature
of action as situated would be helpful.
There are three general characteristics of the concept of situation as described by
symbolic inreractionists. The situation encompasses the idea that reality is emergent, that
the relation of living things to reality is an active process of adjustment, and that human
beings can interpret the situation and guide actions on the basis of the meanings of things.
meanings which are derived from the social interaction one has with oneself and others.
These characteristics are fundamental to the symbolic interactionist perspective of human
conduct.
The reality of a situation is emergent. Emergence describes the dynamic and
changing nature of matter and energy in process. The physical universe is continually
changing through time. and nothing exists which is absolutely static. Therefore. the events
living organisms experience, as well as the organisms themselves are in process.
Emergence also expresses the indeterminacy of the universe. No two moments are
nwnerica1ly identical, nor can all the events of one moment be the causal source of the next
moment; therefore, we cannot predict exactly what will happen in the future. 1 TIle concept
of situation, then. includes the stream of emergent events in reality which change over time
in an indeterminate fashion.
AU living things handle emergent reality by actively changing with it. Living
systems change in different ways than non-living systems. The inanimate object changes
passively. The structure of a rock, for instance, persists by the coherency of its chemical
bonds that resist change up to a certain threshold. Machines are also passive systems. The
quarter in a soda machine initiates a series of events. Living organisms do not change
passively with emergent events, but confront a stream 0/situations which they must handle
to maintain themselves. There is nothing in the mechanism of the soda machine by which it
maintains itself, it merely responds in the way it is constructed. while the person drinking
the soda is maintaining his or her supply of fluids. This is an active process because the
living thing must reorganize itself from moment to moment to not only deal with change,
but also to keep intact its own life processes. Blumer describes the active relation to the
environment in similar terms. "[Tjhe human individual confronts a world that he must
interpret in order to act instead of an environment to which he responds because of his
organization. He has to cope with the situations in which he is called on to act, ascenaining
the meanings of the actions of others and mapping out his own line of action in the light of
such interpretations. He has to construct and guide his action instead of merely releasing it

1 This is evident in the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle among other principles of non-linearity, but is
also true by common sense. We do not act through time by figuring out how the position of each atom in
one moment is causally related to the positionof eacb 310m at another moment,

D.S. Fearon, Jr.

Symbolic Interaction and Neurophysiology

6

in response to factors playing on him or operating through him. He may do a miserable job
in constructing his action, but he has to construct it" (Blumer, 1969: 15).
Blumer calls the active process of self-maintenance or self-organization by which a
living thing persists adjustment (Momone, 1988: 8). Living things meet a stream of
emergent situations by adjusting to them. An amoeba adjusts to its lack of nutrients by
searching for food; the little girl adjusts to her situation in the store by looking for her
mother. Situations, then, are both emerging reality and the adjustment of organisms in
relation to reality. Thus, the tree falling in the forest makes a sound, but that particular
event is not a situation unless someone is there to hear it (including animals). It is then a
situation for that listener. Adjustment is a continuous process, since there there are always
emerging, developing aspects of situations which an organism must handle; therefore,
activity is unceasing, even in sleep, which is simply a different form of adjustment

Adiustment and Interpretation:
I mentioned above that human beings adjust to situations by interpreting them. a
process by which situations become meaningful. Though other animals interpret their
realities to various degrees, the human being interprets situations in several characteristic
and unique ways. Situations are interpreted by bringing an orientation from the past
(involving memory) to handle the immediate emergent events to construct a line of activity
for the future which fits the emerging system. Again, the prediction is never perfect, but
action is always constructed in this way, and reconstructed with each novel event The past
is represented by some form of memory of both the immediate and often more distant past.
Both animals and human beings draw upon past experiences to meet novel situations;
however, for human beings these experiences may include certain social experiences.
While the girl was defining her situation, she knew that the place she was in was called a
"grocery store" because that is the way others referred to the place. She also referred to her
mother as a social entity; she may have recalled her mother saying "don't wander off," and
was predicting getting scolded, then when she saw the woman she may have said to herself
"there's Mommy." These past social experiences and the social interaction she had with
herself and others went into the way she interpreted the situation she was in. She used this
social interaction to make the situation meaningful in ways which went beyond her
immediate sensory experiences, and she guided her actions on the basis of this meaning.
Nonhuman animals are incapable of using this specific son social interaction in
constructing lines of action, as will be explained below.!
The interpretation process which utilizes social interaction and socially derived
experiences in adjusting to situations is a necessary aspect of what Blumer defines as action
for the human being. Action encompasses oven dimensions of activity, such as observable
behavior, and also covert aspects such as thinking, or physiological processes.
"Fundamentally, action on the part of the human being consists of taking into account of
the things he Dotes and forging a line of conduct on the basis of how he interprets them."
This form of interpretation that is characteristic to human beings is what Blumer calls
symbolic interaction (Blumer, 1969: 1). The concept of symbolic interaction is difficult to
define in a few words, and will take the rest of this chapter to explain sufficiently;
however, a simplified definition of the term here will show where the chapter will
eventually lead Symbolic interaction is a certain form of social interaction in which
symbols, such as words, are used to designate situated events taking place or things that
one encounters. In such cases the individual indicates, or points out to oneself the intent or
future relationship implied by the symbol before that implied action is carried out The
interpretation can then be used to guide one's action on the basis of the meaningful
1 Nonhuman animals appear 1.0 act based on memories 'of past social experiences as well, such as past
fights, mating, or other encounters; however, these experiences contribute to conditioned responses rather
than memories of which we may be consciously aware. This distinction will be detailed below.
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implication of the symbols. When the girl saw the woman she did not run up to her
instinctively like a gosling to a mother goose, but instead pointed the woman out to herself
with the symbol "Mommy." The use of the verbal symbol helped her to organize her
further actions on the basis of what Mommy meant to her in that particular situation. The
symbol "mommy" is social because, first, she learned what the term meant in pan by the
way others used it to refer to her mother, and secondly, because the symbol "mommy" can
be shared with others (such as those reading reading about this episode) and interpreted by
others in much the same way the girl was using the symbol in that particular situation.
People can interact symbolically with others. whether present or not, and with themselves.
Also, it will be shown that the symbols themselves are not just the words, but are, in a
sense, anything we point out consciously to ourselves, whether or not we actually name the
conscious objects in the process. As will be described below, it is this social process of
symbolic interaction from which consciousness and the mind emerges, from which self and
others emerge as social objects, and by virtue of which human society exists and is
perpetuated
Understandably, this discussion of symbolic interaction will require many more
details to make sense. The relevant point here, however, is that human beings can adjust to
situations through the social process of symbolic interactionism by which people can
consciously construct lines of activity on the basis of meaningful interpretations of
situations. Human beings have this capacity of adjustment in addition to the processes of
adjustment we share with other animals, such as eating, sleeping, walking, and
maintaining posture. In addition to our biological world human beings live in a social
world which gives more flexibility, variability and control in coordinating our own actions.
Individuals can also coordinate their lines of actions with others, and by this process,
according to Blumer, groups, institutions, organizations, and societies are formed, "Such
instances of societal behavior, whatever they may be, consist of individuals fitting their
lines of action to one another" (Blumer, 1969: 16).
Blumer formulated the perspective of symbolic interaetionism on the basis of three
axiomatic premises which are embraced in the discussion of situations above.
"Symbolic interactionism rests in the last analysis on three simple
premises. The first premise is that human beings act towards things on the basis
of the meanings that the things have for them. .. The second premise is that the
meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction
one has with one's fellows [and with oneself]. The third premise is that these
meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by
the person dealing with the things he encounters" (Blumer, 1969: 2)
People do not react passively or mechanically to emerging reality, but act on the basis of
what that reality means for a given situation, how they interpret it, and how this
interpretation orients them toward future action. People adjust to situations by drawing
largely from past social experiences through the process of symbolic interaction by which
action can be guided consciously. This is all pan of the interpretive process by which
people handle situations.
The remainder of this chapter will explore the theoretical origins of Blumer's three
premises of symbolic interaction and consider to what extent they form a comprehensive
description of human action, and social conduct. To do so I will draw primarily from the
work of George Herben Mead, whose social psychology and philosophy of action
comprise the bulk: of the "meta-theory" behind symbolic interaction. Mead's introspective
philosophical work and lucid observations of both human and non-human behavior will
focus attention on the issue of action in general and as it applied specifically to our
comparison of neurophysiological aspects of action.

The act

D.S. Fearon, Jr.

Symbolic Interaction and Neurophysiology

8

For Mead, action as an ongoing adjustment to emerging situations is expressed by
his concept of the act. Like Blumer, Mead did not consider an organism's relation to the
environment to be passive like a machine, but active. Living things persist by actively
reorganizing their relation to emerging reality, and Mead's concept of act expressed the
whole of this process, from the beginning of the adjustment process, to the perception of
the world and the behaviors involved in dealing with that world, and the end of an act
which led directly to new acts as new situations emerged.
Mead's concept of the act was different than the predominant psychological model
at the time of his writing, Watsonian behaviorism. Mead developed his concept of the act
during the early 1900's, and the bulle of his concept was compiled in his book The
Philosophy ofthe Act (Mead, 1938), a collection of his unpublished works published after
his death in 1931. Mead, together with several other philosophers and psychologists,
especially Mead's colleague John Deweyl. opposed the behaviorist model because it failed
to present an adequate account of action.
Watsonian behaviorism follows the positivist tradition which held that empirically
observable behaviors are the aspects of action most relevant to scientific study. Animal
behavior was a problem in this respect because many aspects of the animal's activity were
difficult to point out and measure objectively. The central nervous system, for example,
was a mass of tissue and connections and electrochemical reactions which, on the surface at
least, gave no hint of its internal mechanism. Such a mechanism had to be constructed
theoretically by the researcher. The behaviorist solution to this problem of how to model
action was to limit their model to only what was readily observable, the behaving animal,
and the environment in which the animal's behaviors took place. The analysis of action.
then, became a matter of discovering which occurrences in the environment led to which
behavior of the animal.. Action began with the stimulus, some occurrence in the
environment which is sensed by the animal; and the response, the behavior which the
stimulus elicits. Thus activity consists of chains of stimuli and responses. The internal
element in this model consists of the link between responses and the various stimuli which
cause the responses. These links were formed on the basis of what was learned in past
experience. Attention in behaviorism, however, is not focused on internal mechanisms,
but upon the observable behaviors, and upon finding out which environmental conditions
elicit which responses, how are these responses learned, and so forth. The internal process
of action was otherwise unimportant
Mead, in contrast, considered the internal processes to be the more important part of
action, and emphasized that they must be included in a model that will provide an adequate
understanding of action. Stimuli and responses were relevant to action, but insufficient on
their own to explain why action occurs. The stimulus-response model ignored the internal
processes of organizing and interpreting stimuli in constructing a line of activity. By
ignoring these internal processes, Watsonian behaviorists were left with only the stimuli
and the causal chain of responses which the stimuli must set off. The role of the organism
itself in these chains was to respond, and carry around the set of links which make these
responses possible. The active participation of the organism in constructing behaviors is
not clear in the S-R model. Rather, the organism is described as a passive vehicle for
environmental forces. For M~ the stimulus was not the causal force of action. Stimuli
are relevant to action, but only if they are interpreted by an adjusting organism who actively
consttucts a response.
_
Though Mead focused upon internal as well as externally observable elements of
action, he did not take the dualistic position that these internal processes. such as
"subjective" experiences, were distinct from the "objectively" observable behaviors. The
unobservable internal processes did not exist as a separate "substance" or plane of reality
1 (c.f. Dewey, 1896).
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separate from the mechanisms of empirically observable behavior. Instead, his approach
was to describe all of action, the "objective" relationships of an organism acting in the real
world and the "subjective" world of inner experience, as occurring through functional,
ph ysical processes.
Mead, then, conceived of action as a holistic process which encompassed the entire
process of adjustment to emerging situations. In other words. action encompasses all that a
living thing does, including both oven behaviors and covert physiological and
psychological processes. Action encompassed the organism's orientation from past
experience used to project a future line of activity, the processes by which these plans were
executed, and the ongoing modification of the action as it met changing situations. Such a
holistic approach could not begin with the stimulus, since the stimulus itself did not
determine how the organism was using its activity. M~ in his analysis of action could
not use the stimulus and response alone because this left out the internal processes involved
in action; nor could the internal be simply the mechanistic linkages between stimuli and
responses. Instead, Mead took the act as his fundamental unit of analysis for his concept
of action. "The act, then, and not the tract, is the fundamental datum in both social and
individual psychology when behavioristically conceived ... (Mead, 1934: 8). By
"tract," Mead refers to the tracts of the central nervous system that he considered "only a
specialized pan of the entire organism" (Mead, 1934: 111). Though analysis of the central
nervous system was important to understanding action, Mead stressed that, in addition to
this, social scientists must study the "whole process of conduct" in order to understand
action (Baldwin, 1986: 55). For human beings, this "whole process" includes social
conduct Mead, then, also looked beyond the individual to society to be included in a
holistic study of action. 'The social act is not explained by building it up out of stimulus
plus response; it must be taken as a dynamic whole-s-as something going on-no pan of
which can be considered or understood by itself-a complex organic process implied by
each individual stimulus and response involved in it" (Mead, 1934: 7).
to

Theaet
From the holistic process of action, Mead drew the act as a basic unit of analysis.
Although "[A[nalysis breaks up, for the time being, this organic unity and these
relationships" (Mead, 1914: 31), each act consists of four interrelated components or
phases: I) impulse, 2) perception, 3) manipulation, and 4) consununation. Though for the
purposes of analysis, the phases are separated into eena.in characteristic processes, Mead
makes it clear that the act is not a strictly serial or causal stage model of action, but rather is
a dynamic, organic process in which the four phases are facets of action as a dynamic
whole. All animals handle siruarions by acting, and though social conduct is a more
elaborate form of adjustment, the social act involves these four phases as well. Acts occur
in many forms and degrees of complexity. Examples of human acts include going to work,
picking up a cup of coffee, or having an idea.
Mead described the act of a dog getting food as a typical example. The organization
of action begins with the impulse of hunger, by which the dog is prepared to look for food
as a goal of the action. The impulse orients the process of perception, in which the dog
selectively scans its surroundings for something to eat. If food is found, the dog
manipulates the object., which involves oven behaviors of obtaining, tearing and chewing
the food which is means to the end of consuming the food. A common act for a human
being would be would be stopping a car at an intersection, seeing a green light and making
a left tum.
The green light is not the stimulus which causes the driver to begin moving the car.
Rather, the impulse in this case is the readiness to act in the new situation which followed
the previous act of stopping for the red light. The perception phase involves the selection
of stimuli relevant to the action at hand, which is initiated with the impulse. The driver
perceives the light and the stopped cars in the other lane, as well as those cars coming
toward her. Manipulation involves the behavior necessary to make the rom. The driver
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manipulates the wheel, gas, clutch and gear shift, and that particular act is consummated as
the driver successfully makes the turn. Having made the turn, a new act of driving down
the road is underway.
Though these stages may appear to follow a linear sequence in these examples, the
act is not strictly a serial process. The stages are not isolated from one another; rather, the
four phases are interwoven and each phase is present, in some form., throughout the act
The driver perceives the gear shift in terms of how she will manipulate it in the future. The
anticipation of later phases, such as the goal of making the turn, can feed back to influence
earlier phases, such as turning the wheel in the correct direction. Similarly, acts do not
always lead smoothly to consummation. Novel occurrences may emerge at any time. For
example, the car may have stalled, so the driver cannot make the turn. The person must
adjust to such emerging, unanticipated occurrences which occur throughout the act With
ongoing adjustment and modification throughout, acts vary in their complexity. Anyone
act, such as going to work, is actually composed of various sub-acts, such as going out the
door, walking to the car, getting into the car, starting the cart and so fonh (Blumer and
Morrione, 1985). Thus the act as a basic unit may be hard to distinguish analytically. For
descriptive purposes, however, the act represents a process of adjustment to conditions of a
given situation, and can be distinguished in the way they incorporate these four phases.
Acts, then, do not lead simply from impulse to consummation in a direct causal
sequence. Like like the situations they handle, acts follow "careers" (Blumer and
Morrione, 1985). Mead's model of the aet answers to a reality of emergent unpredictable
events, and an organism's adjustment to such a world. Action is a process of
development, and the act is built up through interaction and the co-presence of the four
phases. A more thorough analysis of the phases of the act will show how Mead's model of
the dynamic, holistic process fits an emergent, organic reality.

Impulse
The act, according to Mead, begins with the impulse. Among the four phases,

Mead gives relatively few details about this initial phase; however, the concept of impulse
is the crucial element in Mead's description of action as an adjustive, interpretive process. I
will explore how the impulse fits into Mead's general theory of adjustment in chapter three.
Three aspects of the impulse will be presented here to show the impulse's important role in
organizing the entire act First, the impulse represents the dynamic tendency by which the
organism adjusts to emerging reality, in other words, the impulse begins the interpretive
process of the act Mead argues that, because of the interpretive process of action, it is the
impulse and not the stimulus which begins an act Second, this tendency to adjust has a
direction, or goal of action which sensitizes all phases of the act and begins the process by
which the line of action is built up. Third, the impulse is present throughout the act as the
ongoing process of adjustment to novel events. In this way, the impulse allows lines of
activity to be holistically organized around situations, rather than occurring as causal chains
of activity.
The impulse is a dynamic tendency for the organism to adjust to changing
conditions. In other words, the impulse begins the active process by which an organism
bandles emerging reality. A more thorough description of what Mead means by "tendency"
will be presented in Chapter 3. For now. we can think of the impulse as arising in the flow
of meeting emergent events with a fluctuation which changes the organism's current line of
activity. The fluctuation may be internal or external. For example, the pang of hunger is a
fluctuation brought about by an empty stomach. Another fluctuation would occur if a
pedestrian stepped in front of the driver's car while she was making the tum. In both of
these cases, the novel situation was handled in such a way as to change the course of action
one is in. In the driver's previous situation, her projected course of action offered no major
difficulties. With the impulse, the previous line of action requires more than minor
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modifications to deal with novel events in the situation at hand, and requires instead a new
act to handle a new simarion,
The organism is actively dealing with these fluctuations through an active process
by which it interprets incoming stimuli on the basis of the previous situation. Thus the act
has its beginning in the organic active process by which the organism meets incoming
stimuli. The stimuli themselves do not begin the act In the stimulus-response model
described above, the stimulus is assumed to be the source of the action, starting the chain
of responses linked to various stimuli. This implies that the stimulus controls the act. by
setting off the fixed response linked to it Mead describes the impulse as selecting the
stimuli upon which it acts. 'We cannot interpret the act in terms of stimuli; if we do, we
miss its significance. Rather, an impulse or a tendency to act is present. and it makes use
of stimuli or selects them to act. and this is characteristic of all life forms" (Mead. 1927:
109).
Though the act begins with the impulse and not the stimulus, the impulse is not
simply the cause of a predetermined chain of events; rather, the impulse gives a direction to
emerging action which can best handle the emergent events. The impulse, therefore,
orients the organism toward a new line of activity. The impulse of hunger orients the dog's
action toward finding food. The sight of the pedestrian is handled by an impulse directed
toward putting on the breaks. In this way, the impulse sensitizes later stages of the act
Thus the impulse begins the organization for the whole act
The direction of action given by the impulse comes in pan from past experience, in
which certain stimuli become more relevant than others. The hungry dog knows that
certain things which it encounters qualify as food. and others do not; thus the organism
brings to the stimuli the criteria for their selection. "Impulses, therefore, require certain
types of stimuli. The impulse is thus this tendency to act in the course of the life process,
like the movement of moms toward a light, or of sap to the tree top. The impulses are there
ready to be carried out. depending on a cenain contact with nature. The stimulus is thus
dependent on the structure of the organism itself' (Mead, 1927: 112-114). Thus the
impulse mobilizes, in a sense, the selective anenrion one gives to certain elements of a
situation.
Mead suggests the impulse functions to sensitize all parts of the act; it orients the
organism toward certain relevant stimuli, the type of manipulation, and refers to the goal of
the particular act (Baldwin, 56). In this sensitizing process, past experiences are related to
present conditions in anticipating future events. Anticipating the result of an act, such as
making the left tum, influences how one is prepared to perceive things and manipulate
things. The impulse, for instance, brings out what Mead refers to as imagery, both
sensory imagery, such as the anticipated green light. and motor imagery, such as the
motions necessary to drive the car. 'We find the precondition of the act in imagery, the
sense imagery which controls the selection of stimuli and motor imagery which facilitates
the response" (Mead. 1914: 28). Through this sensitizing process, an anticipation of later
phases of the act can be used to organize earlier stages. Thus the organism begins to
construct its line of action on the basis of a future which it interprets. In this way the
organization of the entire act begins with the impulse.
Though the impulse projects a future line of activity, the impulse does not determine
the future course of action. The hungry dog may be ready to eat, but may not find food.
As an individual's activity continues, the environment continually present novel conditions
and stimuli which modify the course of the act. The act requires many mid-course
adjustments which re-orient the direction of the act. The impulse then, is present
throughout the act. continuously modifying the direction of activity by calling out new
sensory and motor imagery and new responses. The impulse orients the act toward a
future, but the organism still meets a reality which is not perfectly predictable. Thus the
activity itself is built up in the interaction of the impulse and the emergent reality to which it
adjusts. The impulse, then, helps build up the career of an act (Blumer and Morrione,
1987; Morrione, 1988: 8).
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Since the impulse calls out all phases of the act throughout the course of activity,
the impulse plays a part in unifying our experience of the act as a whole. In other words,
the impulse helps to organize emergent reality and our own experiences as situations ,
rather than as unrelated streams of events. An awareness of the situation helps unify the
various components of activity along a more unified goal or direction. For example, the
driver is involved in the situation of making a turn in which the various steps, such as
shifting gears, turning the wheel, and pressing the accelerator can be unified around the
purpose of the situation. Again, this differs from the S-R model in which the stimuli can
only call out chains of responses, and cannot sustain a purpose of the resulting act.
Impulse, then, begins the act, directs action to a future, and helps orient the
selection of relevant information for handling that furore. The impulse also helps to sustain
that orientation while the given act persists. Though the impulse orients the direction of
action and sensitizes the other phases of the act. it is in the next phase, perception, that the
tendency to act is filled out by what is actually encountered.
Perception
The phase of perception continues the process, initiated with the impulse, of
interpreting emergent conditions and events. Perception is an active process encompassing
both the structuring of experience into a line of action, and the indeterminate process by
which the anticipated line of action meets emerging reality. In this phase of the act, one's
experience of the present situation becomes meaningful in terms of the future line of action
one constructs.
The phase of perception is not simply the intake of stimuli in one's surroundings,
but an active structuring of the sensory world in which experience becomes relevant to the
organism's emerging line of action. This is accomplished through an active process of
selection. The process of selection is active in two respects. It is a physically active
process in the muscular sense of the organism orienting itself to either the immediate or
anticipated source of the stimuli, such as looking toward the traffic light.
Perception is also an active interpretive process as the organism selects the stimuli
relevant to the situation at hand, particularly those stimuli relevant to the completion of the
act As mentioned, the selective process was initiated by the impulse. The impulse. calls
out what Mead calls "imagery" anticipating what son of stimuli would be relevant in the
future. Mead is not clear whether this imagery is an actual sensory image; rather, the
imagery expresses the direction of adjustment called out at the impulse (Mead. 1934: 338;
1938: 3,54,161 )27). For example, the impulse occurring with the green light orients
perception toward certain stimuli over others, such as the road ahead, the other cars and
pedestrians. Perception, then, involves both what occurs from moment to moment, and
what is organized with the impulse.' The driver still experiences the full sensory field, such
as the street comer, and the shapes and colors of the cars going by, but the driver perceives
primarily those sensory experiences which are relevant to making the nun at the green light.
Other stimuli are still present, however, and may attract one's attention, such as a
pedestrian stepping in front of the turning car. Perception, therefore, is the ongoing
mixture of the stimuli in one's surroundings, and what one brings to those stimuli in the
process of selecting and interpreting stimuli. It is through this selection that the individual
organizes his or her sensory experiences according to the interpretation of the situation at
hand. In other words, perception transforms emergent reality into a situation experienced
by the individual.
The selective process of perception, in effect. creates the individual's environment
This is an important point, because it shows that the environment which is relevant to
action is not external to the organism, but is a combination of the reality which is "out
there" and what the organism brings to it If the- environment is partially dependent upon
the organism, it cannot consist of fixed conditions to which the organism passively
responds. This gives another reason why the stimulus is not the causal force of an act
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The stimulus is not a fixed condition impinging upon us, but must be interpreted to be
relevant to action. Our relation to the world is therefore co-determinant The environment
changes and affects us, and we also change the environment in adjusting to novel
conditions. There is therefore no clear distinction between the organism and its
environment There is instead the dynamic relationship of a living system adjusting to its
surroundings.
This interpretive process by which individuals organize the things they perceive
creates an environment of "objects" which are relevant to future action, and are organized
into some form of situation. "Environment is thus the creation of objects and. by this
relationship, giving new content to things that did not have it before" (Mead. 1914: 29).
The objects are organizations of things in the sensory field into both sensory experiences
and the relationships they will have to future action. The cars in the road are objects
relevant to the situation as obstacles to be avoided. The "content" of objects is the future
relationship the individual will have with the object. Perception. then. anticipates later
stages of the act. Perception uses memories of past experiences in terms of their relevance
to the immediate and future situation. "The perceptual world is made up of means and
ends" (Mead, 1914: 31). Perception sees things in terms of means (manipulation) and ends
(consummation) and experience is organized such that action is guided through to
consummation. Individuals do not act on the basis of stimuli but on the basis of the
interpretation of stimuli through which they are related to some future action. In other
words, individuals act on the basis of the meaning of the object The meaning of an object
is the implication of a future relationship we bring to sensory experience. The individual
does not have to actually handle a thing in the future for it to be meaningful in the present
One can perceive a thing in order to avoid it, such as perceiving cars as obstacles to avoid..
The environment, then, is interpreted as meaningful objects, objects which callout
some relation to future action. This image of future action can guide the formation of the
line of activity by bringing later stages of the act into the present Past experiences used in
relating meaning to objects can "fill in" elements of the sensory field.. "[O]ur imagery fills
in what we do not actually see, hear, etc. In reading, there are perhaps only two or three
points in a line which we actually take in. A word may be incorrectly spelled and we may
actually see it spelled correctly. Past experience is present in the perception. The past
experience which comes in is one in which we have acted upon the same or a similar
stimulus" (Mead, 1927: 114). By "images" Mead means not only visual or other sensory
images, but also motor images which anticipate what we will do with a thing once we get
hold of it. Thus perception refers to both manipulation and the consummation phases of
the act By projecting the forms of manipulation related to the meaning of the object,
perception of meaningful objects organizes sensory stimuli into a situation of things
relevant to our action. Mead calls perception the "collapsed act" because it anticipates all
later phases in the present "A perception is what we call a collapsed act. "This imagery
gives us the result of an act before we carry it out" (Mead, 1914: 29).
Though perception builds up an environment of objects relevant to future action, the
objects do not determine the course of action, just as the impulse does not determine action.
One may anticipate that a tea kettle is empty. but will not be sure until it is picked it up.
Perception. then, builds up a hypothetical future which is confirmed by later activity.
"Such an aroused future act always has a hypothetical character. It is not until this initiated
response is carried out that its reality is assured" (Mead. 1938: 25). Meaning does not
determine the resulting action; instead, both sensory experience and action are built up in
the interpretive process and are modified continually in the course of an act There is
therefore both structure and indeterminacy in the process of perception. The organism
structures reality into objects related to future actions. but cannot predict those actions
absolutely.
Through perception, an individual brings to the reality of a situation a hypothetical
future which guides the formative line of action. Anticipating the meanings of things at a
distance gives more control to the emerging action because immediate stimuli can call out
II
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several future directions to the act before one carries them out An individual may see a
banana and plan to eat it, but then remembers that the bananas are to be used for a pudding.
The ability to associate various future relationships before they occur adds variety and
flexibility to the types of actions one may have. An object of perception, then, is not linked
to a single response. Associating present stimuli with past and present conditions gives
choice to the acting individual.
Objects created through perception are not limited to the immediate sensory
experience at hand. The object as an organization of experience may extend, in a sense,
beyond one's immediate surroundings in both space and time. Visual or auditory imagery
may also be identified as an object since they can be related to the projected line of action.
Thus one can experience a visual image of one's childhood home, or the auditory image of
a song. Though past experiences are utilized in the perception of objects, memories are
reorganized in novel ways in the present conditions. For example, one recalls what a
traffic light is and that a traffic light will tum green without necessarily recalling some
specific instance of experiencing a traffic light Although emerging memories generally fall
into relevant patterns. past experiences are recreated in the present, and have their relevance
in the anticipated future. In this sense, both past and future are constructed during the
course of the act "[Imagery] only refers to the past in so far as it has a future reference in
some real sense. It may be there without immediate reference to either future or to past
We may be quite unable to place the image" (Mead, 1934: 344). Past responses, then, in
no way determine future responses. Even the most habitual act is reconstructed in a novel
act, and always involves the variations and modifications of adjusting to an emergent reality
(Blumer, 1969: 11). Emotions and physiological phenomena such as pain can also
become objects since they playa large factor in guiding the course of action.
Perception continues throughout the act, as new information is interpreted. The
anticipated line of action, then, is continually modified throughout the act Since the act is
constantly reorganized with the impulse interpreting new stimuli, perception of things at
any point in the act can be related to the definition of the situation at hand. Novel
occurrences, therefore, are handled by the interpretive process. If a person jumps in front
of a car, the driver reacts to the event immediately by slamming on the brakes, but that
particular response is consistent with the overall experience of driving the car.
The phase of perception, then, encompasses the interpretation of relevant stimuli
selected on the basis of the impulse. The representation of past experience is bound to the
present to create an environment of objects meaningful to future action. One's line of
activity can be guided, but not determined, by the hypothetical future relationship
represented by the meaning of objects. Perception continues throughout as the act and
meanings are continually modified through an ongoing interpretive process.
Manipulation

With his description of the phases of impulse and perception, Mead shows that the
line of action is organized to a large extent before it is actually carried out in manipulation.
Both the type of response as muscle movements and the anticipated results of the act are
organized in earlier phases. In the phase of manipulation, the line of activity which had
been largely covert becomes oven in the sense that behaviors, or observable actions, are
carried out Manipulation, however, is not simply the movement of muscles. Just as
perception as an active process has motor as well as sensory components, manipulation
also has sensory components. The motor movements are guided by the anticipated
response organized by processes of impulse and perception.
Anticipating the form of motor movement does not determine the actual muscle
movements, however, because these movements are interacting with the conditions of the
physical world as they are carried out, and are therefore open to continual modification.
The sensory components of manipulation enter-with this emergence of behavior. When
one manipulates a thing, such as a coffee cup, one encounters the reality of the cup in the
resistance it offers to the touch (Mead, 1938: 22, 150, 186,212). The hand strikes a hard
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surface through which it cannot pass. The cup, like any physical object. has mass and
weight and is composed of molecules which push back upon our contact These properties
are traditionally called the primary properties of physical things, but Mead refers to mass,
weight, and resistance as contact experiences (Mead. 1927: 120-122; 1938: 22-23). This
term includes not only the physical properties, but the organism's active relation to the
physical thing in making contact The organism adjusts to contact experiences and
modifies ongoing action. As one lifts the coffee cup the individual automatically modifies
the force exerted by the muscles according to the cup's weight
Contact experience through manipulation confirms the hypothetical nature of
perception. The process of confirmation involves the sensory experiences of contact as
well as the motor process of handling the thing. Manipulation can reveal discrepancies in
what is anticipated; therefore, contact can feed back to modify the results of these earlier
stages. The driver, for example. may press the accelerator but find that the car does not
move because it has stalled. Manipulation in this case reveals a problem with one's current
line of action that becomes the impulse for an new or modified act
The contact experience confirms anticipated perception not only physically. but
temporally. Contact must occur in the present, the "now." Perception of objects at a
distance. according to Mead, involves not only a separation of space between the object and
the perceiver, but of time as well. The chair in a room is so many steps away. and the
clock on the wall is farther. With contact through manipulation. however, the object has its
temporal reality in the present If one bumps into the chair the contact is not anticipated,
but is real now as it occurs.
Mead considers spatial relationships among distant objects to be handled in
perception by projecting future contact experiences on distant objects. Perception, then,
involves the anticipation of how a thing will be handled, and thus guides the manipulation
one will have of a thing. Actual manipulation subsequently confirms the reality of this
hypothetical object and modifies the action as it occurs, thus reorganizing the form of
perception. Both these processes can, and often do, occur simultaneously; for example,
manipulation may reveal a car which will not move and at the same time the driver
perceives a red light on the dashboard and does not hear the engine running. By
interpreting all of these elements through no particular order, the driver realizes that she is
dealing with a new act, a stalled car. Again, this shows that action is not a serial chain of
events. but a developmental process which can operate both sequentially and in parallel.
Anticipating the future relationship one will have with an object at a distance gives
the meaning of that object The meaning of distant objects develops from past contact
experiences with things. Mead describes how our ability to act toward distant objects
develops in early childhood. We are not born able to anticipate future contact relationships
among objects; rather, this capacity develops through the infant's interactions with
physical things. The child understands the contact qualities of a hammer by first picking it
up and experiencing its hardness and weight in addition to its visual appearance, and other
sense qualities. When the child sees the hammer again, he or she can associate the meaning
of this distant visual experience on the basis of past experience. With repeated contact
people can understand the meanings of things at a distance more clearly because they are
better able to anticipate the various experiences they may have if they contact or manipulate
the things. The many typeS of future relation one may have can therefore be anticipated
from a distance (Baldwin, 1986: 58).1 It is this ability to anticipate the relationship of
objects to actions which gives meaning to objects in one's surroundings.
The variety of contact one may have with a thing adds flexibility to the type of
meaningful relationships organisms may have with their surroundings. The human hand is
1 The types of relationships do nOI necessarily involve actual contact one is going to have. One may
perceive a lhing in order to avoid it, such as the pedeslrians and the other cars. This will be described
further in the discussion of "objects" below.
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significant for Mead in this respect because it allows a larger variety of contact experiences
with a thing. "In manipulation or contact the hand is of fundamental importance, and its
high development is a mark of the intelligence of the human,. (Mead, 1927: 119). The hand
is therefore important in evolution since human beings can deal with the things across a
wider range of meanings. Other animals have only limited contact experience with things,
and therefore have a more limited world of objects (Baldwin, 1986: 58-59). "Our world,
as a physical world, is built up of contact experience through the hand. The dog's world is
built up of odors. There is no world of physical experience between the stimuli for him,
but we separate the mediate experience from the consummatory process" (Mead, 1927:
119). Manipulation, then, is a means to the end of consummation, and is in this sense
"instrumental" to consummation (Mead, 1938: 24).
Consummation
Mead considered consummation to be the phase in which an impulse subsides
(Mead, 1938: 23ff, 445-457). Consummation completes, in some fashion, one's
adjustment to the given act Mead gives the example of hunger subsiding with eating and
"satisfying the impulse" of hunger (Mead, 1938: 136). Although consummation represents
end of a given act, it is also present throughout the act as a referent for action.
The impulse, as a tendency to act, mobilizes action toward some goal or general
direction. With the green light, the driver's goal or consummation was to be achieved upon
making the turn. The goal of action is modified and often changed as the act proceeds,
however, most acts are generally directed toward some purpose. Although the goal of an
act is anticipated, the actual conswnmation is never predetermined. The rest of the act, in a
sense, fills out early stages of the act with perception manipulation that may subsequently
modify the act as it is carried out. With constant opportunity for novel events to modify or
redirect the act, the act may consummate differently than expected. and will always be
slightly different than anticipated. Even the most habitual action is recreated anew (Blumer.
1969: 17). Brushing one's teeth each night is similar, but never exactly the same as it was
the night before. The consummation is in this sense, the result of the emergent,
developmental process of a given act, and the passage to a new act.
Though the given impulse is resolved, action does not stop with consummation;
rather, the organism goes on with some other activity, act. and situation. As mentioned
above, the activity of dealing with emergent situations and reality is a continuous process.
The activity of an organism stops only when the organism is dead 1 Even sleeping is an
activity of a different sort, Thus an impulse may be resolved in various ways, from a
redirection of one's previous line of action in problematic situations, to the slipping of
Dne~ attention ttom one topic to another when one is dey-dresmmg. U an act is redirected,
such as when the car stalls, the consummation is simply the shift to a new stimulus to act.
The present impulse, then, may be resolv~ su~essfully, OF !Jlay change to some other
problem, but the active adjustment process IS continuous for living syst~ms.
.
Mead. describes consummation as giving the value of the act 10 one's expenence.
Consummation then is more than the completion of a given act, but is also an experience
of the organism'. "o;nsummation is satisfa~tion and, ~ you will, ~a~piness" ~ead.. 1938:
136). Having eaten, one may feel the physical expenence of s~tlatIon or ~~sf~uon. In
other acts, the physical experience of consummation may be difficult to distinguish from
1 The act beginning with impulse therefore should not be interpreted as an organism pr~ng from. some
occasion of disequilibrium with its surroundings to equilibrium (c.f. Johnathan Turner's ~te~~on of
Mead's act in Turner, 1989: 459-460. "For Mead. an impulse represents a state of disequilibrium or
tension between an organism and its environment- Turner. 1989: 459). Equilibrium is the .cessa~on of
self-organizing or adjustment activity and is not c~~ristic of life, processes. As menuon.ed J~ the
description of situations, adjustment to emergent reality I.S a ne~er ~nding 1?~ as the orgw.u.sm, hve:s.
Mead's description is characteristic of living systems which rnamtam conditions far from equilibrium in
adjusting 10 novel occurrences. This will be discussed further in Chapter three.
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other experiences occurring simultaneously; but with introspection. one can often
distinguish the ending of an act as a physical sensation. As an example, think of your last
thoughts or sentences, and there seems to be a shift or sensation "marker" of the pause
between thoughts or sentences. Mead suggests that various aesthetic experiences and
emotions may be associated with the consummation of acts. though emotional experiences
may be present throughout action (Baldwin, 1986: 59).
The value given to the consummation may help to preserve the act in memory,
making the experiences useful for future acts. Consummation gives the reality of the act in
the sense that what has occurred has occurred. Though all phases of the act are in
development and are basically indeterminate or emergent, a given act, when completed. has
a history which one can recall, though only indirectly through reconstruction of the past in
the present Thus the memory of a given act or experience can be value laden, often
depending on the success of the results. Events and objects within the act can be recalled
as "good. bad, indifferent, beautiful or ugly, and lovable or noxious" (Mead, 1938: 25).
In this way. perhaps, past experience as consummation of past acts may become
components of future acts, in anticipating the nature of the results of action. "In terms of
these values we can analyze the act" (Mead, 1938: 452).
From these analyses of the phases of the act, we can see that Mead describes the act
as an organic process of adjustment which encompasses both structure and indeterminacy.
Emergent reality is met by the impulses that occur with fluctuations in the adjustment
process. The impulses reorganize the past line of activity and mobilize future phases of the
act In the phase of perception, stimuli are selected and interpreted on the basis of past
experience to create an environment of objects meaningful for a hypothetical future line of
action. Through manipulation, the action is carried out, yet modifies perception and the
entire act by feedback from contact experience. With consummation, the impulse is
resolved and activity continues with new acts and situations. Emergent reality, therefore, is
structured and made meaningful to a future line of action. People act on the basis of the
meanings of things, and not by the causal force of the stimuli. The projected line of action,
however. meets the emerging reality of the present, an is therefore indeterminate, Action
then, does not lead simply from impulse to consummation in a direct causal sequence.
Mead's model of the act, instead, answer's to a reality of emergent unpredictable events,
and an organisms adjustment to such a world. Action is a process of development, and the
act is built up through interaction and the co-presence of the four phases. Mead's model of
the dynamic, holistic process of action fits an emergent, organic reality.
Mead's concept of the act has shown how action can be built up through the
meaningful interpretation of emergent reality. Much of the description of the act presented
so far applies to all higher animals, such as the hungry dog at the beginning of the section.
All animals go through some form of the four phases of the act in interpreting and adjusting
to the situations they meet Human beings, however, construct and control their actions in
certain ways differently than other animals. Both human and non-human animals act;
however. the discussion above has left implicit the social process of action. As mentioned
above in the introduction to the concept of situations, human conduct is characterized by
symbolic interaction with ourselves and others, a process which transforms radically both
the way human beings act toward the world and the way they experience the world.
The reason for leaving the social process implicit in the introduction to the act was
to show that all forms of action. including human conduct, have their roots in the process
of adjustment; therefore, many aspects of human conduct are shared with all other animals.
The social process of symbolic interaction is in essence an elaboration of the process by
which we adjust to, interpret, and act toward the situations we encounter. From this basic
description of the adjustive process, we can now build upon the characteristic processes by
which human beings construct lines of activity consciously, through the process of
symbolic interaction with others and themselves. From this process emerges the mind,
self, and society. Since these capacities arise as an elaboration of processes of the act,
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Mead can describe mind and consciousness as biological processes arising by virtue of our
symbolic interaction with others and oneself. He can therefore reject the dualistic
separation of mind and body, subjective and objective experiences, and describe instead the
physiological and social origins of psychical processes.
Mead's line of reasoning for this conclusion stems from his concepts of the distance
experience and contact experience. Mead proposes that people construct meaningful
objects by imposing contact experience on distant objects. Individuals can then act on the
basis of the meanings of the objects. This process of perception, however, involves two
phases for human beings from which emerge two sorts of meaning: implicit and explicit
meaning. Meaning is the process by which past experiences are interpreted with present
conditions to project a line of activity in the future. On the basis of implicit meaning, the
line of action is carried out directly. All animals act on the implicit meaning of things;
however, humans can act on the explicit meaning of things when the implicit meaning of
the object is pointed out, or indicated, to oneself. Through this process of indication,
explicit meanings become conscious, and human beings can then guide action consciously.
People can become conscious of the explicit meanings only through the social process of
symbolic interaction. Before describing the social process, however, I will briefly
elaborate the arguments leading to this point

Symbolic interaction
People act on the basis of the meaning of things. The relationship of meaning and
action was mentioned earlier in the context of the act in the relationship of perception and
manipulation especially. I mentioned that in perception, together with contributions of
other stages, the environment is built up both as stimuli which release the tendencies of the
impulse, and the interpretive process which the organism brings to stimuli. We do not act
upon the stimulus alone, but act as a result of this co-determinant organization of
experience. Interactionists refer to that which is indicated as objects. In this section, I will
describe Mead's concept of the object as the integration of experience and meaning,
meaning which forms the basis of action.

Objects:
The organization of the world into objects involves the relationship of contact and
distant experiences described above. As mentioned, these are Mead's functional
alternatives to the philosophical concepts of primary and secondary qualities. Primary
qualities are mass, solidity and resistance to movement, the basic physical properties of
matter and energy. Secondary properties are those experiences had by a perceiver of a
thing at a distance. They include color, shape. sound, taste, and odor. Mead rejected the
notion that primary and secondary properties should be separated when used to describe the
experience of organisms, especially when they are split into subjective and objective
experience. Descartes, for example, split reality into the mental "substance" of subjectivity
and the material substance of "extended things." Mead considered the experience of both
primary and secondary qualities to occur through physiological processes of adjustment to
the reality of physical things; thus, there is no clear distinction between subjectivity and
objectivity. Further, he claimed that such a distinction tends to lead to dualistic separations
between the perceived and the perceiver.
Mead's task, then, is to describe the functional relationship between "objective"
contact with emergent reality, and the "subjective" experience of meaningful objects upon
which we act Mead describes this functional relationship as that between contact and
distance experience of objects. According to Mead, we are able to act on the basis of
meanings of things by giving distant objects contact characteristics. The contact is both an
active manipulation of things and a sensory process of confirmation, and the distant
experience is a projection of contact qualities from a distance. It is through this relationship
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that the individual perceives an object in terms of a hypothetical future relationship which
guides action in the present.
The ability to act upon objects at a distance evolved as an elaboration of the action
toward contact objects. For Mead, experience has its reality in contact As mentioned, the
contact experience is gained through manipulation of physical things. In a more basic
sense, however, contact is the direct adjustment to emergent reality. The living system is in
contact with its surroundings in the constant exchange of energy and matter by which the
living system maintains itself. In this sense, contact experience is common to all
organisms. The amoeba's world, according to Mead, is only of contact experience. It
adjusts to the proximal conditions of its immediate surroundings. It takes in food when it
contacts the food's chemical signal and avoids damaging materials, such as corrosive
chemicals, when it contacts them. The sense organs work by contact and proximity at their
basic level. The rods and cones in the retinae fire when struck by photons. Likewise, the
interaction of neurons in the brain is proximal. Neurons fire when they receive
electrochemical signals from neighboring neurons.I Contact, then, is both a basic
experience and a basic activity of adjusting living systems.
Most of our experience, however, consists of objects perceived at a distance. Our
ability to perceive distant objects goes beyond the direct adjustment to contact experience.
Only a portion of our world or experience is of direct contact. 'We do not live in a world
of photochemical work of the retinae. We live in a world of distant objects, of
automobiles, of symbols" (Mead, 1927: 117). While manipulation deals with contact of a
thing, perception is largely of distant objects, and most of our sense organs, vision
primarily, deal with things at a distance. Distance experience gives such properties as
color, shape, sound and odor, but does not give directly the physical resistance of a thing.
This ability to act on things at a distance goes beyond the contact experience. "Energy
comes in from the sun and currents move the amoeba about, but in this instance the
response is to the contact object and experience, not to the distant. The amoeba cannot get
into relationship with objects at a distance" (Mead, 1927: 117).
We are able, then, to act on things without first having contact. This is an obvious
capacity, but what is the process by which this is possible? As mentioned, Mead suggested
that the relationship with objects at a distance is possible by imposing contact experiences
on distant experiences. What the organism adds to the experience are aspects of contact in
terms of a future relationship. The contact is experienced only in the sense of an implicit
response or tendency. One does not feel the actual texture of a brick wall at a distance.
"For general pwposes the percept has contact content Dot different from actual contact
experience. I need not have contact experience of a distant stimulus to be able to see it as
hard, soft., cold, pleasurable, or painful" (Mead. 1927: 125). This content comes from
binding past experiences or their generalized qualities, to present experiences in order to
anticipate future relationships among things. The nature of this time binding and its
development of this capacity in humans was mentioned above. This future relationship
becomes the meaning of that distant object
The object, then, as Mead uses the term, has two aspects. An object is both the
sensory experience of a thing and the tendency toward some future relationship with a
thing. The object as experience includes its distance qualities, the so-called "secondary
qualities," and also the actual somatosensory experience (touch) should we be manipulating
the object at the time. It is the second aspect, however, which relates the object to action.
The tendency toward some future relationship with the object is the meaning of the object
For example, the meaning of the armchair is something in which the perceiver will sit
Perceiving the meaning of a thing as future contact does not replace the distance
experience we have of a thing. Instead, both forms of experience occur simultaneously in
one's field of experience. "There are distant objects, but what they are in perception is
I d.
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contact experience that we may have when we get hold of them" (Mead, 1927: 120). In
other words, we experience shapes, patterns, and colors of the changing visual field among
other sensory experiences, but we organize these experiences in terms of some active
relation we would have with them in the future, such as would be had in manipulation of
the object To give a more concrete example, we can see this simultaneous relation in how
we deal with three-dimensional objects. H one looks at an armchair from the side, it's
immediate "raw" appearance shows that there is not space enough between the arms to fit
one's body; however, we know despite this visual information that the chair is wide
enough to sit in. We add contact content to the visual image of the chair. Similarly, Mead
gives the example of a penny which when manipulated by the fmgers may appear as an
oval, or a line if only one side is seen. Yet at the same time we see it as an oval, we also
see the penny as round This is not a case of one visual image or sense datum being fused
to another. "The datum in this case is there never as a mere visual content but as an
indication of the experience of manipulation, and our percept of the penny is then in terms
of the action under the conditions of the most advantageous conduct" (Mead, 1936: 128).
The round penny is advantageous in the sense that we use and grasp a round shape, not an
oval shape, and we act toward to the penny as round, thus the round penny is the dominant
nature of what we see.
Through the relationship between contact and distant objects, therefore, Mead
describes a functional relationship between perception and action. The meaning of an
object is an expression of some future form of conduct in relation to that object The
stimulus, or sensory experience by itself has no motivating force in action without being
related to the tendency to act in relation to it Therefore, we act not on the basis of stimuli,
but on the basis of the meaning of objects. Action, such as the form of manipulation, is
organized and guided according to the meaning of objects one perceives. Thus meaning is,
in this sense, the organization of means to ends which leads the act to conswnmation.
Again, there is indeterminacy in this organization of experience. Objects and meaning are
not static products of perception which control action, but rather are built up throughout the
act, The distant object has a hypothetical nature which is confirmed, dis-confirmed, and
modified with each moment and each change of conditions. Thus, objects and their
meanings, as with the entire act, are developed in an ongoing manner and are emergent,
Inmlicit and explicit meaning:
Although all animals act on the meaningful perception of objects, human beings add
a future process of perception by which we become conscious of the meanings of things
and can guide actions consciously. Mead expressed the difference between these forms of
perception as implicit and explicit meaning. The relation of these forms of meaning to
action can be observed in the way humans and other animals control their conduct Human
beings deal with objects differently than do other animals. An ape in a zoo, acting on an
impulse of hunger, reaches for a banana and consumes it, A boy in a kitchen, acts on a
similar impulse of hunger, sees some bananas on the kitchen counter and begins to reach
for one. The boy then stops his action, however, when he remembered his mother was
going to use the bananas for a pudding.
What is the difference between the act of the ape and the boy? The difference,
according to Mead, is in perceiving and acting on the meaning of the banana as an object.
The boy constructed his line of activity through two phase of perception. "There are two
different phases of perception: (1) selection of the stimuli - we approach the hammer to
grasp it, and thus the later pan of the act is present in the earlier stage; (2) the response that
brings this attitude into the experience to develop the control that we exercise. The laner is
what social conduct has established When we perceive, we not only control the approach,
but our attitude to it stands out as an experience that can control the whole process" (Mead,
1927: 133). The first phase is the implicit meaning of an object and the second involves
the explicit meaning of an object. It is the second phase where experience becomes
conscious.
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The first phase is implicit in the sense that the stimuli are organized according to
their tendency toward response. As mentioned, this tendency comes from anticipating
contact experiences on distant objects in organizing the form of manipulation the organism
will have with it. Mead often refers to this tendency as the "attitude" of conduct toward a
thing. ''We can speak of attitude as the tendency to move toward [or in relation to] an
object which changes as the approach is made - all of which enters the object and make it
what it is. Our perception involves the attitude of going out, covering the distance from the
organism to its content, and this is part of meaning" (Mead, 1927: 127) The attitude does
not determine the response, but is built up as an organization of movement, and modified
as the action proceeds.! Implicit meaning, then, is the direction of conduct in relation to
the stimulus, by which an act is guided to consummation.
In the second phase the implicit meaning of a thing becomes explicit. This is
accomplished through the process of indication. In the second phase of perception this
tendency to act is itself experienced and thus can become a new standpoint for organizing
action. The meaning of the object is explicit because the tendency is pointed out or
indicated to oneself. With the process of indication. the tendency becomes an experience,
and, just as other experiences or stimuli, it can be re-associated with other lines of action
organized on the basis of memories or new information in one's surroundings. The boy,
for example, indicates to himself his own actions of getting the banana and then remembers
his mother's future use for the bananas, and possibly imagines her anger should he take
one having been told not to. By indicating his action, the boy is able to reorganize his line
of activity and act by choice rather by reflex. With indication the implications of the
implicit meaning enter experience and can be used to reinterpret the act at hand, and modify
or redirect action before it is carried out In this way, the anticipated line of action itself can
become an object in addition to the thing one perceives. With indication of explicit
meaning, one becomes conscious of his or her own actions and those of others. The
conscious or explicit meaning of objects and actions as objects allows greater control of
emerging action.
Notice that Mead calls these two types of perception phases and not stages. This
implies that explicit meaning need not proceed sequentially from implicit meaning; rather,
the two forms may occur simultaneously. Explicit meaning is a future processing of
implicit meaning, and is therefore dependent on implicit meaning. One can, however, act
on implicit meaning alone, such as when one grabs a doorknob and opens a door without
taking note of one's actions. If the door is locked, however, the person indicates the fact to
himself or herself. Many habitual or "automatic" activities are organized through implicit
meaning alone and most acts of human beings involve both implicit and explicit meanings
in carrying acts to consummation.
Non-human animals, however, cannot act upon the explicit meaning of things.
Objects in their surroundings have only implicit meaning by which they organize the
manipulation they have around the goal of consummation. The line of action organized
may be quite elaborate, such as the acts of lions on the hunt. Non-human animals,
however, cany implicit meaning directly through to consummation. The tendencies to act

1 I will use the term implicit meaning instead of attitude, because the later term often has a different

meaning in psychology and in common usage. For instance, one has an attitude toward racism. Other
psychological theories often give attitude a deterministic form, such I.ha1 attitude sets the behavior one will
have toward a thing: thus if you can know a person's attitudes. you can predict their behavior in some
given situation. Mead's use is of a more basic organization of behavior. Mead's use of n Attitude" is
comparable (0 its use in aeronautics, the attitude or orientation of approach. which is constantly adjusted as

one flies along.
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are, in a sense, simply released and are not presented back to oneself to be acted upon. 1
Non-human animals. then, cannot act upon the explicit meaning of objects because they
cannot present the implication of action to themselves before the act occurs. This capacity,
according to Mead, requires the social process. or the capacity to interact symbolically with
others and oneself.
I will discuss the social process below, but we might first ask why explicit meaning
is important in organizing action. What does this capacity allow? As mentioned, the social
process allows the implications of future relationships of objects to be experienced before
they are carried out. This process essentially makes the meaning of objects conscious.
They are conscious in that they are presented to oneself as objects of experience.
Subsequently, one can become aware of oneself as an object, a capacity which other
animals do not have. Others can also become conscious objects and their actions can be
understood in relation to one's own actions. This is possible because explicit meaning as
represented by symbols such as language, can be shared among those for whom the
symbols have the same meaning. Thus, we are able to coordinate activities socially on the
basis of shared meanings and common definitions of objects and acts. This capacity for
symbolic interaction is instrumental to the formation and maintenance of society. The use
of symbols and shared meanings by the individual in guiding action is what Mead calls
mind and thinking. The mind, then, is not a spirit or substance separate from the material
world such as in Cartesian dualism. The mind is instead a functional relationship of the
organism and its surroundings, the manifestation in the brain of the organism of the social
process of symbolic interaction,
Symbolic interaction:
The discussion above has concentrated upon the biological or physiological
elements of human action, which interactionists recognize as the foundation of behavior. I
will continue to focus upon physiological aspects of human conduct as we briefly discuss
symbolic interactionsism and its related processes described above. Mead, and Herbert
Blumer especially, recognize that only through acknowledgement of the many social factors
in the human conduct could a theory of human action and group life be adequate. It is in
their treatment of the social processes of human conduct and group life where the
perspective of symbolic interactionism is most unique and insightful. Mead and Blumer
considered the use of symbolic interaction, and the use of language especially, to be of
primary importance in understanding the nature of human action. According to Blumer,
people can act on the basis of meanings which arise from social interaction one has with
others and oneself (Blumer, 1969: 3). Only through living in a social environment can one
gain language, and with language the enhanced capacities of experiencing and adjusting to
the world. through the mind. self, and society. As a sociological perspective, then, the
concepts of symbolic interactionism deal with people acting in and adjusting to a social
world---a world where people converse with others and coordinate their actions socially.
Herbert Blumer and other interactionists have used these concepts to analyze many
important sociological aspects of the social world. such as social organizations,
socialization, social problems, and other topics. Since the focus of this paper is to compare
interactionist and neurophysiological aspects of human action. I will introduce the social
factors of human conduct emphasizing the physiological processes which Mead recognized
as important in mediating symbolic interaction.
Gestures and si2Dificant symbols:

I Though the responses are released in this sense, they are not organized and carried out in a deterministic
fashion. 'The action which the animal starts may be blocked or modified at any point, and lhus even
implicit meaning is developed ongoingly,
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The capacity for symbolic interaction among humans has its roots in the less
complex communication of animals. Mead compared animal and human communication to
trace these roots (Mead. 1934). According to Mead. the primary forms of communication
among higher animals is the gesture. The gesture is an overt behavior which is directed
toward other animals. Examples of communication through gestures include various calls,
and species-characteristic movements of body pans or displays such as plumage, or
sometimes chemical signals such as odors. An animal's gesture functions as
communication by signaling to other animals some future activity or event, For example,
the bird may call signaling others of danger, or the dog growls signaling its intention of
future aggressive activity. "The term 'gesture' may be identified with these beginnings of
social acts which are stimuli for the response of other forms" (Mead. 1934: 43). Both the
gestures and their responses can be innate or learned, or a mixture of both. In either case,
they serve to alert other animals of furore conditions.
In relation to the act. then, the gesture is an overt manipulation which conveys to
other animals information about the whole act (Mead, 1934: 43). Other animals select
gestures as stimuli, and as impulse for redirecting their actions; thus the gesture
communicates a "truncated" act to other animals. For example, the dog's growl is a sign of
the whole aggressive act (Baldwin, 1986: 73). The importance of an animal's gesture in
communication, then, is that it allows other animals to adjust to the prediction of future
action before the actual event occurs. Rather than anacking immediately, the dog can signal
its anger to the other dog who might then back off; thus a potentially damaging conflict is
avoided. Gestures may also signal danger, such as the approach of predators, before their
attack occurs. The use of gestures, then, is adaptive for the survival of social animals.
Animals communicate by adjusting directly to the implicit meanings of the gestures
of other animals through an exchange of conditioned behaviors. Mead calls the exchange
of gestures among animals a "conversation of gestures" (Mead, 1934: 43). Mead uses the
example of a dog fight "The act of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for his
response. There is then a relationship between these two; and as the act is responded to by
the other dog, it. in turn, undergoes change" (1934: 42-43). The growl of one dog evokes
a growl in the other, to which the first dog adjusts with another growl or behavior. Since
other animals interpret a gesture by relating it to a behavior that is carried out directly, the
gesture has implicit meaning to those observing it, The meaning is implicit since it calls out
a direct response. The animal interprets the gesture it selects as a signal for some later stage
of the act that allows an animal to organize a response in the present 1
Since the implicit meaning is sufficient for organizing a response to a gesture, an
animal need Dot be aware of the meaning of the gesture in order to adjust to its predictive
information. The meaning of the action need not be indicated, or pointed out to oneself, for
some form of responses to take place. 'We do not assume that the dog says to himself, 'If
the animal comes from this direction he is going to spring at my throat and I will turn in
such a way" (Mead, 1934: 43). Instead, the animals adjust directly to the implicit meanings
of each other's approaches. One dog's gesture as a stimulus is interpreted only insofar as it
signals the organization of a corresponding action. "The mechanism of meaning is thus
present in the social act before the emergence of consciousness or awareness of meaning
occurs" (Mead, 1934: 77). Human beings often respond to gestures without explicitly
indicating them. A person may smile at another and that person may "automatically" smile
back.

1 Though animals respond to gestures directly. Mead does not describe the conversation of gestures as a
mechanistic exchange of stimuli and responses. As mentioned above. even action based on implicit
meaning is still an interpretive and indeterminate process by which the organism selects and interprets the
stimuli on the basis of its orientation to the impulse. There is always a degree of flexibility and
indeterminacy in the type of response an animal may make to a gesture or to any other stimuli
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It is, however, through the self-reflexive process of indication that human beings
do become aware of the implicit meaning of gestures, such that the meanings become
explicit This occurs when the gesture calls out the same meaning to both the sender and
the receiver. The gesture not only calls out a future line of response, but isolates the line of
action as an experience, such that we can experience the meaning of the gesture and use it
as a standpoint for controlling actions. In such cases the gesture is significant, and when
significant gestures are represented by symbols such as words, people interact with

significant symbols.
According to Mead, the ability to interact with significant gestures or symbols
evolved from the use of the vocal gesture. With the vocal gesture such as a spoken word.
the speaker hears essentially the same sound as the listener. This distinguishes it from
other gestures such as facial expressions, where the person seldom can see his or her own
gestures. "The importance. then, of the vocal gesture is that the person can hear what he
says and in hearing what he says its tending to respond as the other person responded"
(Mead, 1934: 69-70). In other words, the vocal gesture can represent the same meaning to
both the speaker and the listener. For example, if two people are in a room reading and the
phone rings one may say to the other "get that, will you?" Both individuals understand
English, so when the phone rings the the speaker assumes the other understands the action
he is requesting. Both the speaker and listener identify the same future act, and understand
who is being asked to perform the act Thus.the person it able to communicate his
intentions to the other by exhanging vocal gestures.
"It is in this which gives such peculiar importance to the vocal gesture: it
is one of those social stimuli which affect the form that makes it in the same
fashion that it affects the form when made by another. That is, we can hear
ourselves talking, and the import of what we say is the same to ourselves that it
is to others" [Mead, 1934: 62].

If a gesture has a same, or a functionally similar meaning to both those receiving the
gesture and those using it. then that gesture is significant When the gesture is a symbol,
such as a spoken or written word, then interaction is taking place using significant
symbols. "Gestures become significant symbols when they implicitly arouse in an
individual making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are suppose to
arouse, in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed ... " (Mead,
1934: 47) Though in Mead's terms the "same" meanings are communicated, he implies
that meanings people interpret are functionally similar rather than numerically identical.
The word "ouch," for example, does not arouse the same response in all persons who hear
it When one person tells the other to get the phone, they share a similar idea of the future
act of getting the phone. Words do not transfer fixed meanings from one person to
another, rather, symbols, like any other stimuli or emergent events, are selected and
interpreted, and therefore their meaning is formulated in use through an indeterminate
process. Though both understand the meanings of the symbols used, the speaker interprets
his relation to the situation differently than the other. When people do not share the
meaning of symbols, such as when one asks directions of someone who doesn't speak
English, those symbols are not significant; however, they are both involved in a significant
situation in that both know they are misunderstanding each other. Thus, people can share
the meanings of words, acts, objects, and situations.
Symbols have the same meaning for the speaker and listener by being perceived in
ways which callout a similar future relationship concerning the objects, actions, or
situations indicated. Through perception of the symbol, both experience that future
relationship as explicit meaning, rather than the implicit meaning characteristic to
conversations of gestures. In non-symbolic interaction, an animal sees the gesture of the
other which has implicit meaning for future action. but the animal making the gesture does
not perceive its own gesture in the same way. With symbolic interaction, the gesture made
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toward another is also made to oneself. Thus as the other perceives the gesture in terms of
a future activity, the individual making the gesture will have perceived a similar future
relationship, the one intended to be communicated. Indication, then, is an internalization of
the processes of making significant gestures to others. One's own gestures are significant
to oneself as well as to others if the meanings of the symbols are shared; thus in symbolic
interaction, one is making explicitly meaningful gestures to oneself. "That is fundamental
for any language; if it is going to be language one has to understand what what he is
saying, has to affect himself as he affects others" (Mead 1934: 75). In the context of the
act, symbolic interaction involves a self-reflexive feedback between the phases of
manipulation and perception. Symbols and gestures made by individuals are forms of
manipulation which are simultaneously perceived by oneself. Therefore, one indicates the
resultant action of the act to oneself as well as others.
Indication of the explicit meanings of symbols or objects mediates perception and
oven action. "With us the individual does not carry out the act, he only indicates it to
himself and others, It is, then, this mechanism of indication. showing the final result of the
act in the present activity, that gives importance to language and communication. We
emphasize this meaning of the symbol, the later part of the act insofar as it determines the
present situation" (Mead., 1927: 160). The indication of the future line of activity can be
used as a new standpoint for organizing actions in the present If one moves to open a
door and someone tells the person it is locked, the words are interpreted in terms of the
explicit meaning of what will happen if the person tries the door; thus, that person can
reorganize his or her actions before carrying out the act In this way, one can gain further
control of actions by use of the explicit meanings of things represented by significant
symbols. Since symbols can be shared, people can fit together and organize actions
socially, rather than through individual trial and error.
People interact symbolically with themselves as well as others. Symbolic
interaction allows people to understand each other, communicate, share ideas, and
coordinate actions on the basis of the explicit meaning of objects. Symbolic interaction also
allows the individual to organize his or her actions through the inner conversation an
individual carries on with himself or herself. People talk to themselves through the same
social process by which they talk to others, and Mead called this "inner forum" that which
constitutes the field of activity called mind (Baldwin. 1986: 81). Mind. like the process of
indication, is an internalized form of symbolic interaction. "The internalization in our
experience of the external conversations of gestures which we carry on with other
individuals in the social process is the essence of thinking ..." (Mead, 1934: 47) Mind
and thinking exist only where there is exchange of significant symbols. "Only in terms of
gestures as significant symbols is the existence of mind or intelligence possible; for only in
terms of gestures which are significant symbols can thinking-which is simply an
internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself by means of such
gestures-take place" (Mead, 1934: 47). A social world of symbolic interaction therefore
precedes the existence of any individual mind.
Mead's concept of mind rejects in several ways the dualistic separation between
mind and body. First, it claims that the mind emerges as a functional process of symbolic
interaction with ourselves and others which we experience in addition to our perceptual
experience and physiological activity. The functional relationship resolves the gap between
an "objective" material world and a "subjective" world of conscious experience. Second,
the individual mind is not isolated from the minds of others in that people think using the
same significant symbols as others, thus ideas can be shared.
Objects:
Indication of the explicit meanings of things through symbolic interaction with
oneself and others gives the experience of objects a "new content" which goes beyond the
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implication of contact experience in the distant object By perceiving a language symbol,
the individual organizes an object which can substitute for other forms of experience. "In
auditory experience we make use of speech in place of contact experience. We may have
experience of the dog from the mere word 'dog.' If someone denies that we are having this
experience, saying that our definition is wrong, we appeal to a dictionary, still having no
contact experience with the dog. Here is the difference between the word and image"
(1927: 125). The word can substitute for the distance imagery and contact experience with
the dog. "Speech stands for the content of the act itself; we can tell ourselves and others
what a spade is. This content mediates what we ourselves feel in a spade, it describes the
perceptual object, so that language is a medium for communication. It makes the content
explicit so that we can tell others what the object is." By sharing the explicit meanings of
objects with others, people can coordinate their activities according to shared definitions of
the objects.
With symbolic interaction a wider variety of objects may be identified and acted
upon, giving the human being a world of experience vastly more complex than that of other
animals. Herbert Blumer, for example, defined explicitly meaningful objects as "anything
that can be indicated. anything that is pointed to or referred to. He distinguishes three
categories of objects: "(a) physical objects, such as chairs, trees, or bicycles; (b) social
objects, such as students, priests, a president. a mother. or a friend; and (c) abstract
objects, such as moral principles, philosophical doctrines, or ideas such as justice,
exploitation, or compassion" (Blumer, 1969: 10-11). Thus, office workers can organize
their activities around an abstract object such as a publishing deadline, whereas animals are
limited to acting upon concrete things or physical events. Objects for human beings then
may extend beyond immediate space and time, and may be both fictional and real.
tl

Social coordination of actions. Role-taking. self. and joint action:
Just as people organize actions around the shared definitions of objects, individuals
also act towards others and themselves as objects. Indicating the self and others as
meaningful objects is part of the process of coordinating actions socially. There are three
aspects of the social coordination of action: taking the role of others, taking the role of
oneself, and the joint actions identified in interaction,
An essential part of the process of coordinating one's actions with others involves
predicting what another will do in a social situation. One predicts and adjusts his or her
own line of action largely on the basis of both what another is observed to do, and what
one predicts another will do. In order to predict the actions of others. one must, in effect,
put oneself in the imaginary standpoint of another. This process Mead calls "taking the role
of the other" or role-taking (Mead, 1934: 73,109, 138,153). A person anticipates
another's behavior by drawing upon the words, gestures, and mannerisms that he or she
understands from past experience with the other. During interaction, the person evokes in
himself or herself the imagined responses that approximate those of the other. These
imagined responses of the other can be used to anticipate what the other will do. and how
the individual should act in return. In the example above, the phone rang, and the man may
have started to ask his friend to get the phone. but stopped when remembered that she hales
to answer phones. In this case, he organized his activities by taking the role of his friend
People also take the role of others to understand another's past actions. The man, for
instance. might later ask himself: "why doesn't she like to answer the phone?"
Role-taking is involved in coordinating activity with those we know from past
experience, but also with those whom we don't know. People in most situations act in
more or less predictable ways, and individuals and people organize their own actions by
predicting some aspect of the actions of others. We know. for example, that store clerks.
police officers. teachers, or pedestrians tend to act in predictable ways in the situations in
which we encounter them. People can coordinate actions by anticipating actions
characteristic of the roles people people play in their everyday activities. People organizing
their own actions rely heavily upon the roles they expect others to take. Subsequently,
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people tend to act in ways appropriate the the meanings of roles they have come to share
simply because doing so allows a less problematic interpretation of one's social world.
Although people may act in predictable ways, the roles they play do not determine their
actions. People often act unpredictably, and seldom act exactly as one predicts. Also, the
specific roles are not always pre-defined for social situations. In every situation, the roles
of others and oneself are interpreted anew, and the success in one's role-taking in
anticipating the actions of others is confirmed in actual interaction; therefore, roles and
role-taking, just as all phases of action, emerge from the formative and indeterminate
process of interaction, both in organizing our own actions and assessing those of others.
According to Mead, role-taking occurs in various degrees of complexity (Mead,
1934: 61). The character actor strives for the highest degree of role-taking; however, role
taking is also a basic component of any symbolic interaction. Mead described role-taking
as instrumental to all types of interpersonal behavior. We take the roles of others habitually
in communicating with oneself and others. Role-taking is implicit in Mead's definition of
the significant symbol in which the symbol evokes similar responses or explicit meanings
in both the speaker and listener. Role-taking is also involved in the internalized
conversation of the mind. 'We are, especially through the use of the vocal gestures,
continually arousing in ourselves those responses which we call out in other persons, so
that we are taking the attitudes of the other person in our own conduct" (Mead, 1934: 69).
Role-taking, according to Mead, is a process essential for thinking. 'Where the response
of the other person is called out and becomes a stimulus to control his action, then he has
the meaning of the other person's act in his own experience. That is the general mechanism
of what we term 'thought,' for in order that thought may exist there must be symbols,
vocal gestures generally, which arouse in the individual himself the response which he is
calling out in the other, and such that from the point of view of that response he is able to
direct his later conduct" (1934: 73). Role-taking, then, is crucial to our own ability to
think and also to understand others' actions and communication. For example, when
someone observes communication in which he or she is not participating, such as in
watching a television show, one takes the role of those involved in order to understand
what the actors are doing.
Individuals also take the roles of themselves in coordinating actions with others, a
process by which the self becomes an object Coordinating actions with others requires
that the individual assess not only the other's general intent in a situation, but also the
other's responses toward himself, and the person's own responses and feelings toward the
recipient or observer of his action. Just as one's conception of the roles of others are
useful in guiding actions, an individual takes the role of the self in organizing actions, both
in choosing and inhibiting responses. People present different "selves" for different
situations. We are sometimes the "customer," sometimes the "employee," the "son,"
"daughter," "student," or "stranger." The roles or selves we take on, in most
circumstances, are those which we are trying to make fit the roles of others in the situation
at hand.
The self as an object emerges through the process ofindication. When objects are
indicated there is self-reference, the objects are pointed out explicitly to oneself as
experience. This is especially the case when one indicates himself or herself directly.
When individuals indicate their own actions in the future or past, they are taking the role of
a future or past self. For example, the anticipation of getting ice cream involves an
implication of a future self with ice cream. Similarly, one reconstructs one's own past
actions by making the past self an object The self, then, arises out of the "inner forum"
one caries on in thinking.
The social self, however, is only a functional part of one's total experience. A
person has conversation with oneself and others, but one also has personal experiences,
emotions, and sensations from one's unique standpoint which cannot be shared. An
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individual may describe what another may see, but does not actually see through his or her
eyes. Thus the self has a dual nature. Though the self is created as a conscious object
through the reflexive process of indication, one maintains the fullness of one's own
experience. The self is the object which is indicated by the social process, named in
various ways in different situations and referred to in relation to objects and others. There
is also the aspect of self which is doing the indicating, carrying out actions and
experiencing a world of sensations. There is, then, the self as process as well as the self as
the object indicated. Both operate simultaneously and are interdependent 1 Biological
processes are essential to the processes of the social self, but the social self can regulate
lower processes such as the impulse. For example, one may pinch one's finger in a
crowded auditorium but repress the impulse to cry out. Symbolic interaction, then,
provides a new degree of flexibility and control for guiding actions and coordinating
activities with those of others.
The capacity to organize activities by indicating the self and others as objects
develops in early childhood as infants first learn to use significant symbols. 2 The child
first interacts with objects on the basis of how others, especially his or her parents, have
interacted with and referred to them. Thus the child first takes the role of its parents in
designating things. The child also learns to indicate himself or herself in relation to the
variety of gestures and activities which parents make in referring to the child; for example,
the mother asks "where is baby's nose?" In answering, the baby is indicating himself or
herself as an object The remarks that the baby can remember and repeat gradually increase
in complexity from simple words to sentences, to entire conversations which can be
rehearsed in imagination (Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin, 1975).
As the child gains more experience and encounters a wider variety of others, it
becomes no longer necessary to refer to specific others to organize his or her conduct The
child may take the role of a specific other in his or her inner conversation, such as the
child's mothers voice saying "don't cross the street;" or may take the role of a more
generalized other, such as "the teachers. Subsequently, the child learns to present
different selves in different situations, becoming a son, friend, student, and so forth. The
social self and the others to which individuals refer become increasingly complex. Adults in
their inner conversations can interact with oneself, specific people, imaginary people or
"generalized others" which is an abstracted composite of our interactions with others. A
politician may ask herself what the voters think, and the "voice" she hears answering is the
generalized other (Baldwin, 1986: 82). Social selves also become more complex as a
reference of action and thought, and the self changes over time as the experiences one
draws upon change.
Coordinating activities socially involves taking the role of others and oneself.
There is, however, a third element to the social coordination that Herbert Blumer calls
"joint action." People interacting in social situations tend to share a mutual understanding
or definitions of the situation; for example, both the customer and the cashier in a store
designate their situations and activities as those appropriate for business transactions. They
organize their activities partly on the basis of past experiences of handling business
transactions. These people would interact differently at a cocktail party. According to
Blumer, people engaged in such mutual adjustment and designation of roles, selves, and
situations are engaged in joint action.
II

1Mead distinguishes these dual aspects of the self as the ~I" and the ~ me" (ci. Baldwin, 1986: 115-122).
2 Several authors have described in detail the symbolic interactionist concepts of socialization and child
development. Mead also wrote extensively about child development (d. Baldwin, 1986: 89·107, and
Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin, 1976). The discussion here barely skims the surface of the interactionist
descriptions of the development of the self and the social individual.
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"As stated earlier, human group life consists of, and exists in, the fitting
of li.nes of action to each other by the members of the group. Such articulation of
the lines of action gives rise to and constitutes "joint action"-a societal
organization of conduct of different acts of diverse participants. A joint action,
while made up of diverse component acts that enter into its formation, is different
from anyone of them and from their mere aggregation. The joint action has a
distinctive character in its own right, a character that lies in the articulation or
linkage as apart from what may be articulated or linked. Thus, the joint action
may be identified as such and may be spoken of and handled without having to
break it down into the separate acts that comprise it. This is what we do when
we speak: of such things as marriage, a trading transaction, war, a parliamentary
discussion, or a church service. Similarly, we can speak of the collectivity that
engages in joint action without having to identify the individual members of that
collectivity. as we do in speaking of a family. a business corporation, a church. a
university, or a nation. It is evident that the domain of the social scientist is
constituted precisely by the study of joint action and of the collectivities that
engage in joint action [Blumer, 1969: 17].
It

When we speak of the interaction between customer and cashier, we do not need to
describe their every word and action, but can refer to the episode in terms of "customer
relations" or "making a purchase" and so forth. Blumer implies. however, that joint action
is more than a convenient means by which we can abstract descriptions of the complex acts
of human groups. Joint action is itself an essential characteristic of how the reality of
human group life is organized.
Common definitions of objects. self. and others are shared by participants as they
interpret and make sense of joint actions. Social life. however, is not an expression of pre
established joint actions. Joint actions are always undergoing a process of formation.
Even the most ritualized activities are formed anew in the sense that individuals are still
constructing lines of action and fitting them to the actions of others (Blumer, 1969: 18).
Since one can never predict exactly what another will do in a situation. there is an inherent
degree of uncertainty in joint action. In other words. collective behavior is emergent.
Situations. then, are not streams of "organized" actions. such as a ritual, or "norms" of
appropriate conduct, or "roles" that reflect the norms. The joint act is primarily an
"organizing" process emerging from the ongoing process of the participants' devising lines
of action in light of what they indicate.
Blumer's concept of joint action ties the "macro" world or "large-scale" social
phenomena to the "micro" world of individuals interacting symbolically. Sociologists who
study sociocultural systems such as complex organizations and institutions study. in pan,
the joint actions individuals create. modify, and maintain through interaction. The process
of joint action outlines how social levels of organization transcend the action of individuals
of which society is comprised.
To speak of society or collective behavior as a transcendent level of organization
does not imply that human group life is a mere aggregation of the psychological makeups
of the individuals. Symbolic interaction occurs among biological human beings. The
psychological and physiological processes of the individual become social by the very fact
that people indicate things in the world, rather than respond to them. The process of
indication and of symbolic interaction with objects, others, and oneself involves
transcending an individual organism's direct reaction to a physical environment. Meaning,
as it is entailed in this process of interpretation, is at its roots social. Human action. then, is
built up from a biological process by which the entire organism adjusts to emerging
situations, but also encompasses the social process of indication shaped by social
interaction. Thus, human action is primarily a social process. Society, likewise, must be
understood and described in the terms of the joint actions of individuals. Society emerges
from the fitting together of peoples lines of activity on the basis of the meanings that are
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created in interaction and shared through the process of symbolic interaction. In short,
society is symbolic interaction.
Sllmmaa:

To summarize Mead's concepts of action and symbolic interaction presented in this
chapter, I will return to Herbert Blumer's three premises of symbolic interaction.
"Symbolic interaetionism rests in the last analysis on three simple premises."
Premise 1: "Human Beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the
things have for them" (Blumer, 1969: 2).
People do not act on the basis of stimuli alone; rather, stimuli, or any changing
event or condition, are actively selected and interpreted by the individual. The individual
builds up a world of meaningful objects through an interpretive process in which past
experiences are used to interpret present conditions to project a future line of activity in
relation to those objects. The interpretation of some furore relation one will have with an
object gives the meaning of that object All animals act on the implicit meaning of objects
when the future action called out by interpretation of stimuli is carried out directly. Human
beings, however, can also act on the explicit meaning of objects in which the future relation
given to the object is indicated to the self. In such cases where explicit meaning is used in
the interpretation process, Blumer's second premise applies.
Premise 2: "The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social
interaction one has with one's fellows [and with oneself]" (Blumer, 1969: 2).
The explicit meanings of objects derive from the use of significant gestures or
symbols which indicate the same future relationship of objects to oneself as others.
Through the use of significant symbols, the explicit meanings by which people interpret
objects can be shared with others. Through this process of symbolic interaction,
individuals can act toward a thing in the way others act toward the person with regard to a
thing (Blumer, 1969: 4) This is the process of role-taking, in which people are able to
indicate to themselves their own actions from the imagined viewpoints of others, either
specific or generalized others. In this way. people learn the meanings of things which arise
in social interaction with others. A person can also take the role of himself or herself and.
therefore, interact symbolically with himself or herself. From the indication of explicit
meanings to oneself arise conscious objects in experience, including physical, social, and
abstract objects (Blumer, 1969: 10-11). Others and oneself also emerge as meaningful
objects. From the processes of indication and symbolic interaction with oneself emerge
what Mead calls the mind. Taking the role of oneself and others through symbolic
interaction allows the social coordination of joint actions, a process by which organizations
of human group life is possible and through which human society persists.
Symbolic interaction, however, is a characteristic elaboration of the general process
of interpretation by which all living things exist
Premise 3: "These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive
process used by the person dealing with the things he encounters" (Blumer, 1969: 2).
The use of the meanings of things as a basis of action is not merely the application
ofresponses conditioned by social interaction. According to Blumer, "[wjhile the meaning
of things is formed in the context of social interaction and is derived by the person from
that interaction, it is a mistake to think that the use of meaning by a person is but an
application of the meaning so derived" (Blumer, 1969: 5). The meanings of objects are
constructed and used in the course of interpreting emergent situations. Meanings of even
the most familiar things are, in this sense, created anew in the course of action. Meanings
of things arise in the course of the interpretive process in which future relationships of
things are indicated to oneself.
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Symbolic interaction, then, is pan of a larger interpretive process by which the
human being handles emergent reality, the process of adjustment, Human beings have the
capacity of adjustment through social processes in addition to the processes of adjustment
we share with other animals, such as eating, sleeping, walking, and maintaining posture.
In addition to our biological world human beings live in a social world which gives more
flexibility, variability and control in coordinating our own actions.
The process of adjustment which embraces the whole process of adjusting to
emergent reality is encompassed by Mead's concept of the act The impulse arises to
handle or confirm emergent stimuli. Perception is the process in which information
selected builds up an environment of meaningful objects which integrates the sensory
experience of things with their use in future action. With manipulation, actions are carried
out and actively modified as contact experience confirms the hypothetical nature of the
distance experience of objects. Manipulation is the means to the end of consummating the
act. In order for the organism to maintain itself, the adjustment process, and therefore
activity, are continuous as the organism meets, interprets, and acts upon a continuous
stream of situations.
The perspective of symbolic interaction proposed by Blumer and Mead was
developed from the intellectual foundations of others, observations of behavior, and careful
introspective reasoning on their own part. Ultimately, however, Mead and Blumer strove
for a theory of human conduct which was consistent with the empirical world. Blumer
states: "It is my conviction that an empirical science necessarily has to respect the nature of
the empirical world that is its object of study. In my judgement symbolic interaetionism
shows that respect for the nature of human group life and conduct" (Blumer, 1969: vii)
Symbolic interactionism describes processes which go beyond the individual in the sense
that only the social world makes human action as such possible. Interactionists do not
claim, however, that the social dimensions of human action should be, or can be, isolated
from the biological essence of human group life, either in theory or in empirical study. On
the contrary, symbolic interactionists, and Mead especially (c.f. Baldwin 1986: 50-68).
assumed they were describing processes involving the central nervous system, though not
in exclusion from its social use by the whole organism. Mead and Blumer would agree
therefore, that a model of action which respects the nature of human group life deserves
exploration of the physiological aspects which are necessary, though not sufficient, for a
more unified analysis of human conduct The next chapter will present a tour of the central
nervous system, the structure and functions of the brain and its evolutionary development.
The goal of the chapter is not to provide grounds for reducing symbolic interaction to
neurophysiological mechanisms; rather, I will explore the possibility that both
neuropsychology and symbolic interactionism describe the same empirical world, and that
there may be many features of the two perspectives which overlap.

Chapter 2: The Central Nervous System:
Evolutionary Origins

Physiology and

In this chapter, I will approach the analysis of action from the point of view of
neurophysiology. This chapter will present a synopsis of the physiology of the central
nervous system (CNS), its major structures and functions, as well as an overview of the
evolutionary origins of the human brain. Though this seems to take a major leap away
from the social psychological analysis of action, the physiological approach is not alien to
the thinking of George Herbert Mead. In developing the theories described in the previous
chapter, Mead drew heavily from his background in physiological psychology which he
studied during graduate work in Germany (Baldwin, 1986: 30). The theory of evolution
was also a constant influence on his work. Before ex.amining neurophysiology in depth,
then, it would be worthwhile to explore briefly why these approaches were important to
Mead's perspective of human action.
Baldwin (1986) describes two main themes in Mead's writing on physiology, both
advocating the use of neurophysiological data. but warning against its overuse (Baldwin,
1986: 60). Mead used physiological data whenever possible to explain elements of the
mechanisms of thought, perception, meaning (as a tendency based in part on past
experiences), emotion and action . Mead, then, advocated the neurophysiological approach
in general. For example, he was interested in the brain's role in human decision making
and purposive action. "Human intelligence, by means of the physiological mechanisms of
the human central nervous system, deliberately selects one from among the several
alternative responses which are possible in the given problematic environmental situation..
." (Mead, 1934: 98). The second theme in his neurophysiological approach, however, was
to acknowledge the limits of neurophysiological data to explain behavior. He was
especially critical of those who used only physiological mechanisms to explain language
and symbolic thought in behavior (Baldwin, 1986: 61). Instead, Mead considered the
central nervous system to be a necessary component of symbolic thought, but not sufficient
in itself without including the role of social interaction in its development The potential for
consciousness, reflexive intelligence, and internal conversation, which take place in the
CNS, is developed only through social experience. "The process [of symbolic interaction]
does appear in a certain sense in the central nervous system, as we take the role of others;
still, the unity or pattern does not belong to the organism but to the group" (Mead, 1927:
173). Mead did not consider the neurophysiological approach and symbolic interacrionist
approach as contradictory; in fact. he advocated the study of action from these approaches,
and believed both would complement one another to form a more unified account of human
action (Baldwin, 1986: 64). "The two are necessary in an adequate statement of behavior"
(Mead, 1927: 175). Both could be integrated in a nondualisric model of social and
physiological processes.
Mead also advocated an evolutionary approach to the study of human conduct. He
assumed humans and human group life to be products of evolution, and therefore
understanding human nature lay in the scientific study of the evolutionary process as a
unifying paradigm (Baldwin, 1986: 51). As examples for many of his concepts, Mead

D.S. Fearon, If.

Symbolic Interaction and Neurophysiology

33

often used animal behavior from various phylogenetic levels, from insects to apes. His
analysis of the conversation of gestures was an example of the origin of symbolic
interaction with human beings. He also considered the evolution of the CNS in providing
the capacity for more flexible and adaptive adjustment to situations. Behavior as mediated
by the CNS evolved from rigid stimulus and response behaviors to increasingly more
complexity in the connectivity between motor input and sensory output Added complexity
allowed animals to organize a wider variety of behavioral sequences and also added ability
to delay response for choosing among alternative lines of activity (Baldwin. 1986: 61).
For Mead, the human being and other animals were not the passive products of
evolutionary forces, but co-evolved, actively reorganizing their environments. "The
organism in a real sense is determinant of its environment" (Mead, 1934: 215). The human
brain is used socially, and therefore evolved in a way consistent with its social use. Thus a
study of both the human brain and social behavior may reveal a complementary
understanding of this co-evolution. With Mead's appreciation of both the physiology and
the evolution of the central nervous system and its imponance in human conduct and
symbolic interaction, a comparison of the interactionist and neurophysiological perspectives
of action is consistent with Mead's own approach.
In the 1920's, the neurosciences were in their relative infancy, and knowledge of
the structure and function of the central neIVOUS system was limited. Mead was obviously
hampered in his ability to use detailed descriptions of the role of the CNS in action. In the
late 1980's, our understanding of the structure and function of the CNS has increased
exponentially, though there are still far more unknowns than answers. In fact, modem
neurophysiology, despite mountains of data, is not much further along in understanding the
"why's" and "how's" of the CNS 's role in action than was Mead. Thus we can follow
Mead's lead in using the eNS in the study of human social action, and update his
contributions with some recent findings. We can also update his evolutionary approach by
describing theories of how the brain evolved according to its use in action. In making these
comparisons, we have found remarkable consistency in the way Mead conceives of the
relation of the CNS to action, and in how the brain has evolved in this respect We will
present these similarities in chapters three and fOUT, after first presenting a synopsis of the
structural and functional organization of the brain, and the latest theories of how the brain
evolved.
Organization of brain
Before we can consider these relationships, it is necessary to give a brief tour of the
organization of the brain, its major structures and functions. This, of course, will be a very
simplified tour of the central nervous system but it should familiarize the reader with the
generally accepted functional areas and systems which underlie some of the processes
which Mead and other interactionists have dealt with in their concepts. The first part of the
tour lists the names and major functions of CNS regions and shows their location in several
diagrams. Isolated structures are then integrated with discussions of their connectivity and
function, using an evolutionary approach. I will begin with the basic units and structures
of the CNS starting from the spinal cord, and work "up" to the neocortex, where most of
the later discussion will focus.
The brain is composed primarily of neurons and a variety of supporting cells such
as glia which hold neurons in place and provide other important functions, such as
removing dead cells. Neurons process and transmit information, and are distinguished
from other cells of the body by their ability to communicate with surrounding neurons by
transmitting electro-chemical "messages." There are several types of neurons of different
shapes and sizes. The typical neuron is comprised of four structures, the cell body, or
soma, axons, dendrites, and terminal buttons. The soma contains the nucleus and provides
for the maintenance of the cell's life processes. The neuron sends messages down an
axon. The axon ends at the terminal button which transmits messages 10 receiving cells.
The terminal button releases transmitter substances, which affect the receiving cell's ability
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to "fire" or send a message. A transmitter substance may excite a cell, or induce it to fire,
or it may also inhibit the firing of the receiving neurons, depending on the type of chemical.
When transmitter substances are released at the terminal button, they travel across a
synapse or gap between neuronal membranes. The dendrites branching out from the cell
body receive messages from the terminal buttons ofaxons. Terminal buttons may also
synapse directly on the soma membrane (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 32).
The cumulative effects of the transmitter substances from terminal buttons reaching
the dendrites and soma help determine whether a neuron will fire a message down its axons
to the neurons with which it communicates, though the condition of the neuron itself is also
a factor in whether it will fire. Thus the communication among neurons is not a simple
system of serial chains which nigger one another in direct causal fashion; rather, neurons
fire by some form of consensus of the right internal and external conditions. Thus
interacting processes of the brain, even in basic units, are already quite complex (Kolb and
Whishaw, 1985: 47).
Despite this complexity, there are characteristic structures. connections among cells,
and functional systems composed of groups of cells. Neural structures can be
distinguished by their location and often by differences in composition. These structures
are interconnected by neuronal structures such as fiber bundles which are comprised of
axons and protective coatings of glial cells . The major structures of the brain are classified
by three major divisions. the hindbrain, midbrain, andjorebrain. The hindbrain is located
at the top of the spinal cord. These structures together with the midbrain form the brain
stem. The forebrain in humans comprises most of the brain tissue, including the cerebral
cortex. The subdivisions of these three divisions and their principal structures will be
presented in this order.
Before touring the brain, however, it would be useful to learn navigational terms
common to neuroanatomy. Figure 3 shows common anatomical directions. The dorsal
surface is the top of the head and back. The chin and the front of the body are ventral
surfaces. Dorsal and ventral surfaces are also described by the terms superior, above and
inferior below. A rostral or anterior direction is toward the chin, or the front of the brain,
and a caudal or anterior direction is toward the back of the head. A medial direction is
toward the midline, and lateral is toward the side (Carlson, 1985: 87).

Hindbrain
Myelencephalon
Structures of the myelencephalon perform rudimentary but essential functions. The
structures of the myelencephalon sit at the top or most rostral end of the spinal cord, and
are the most caudal structures of the brain. The primary structure in this subdivision is the
medulla (Figure 1). Autonomic functions, such as breathing, regulation of heart rate,
muscle tone, and gastro/intestinal processes take place in these structures. Some relay
nuclei are found here, such as those conveying somatosensory information from the spinal
cord to higher levels in the brain. Nuclei are groups of neurons which are distinguishable
by their cell structures, and often by their characteristic connections and functions.
Metencephalon
Nuclei at this level are involved in respiration. blood pressure, and also some motor
activity such as elements of facial expression. Two major structures in this area include the
cerebellum and the pons (Figure 1). The cerebellum is important for the coordination of
movements and sensory information. Integrating information from several sensory areas,
the cerebellum smooths motor output such as standing, and walking. Rehearsed
movements, such as playing an instrument or swinging a golf club, seem to be stored in
this area as a form of "motor programming." The cerebellum is connected by a bundle of
white matter to the pons, bulging from the brain stem. The pons contains nuclei important
for sleep, attention. and motor behavior.
Midbrain
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Mesencephalon
Completing the rostral tip of the brain stem is the mesencephalon, which includes
the tectum and tegmentum (Figure 1). The tectum is involved in orientation toward stimuli
in three-dimensional space. This structure adjusts automatically to auditory and visual
stimuli, and locates the direction of the stimuli. The tegmentum contains nuclei important
for motor systems. Dopamine, a neurotransmitter important for many functions in the rest
of the brain, is produced in the tegmentum. Pain perception and certain species-specific
defense behaviors have been linked to the periaqueductal greymatter.

Forebrain
Diencej)halOfl
The diencephalon contains many more structures than the midbrain and hindbrain,
and little is known about several of these structures. Two major structures, the thalamus
and hypothalamus, will be mentioned here (Figure 1). The thalamus. dorsal to the brain
stem, contains important relay areas for virtually every area of the cerebral cortex . Several
nuclei in the thalamus are specific for sensory areas. The optic nerves from the eyes, for
example, have their first synapse, or connection to another neuron, in the lateral geniculate
nucleus of the thalamus. Nuclei in the thalamus relay axon fibers to the visual areas of the
cerebral cortex, and also have important subcortical connections. The thalamus also has
connections with the motor areas of the cerebrum and has a role in motor behavior, as well
as connections to association cortices and limbic cortices. which will be defined below.
The functions of many of the connections in the thalamus are not well understood.
Ventral and rostral to the thalamus is the hypothalamus. This structure is involved
in such "survival" functions as feeding, drinking, sleeping, reproduction, defensive
behaviors, and flight behaviors. The autonomic nervous system and endocrine system are
also regulated by the hypothalamus.
Telence.phalon
As mentioned above, the structures of the telencephalon will receive the most
attention in the following chapters because these structures are most heavily involved in
higher cognitive processes of the brain. such as consciousness. The telencephalon
encompasses cortical and subcortical structures. Cortical structures include the two
cerebral hemispheres, which are subdivided into neocortex which covers most of the
surface of the hemispheres, and the limbic conex forming the medial-most edge of the
cerebral hemispheres. The neocortex is divided into four lobes. the frontal, parietal,
occipital. andtemporal lobes (Figure 2).
Several more navigational terms will be useful here in describing the cerebral
hemispheres. The cerebral cortex in human beings is highly convoluted. These
convolutions are characterized by sulci. the folds or grooves, and the gyri. the cortex
bulging between the folds. Sulci and gyri form characteristic patterns in the brain, and
provide useful landmarks for locating different functional areas of the brain. The central
sulcus in the dorsolateral neocortex, divides the frontal and parietal lobes. Dividing the
temporal lobe from the frontal and parietal lobes is the lateral sulcus. The calcarine sulus
forms a spur in the medial surface of the occipital lobe (Figure 2). A large sulcus separates
the two cerebral hemispheres. The hemispheres are connected by the corpus callosum, a
large bundle of axon fibers beneath the neocortex which connect geographically similar
regions of each hemisphere (Figure 1). Specific gyri in the cerebral hemisphere are often
given names, such as the angular gyrus, or supramarginal gyrus.
Another system for demarcating specific conical regions is the Brodmann numbers
(Figure 2). Brodmann gave numbers to cortical areas of the brain based on their
cytoarchetectonic characteristics. This term refers to the microscopic distinctions in the cell
structure and patterns of layering of various brain tissues. It was found that these structural
areas tended to correspond to functional roles. Brodmann numbers are therefore useful as
navigational shonhand for the often complex names given to gyri.
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The central sulcus separates two major functional areas in the neocortex, the motor
areas rostral to, or in front of, the central sulcus, and the sensory areas located caudal to the
central sulcus. Proceeding caudally, the parietal lobe is specialized to process
somatosensory information, touch, temperature, pressure, and pain received from neurons
throughout the body. Certain physiologically defined areas within each of the sensory
cortices receive and process sensory information differently. These areas may be divided
into primary cortex and association cortex. Primary cortices receive direct input from the
sensory specific and motor specific nuclei in the thalamus. 1 Primary cortices are the "first
stop" at the cortical level for sensory input, and thus receive "raw" unelaborated data. The
primary somatosensory cortex is located in the postcentral gyrus of the parietal lobe,
adjacent to the central sulcus (Figure 2). This area is often designated as SI, or by
Brodmann numbers 3,1, and 2. Cells in this area form mosaics of columns which register'
either touch, pressure, kinesthesis (movement), pain or temperature. Groups of neurons in
this area correspond to very specific sensations. A low-voltage electric shock applied by a
wire to a specific are of 51 will give the patient the feeling of pressure or heat on a small
portion of the arm, for example, or even the sensation of a breeze blowing across the arm
(Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 200).
Adjacent and caudal to primary somatosensory cortices are the somatosensory
association cortices of the parietal lobe, labeled SA, (Brodmann areas 5 and 7). Everything
which is not primary cortex is traditionally considered association cortex. In association
cortices, information is elaborated from sensations in specific parts of the body to a more
generalized experience or representation of sensations. AU the somatosensory qualities of
an object are experienced simultaneously and comprise sensory gestalts, forms, or images
which can be identified. People with damage to somatosensory association areas may have
sensory agnosia (meaning "to be unknown") or difficulty in identifying an object by touch
alone. Place a key in the hand of such a patient such that he or she cannot see it, and it will
be described as hard. or pointed, but not identified as a "key" (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985:
224-225). Thus association cortices seem to be related to memory or the ability to use
memory to identify objects. 2 We cannot, however, conclude that association cortices are
the "centers" for memory. Memory involves several other areas in the brain; further, it is
not known exactly how or where memory is stored. A simplified description of the
relationship between primary and association cortices will suffice for now. Primary
sensory cortices process sensory data in their "purest" form, much like binary bits of data
in computers, which are then elaborated in the association cortices. Various association
cortices have other functions beside their role in memory. Area 39 for example, the inferior
parietal cortex, is important for reading. Damage to this area has been linked to dyslexia.
Some areas of the association cortex are able to process more than one form of
sensory information simultaneously, such as somatosensory and visual information.
Moving ventrally to the boarder of the occipital and temporal lobes above the lateral sulcus
is the supramarginal gyrus of the parietal lobe (area 40). This is one of the "multimodal"
areas of the neocortex. Input from sensory areas of hearing, vision, and touch converge on
the neurons in this area. The area is also highly connected with other areas of the brain .
Little is known about the exact role of multimodal areas in processing information;
however, the existence of such areas suggests that the boundaries between sensory cortices
are neither structurally nor functionally distinct
The occipital lobe is the most caudal lobe of the cerebral cortex. The primary visual
cortex, (VI or area 17) is located at the most anterior extreme (Figure 2). VI is also called
"striate" cortex after the characteristic striped pattern in cross sections of tissue formed by
IAgain, the thalamus is the rust structure to receive input from the sensory organs, and one of the last
major stationsbefore motor output reaches Ihespinal cord.
2 For now, I am using the term "object" in the general sense of everyday usage rather than the definition
used by symbolicinteractionists presented in the previous chaplet.
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six layers of cell bodies. Again, it receives sensory data from the thalamus as a raw code.
Certain neurons, the "simple cells" in the primary area have basically a. one-to-one
correspondence with specific neurons in the thalamus, and a corresponding rod or cone in
the retina of the eye. Thus, as a photon strikes a cone in the retina. it causes the firing of a
single neuron in the primary visual cortex. Other neurons in VI. however, the "complex"
and "hypercomplex" cells fire when certain patterns of simple cells fire, such as a series of
cells forming a straight line, or a straight line in a particular orientation. Thus objects we
see are broken into a simple code of light, dark, and color, and are elaborated by
increasingly abstract patterns of firing neurons (Carlson: 193). Elaboration continues in the
circumstriate, visual association cortex (areas 18 and 19), which surrounds the striate
cortex. These areas are involved in binocular depth perception as well as rudimentary
perception and memory. Visual information may be elaborated into basic gestalt images in
these layers (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 194-195).
Other visual association areas'are located in the temporal lobe]. The inferotemporal
cortex (areas 21 and 20) in the caudal regions of the temporal lobe, is the location of the
most complex processes of visual perception and the association of visual information.
Damage to this area can cause visual agnosias similar to sensory agnosias described above.
The person can see an object. but fails to identify the object beyond simple dimensions of
shape or color (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 213-215).
The primary auditory cortex (AI or areas 41 and 42) is located in Heschl's gyrus,
part of the supratemporal plane (Figure 2). This area is found on the top pan of the
temporal plane which borders the lateral sulcus. Auditory sensory data from this area flow
down into the auditory association cortices in the superior temporal lobe, area 22 (AA).
These areas function much as other sensory association cortices, involving recognition and
memory of non-language sounds. Comprehension of spoken words, however, involves a
specialized area in caudal region of area 22, called Wernicke's area. This area is crucial for
understanding language. Patients with damage to this area may develop Wernicke's
aphasia in which they are able to speak and write, but what they produce is "word salad,"
a meaningless jumble of words, though the speech retains the tonality and some of the
gestures associated with normal conversation. Patients are unable to understand the spoken
or written words of others, or of themselves, therefore they may not even realize that they
have a problem communicating. Though Wernicke's area is traditionally described as an
area for comprehension. very little is known about its exact function; further, Wernicke's
area does not operate autonomously. but is part of a system involving other structures
which will be described below. Language itself, however, may involve most of the
cerebral cortex in some integrative way,
Other sensory systems in the neoconex include the olfactory cortices, which are
less developed in humans than the other senses, located in area 28, the ventromedial
temporal cortex. Gustatory cortices which register taste are located in area 43, the
pericentral operculum. Electrical stimulation of this area can elicit in the patient very
specific tastes. Some vestibular systems which register balance may be located cortically in
either the parietal lobe or caudal areas of the temporal lobe. The vestibular system,
however, is not well understood at the cortical level.
The frontal lobe comprises all the neocortex rostral to the central sulcus and dorsal
to the lateral sulcus (Figure 2). The primary function of the frontal lobe is behavior. All
the planning and execution of movements occurs here; therefore, our ability to interact

1There is more 10 vision than what is seen at the level of lhe neocortex, There are in fact three other visual
systems which involve mainly the structures in the thalamus, with certain other subcortical areas (Kolb:
194). These systems are important for the localization of visual objects. There are also different neural
pathways handling central vision and peripheral vision; Vision, then, is a process combining several
systems, rather than stemming from a single "center" of the brain.
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overtly with the world and act upon sensory information generally involves the frontal
lobes, in association with the rest of the brain 1. Primary motor cortex, located in area 4 of
the precentral gyrus. is involved in the movement of individual muscles or small groups of
muscles. Premotor cortex (area 6). an association cortex, processes more elaborate motor
Information -coordinating the movement of several motor groups simultaneously. This
area might be considered to contain "motor programs" since electrical stimulation of
portions of the premotor cortex may elicit complete movements. The patient may clench
and unclench the fist, or move the arm in a particular direction. This area is often damaged
by strokes which result in hemiparesis, or partial paralysis of the face or body on the side
opposite to the site of brain damage. The frontal eye field (area 8) directs voluntary eye
movement in three dimensions of space.
The primary, premotor and frontal eye field cortices may be considered the "non
thinking" areas of the frontal lobe. Though these areas are involved in voluntary
movement, the movements themselves are not planned out in these areas but are "released. "
The relationship is somewhat like a piano player pushing piano keys, however, though this
analogy is mechanistic.Z The planning of behavior. or the movements which will be
initiated. occurs at the cortica1level mainly in the prefrontal association cortices, which
include areas 9 through 12. Damage to these areas may leave one unable to sequence and
carry out behavior. A patient may try to reach for a glass of water but is unable to get
beyond the first step, swinging her or his arm in the general direction of the glass. but
unable to grasp and bring the glass to the lips. Prefrontal lobotomies were once used to
destroy these areas typically to stop violent behavior. Metabolic scans which show the
activity of various areas of the brain have shown medial area 6. the supplementary motor
area (MIl) to be constantly active. even when the subject being scanned is told to sit and do
absolutely nothing. It is speculated that this area may be where certain aspects of thinking
take place. specifically, the sequencing of behaviors. and possibly the subjective
motivation of voluntary movements (Smith and Fetz, 1987: 337). though other association
areas are also involved. including, it seems, those sensory modalities which are relevant to
the particular type of thinking (Roland and Friberg. 1985).3
Another area of interest in the frontal lobe is Broca's area (area 44 above the lateral
sulcus.) This area is crucial for the production of language, spoken as well as written.
People with Broca's aphasia can comprehend speech and writing but cannot communicate
beyond simple gestures. Thus Broca's area is the production end of the language system
of the cerebral cortex which is connected to Wernicke's area by a large bundle of axon
fibers, the arcuate fasciculus. Since Broca's aphasics are able to understand that they have
a disorder, they are far more traumatized bl their inability to communicate than Wernicke
aphasics (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 313).
1 There are certain movements. however. which bypass the frontal motor areas. The spinal reflex is the
simplest among these. Tbe majority of behaviors, however. involve the frontal lobes,
2 Neurons in the premotor and primary motor regions, though they are getting their commands from
elsewhere. are still adjusting and selecting transmitter substances from other areas panJy on the basis of
their own internal conditions. This is not a mechanistic relationship. but an adjustive relationship. The
nature of such relationships will be described below.
3 I will specn1aLe in chapter 4 upon the relation of this motor aspect of thinking and Mead's concept of
thinking.
4 This relationship between production and comprehension areas of language seems at first glance to
involve those areas most pertinent to me discussion of symbolic interaction, especially given Mead's
suggestion of vocal gestures which are subsequently comprehended by another area. Though this
relationship will be mentioned in later chapters. this paper will give little direct attention to studies of
language systems in the brain. This is for several reasons. FlI"St, language involves more than these
specific structures. These areas. for instance, seem to involve the ovett production aspects of language.
Broca's aphasics. for example. cannot produce words overtly, but can think: to themselves. using inner
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From the above discussion it may seem as though information from the
environment flows directly from the sensory and association cortices to the motor cortices,
a process relatively isolated from the structures below. This is not the case. Beside the
connections between cortical areas and subcortical structures such as the thalamus, there is
a third system, the limbic system, which is an important mediator between sensory and
motor areas of the neoconex. The limbic system is comprised of a number of structures,
some at the conical level, others in subcortical regions of the telencephalon. At the cortical
level is the limbic cortex, which considered a subdivision of the association cortex. These
structures form a ring around the corpus callosum, hence their name limbus meaning
"fringe" or "border." Figure 3 shows the limbic cortices and their Brodmann numbers.
Proceeding from rostral to caudal structures is the orbital frontal cortex (area 13), the
cingulate gyrus (areas 24 and 23), the parahippocampal gyrus (areas 36 and 37), and the
temporal polar cortex (area 38), at the rostral tip of the temporal lobe. The subcortical
structures of the limbic system discussed here include the hippocampus, amygdala, and
septal area. Other subcortical structures not considered pan of the limbic system include
the basal ganglia, which will be described after a brief analysis of the limbic system.
The limbic cortex is is often referred to as "paralimbic" because of its location
surrounding the sub-conical limbic structures. The functions of the limbic cortices are not
well understood. However, they seem to subserve important functions including emotion
and motivation, and are also related to memory. The orbital frontal cortex (Figure 3, area
13, located above the eye socket) is involved in subjective feelings of emotion, and certain
behavioral aspects of personality. Also, together with its relation to other areas and the
prefrontal areas in particular, the orbital fronal cortex plays a role in the control of
spontaneous behavior and behavior in social situations. This is inferred from studies of
damage to this area and, often, surrounding cortex. Patients may show one of two types of
personality change, pseudodepression, with symptoms such as outward apathy, little oven
emotion, less speaking, and reduced sexual interest; or pseudopsychopathology, with
quite opposite symptoms such as immature behavior, coarse language, lack of tact and
restraint and other social graces (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 440). There have been no
systematic studies of this area as a discrete entity, however, so it is not clear how much or
in what way the orbital frontal cortex is involved in personality and regulation of social
behaviors.
.
Surrounding the corpus callosum is the cingulate gyrus (areas 24 and 23, Figure 3).
This area. may provide the primary motivation for behavior at the cortical level. It motivates
in the sense of "energizing" the plans made in the frontal areas to allow them to be carried
out. The cingulate gyrus has connections to the supplementary motor area (MIl) which
may sequence and plan voluntary movements. The cingulate gyrus may "energize" MIl so
that these plans can actually be carried out. This is inferred from patients who lose the
connections between the cingulate gyrus and the frontal lobe. These patients are able to
plan behaviors, but not carry them out. Stroke victims who lose this area may will
themselves to get out of bed or scratch and itch, but are unable to carry out the behavior.
The cingulate gyrus also connects with other secondary sensory association areas (Kolb
and Whishaw, 1985: 182), and may influence perceptual and memory as well as motor
processes.
The parahippocampal gyrus at the base of the temporal lobe seems to have a role in
recognition of familiar faces, or specific members in categories of objects (Figure 3).
Patients who lose this area are not only unable to recognize the faces of "significant others"
like friends or family, but are also unable to distinguish makes of cars, or the names of
animals (in the case of a farmer who lost this area.) It is doubtful that such information is
stored in this area; rather, this area may be important for retrieval or access of certain
conversation. A detailedanalysis of language systems would therefore detract from discussion of the central
themes of this paper.
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memories stored in other areas of the cortex, and matching the information to incoming
stimuli; thus it seems to be involved in labeling certain information as significanr.l The
parahippocampal gyrus, as implied by its name, is also closely connected with the
hippocampus (described below), which is an important structure for memory (Passingham,
1987: 87).
The temporal polar cortex (area 38, Figure 3, at the rostral tip of the temporal lobe)
is another area related to emotion and emotional reactivity. Patients who lose this area act
emotionally "flat" in that they do not employ emotional emphasis in communication or
behaviors. This area is commonly damaged in head injuries. Such injuries are often
accompanied by a noticeable change in personality. These changes may indicate that the
temporal pole, together with the orbital frontal cortex, contribute to the characteristic
personality traits which are observable in our behavior, though personality is not dependent
exclusively upon these areas 2 (Kolb and Wbishaw, 1985: 182).
The subconical structures of the limbic system are connected with both subcortical
structures and the neocortex via the limbic cortex, and contribute important functions to all
of these areas. The hippocampus is an area crucial for memory. This small seahorse
shaped structure located beneath the parahippocampal gyrus is involved in the conversion
of short term memory to long term memory. H.M. is the famous patient who had his
hippocampi and amygdalas removed to cure his epilepsy. This operation resulted in
anterograde amnesia, such that he is unable to recall anything beyond a thirty second
period, the duration of shoo term memory. He does have memories of events occurring
previous to the operation, but not after. He did, however, have normal motor learning of
procedural tasks such as doing manual puzzles, though he did not remember having done
the puzzles (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 481-485). This area has connections to the sensory
association areas as well as certain frontal lobe areas via the parahippocampal gyrus
(Passingham, 1987: 86), and so may be able to select and label certain information as
significant to future action, but does so in association with other areas -of the brain (Kolb
and Whishaw, 1985: 491-494). The hippocampus is also involved in fear and flight
The amygdala, an almond-shaped structure rostral to the hippocampus within the
temporal lobe has a role in sex and aggression and is involved in regulating some
autonomic functions such as blood pressure. This structure may also have a role in
memory or the selection of significant stimuli, since H.M had both the amygdala and
hippocampus removed, and in studies with monkeys, both of these structures had to be
removed to reproduce amnesia similar to H.M.'s (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 494). This
area has connections to the sensory association areas, limbic cortex, and frontal motor
areas, and so may be able to orient action toward stimuli relevant to survival, such as food
(passingham, 1987: 85); however, ittle is understood about the amygdala's role in human
perception and selective attention.
The septal area (also called the septum or septal nuclei) is the final subcortical
structure of the limbic system described here. 3 The septal area is the rostral and medial
most structure of the limbic system, located directly beneath the rostral tip of the corpus
callosum. This structure is related to the inhibition of aggression and rage, but this is seen
more clearly in animals than in humans. Electrical stimulation of this area also brings about
subjective sexual feelings and euphoria.
ISignificance is used differently than Mead used the tenn. Here. significance refers to the selection of
certain stimuli over others in the sensory field.
2 For interactionists, personality is very much a product of social interaction and the social selves we
present to others reflect the way we take the roles of others in adjusting our own actions. This view does
not rule out, however, the affective qualities in behaviors we present to others. some aspects of which may
be inherued, sucb as habitual body postures.
.
3 The mammillary bodies, caudal and ventral to the septum. are also considered part of the limbic system.
but lillie is known about their functions.
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Beneath the limbic system are the basal ganglia, the other major subcortical
structures of the telencephalon. This group of nuclei has several functions in sensory
motor integration, and in adjusting one's behavior to fit changing environmental
conditions. Damage to some of these areas may result in changes in movement such as
hyperkinesia (excessive rapid involuntary movements) or akinesia (a lack of spontaneous
movements) (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 254), or a syndrome called obstinate progression
in which patients have difficulty avoiding obstacles in their path such as tables and chairs,
even though they may clearly perceive these obstacles. Parkinson's disease and several
other motor disorders have been linked to abnormalities or degeneration of these structures.
Basal ganglia structures include the caudate nucleus and putamen; the nucleus accumbens,
and the basal nucleus of Meynert.
Evolution of the central nervous system
This brief tour of the CNS updates the background in neuroscience which Mead
utilized as a basis of many of his concepts. As mentioned, Mead also drew from the
emerging paradigm of evolutionary theory in his understanding of physiology and animal
conduct. Since the time of Mead's writings, much has been learned about the evolution of
the brain and its relation to behavior. These recent theories of brain evolution, however,
remain consistent with Mead's basic assumptions about the evolutionary process.
In the discussion above, the major structures and functions of the CNS were
presented in seemingly isolated sections. This does not imply, however, that the brain is a
set of isolated structures; rather; the CNS has evolved as an integrated system composed
of many interdependent subsystems. As mentioned above, little was known about the
exact functions of many structures because they did not act in isolation, but as part of a
system. Damage to these areas causes changes in behavior attributed not only to the loss of
a crucial functional "center," but also a break in the system in which it is involved. Such
integration of systems presents a dilemma for those trying to infer brain functions in human
beings from symptoms related to damage to local areas. Each structure in the brain is pan
of at least one, but more often several systems in which the same area may carry out several
different functions. The old notion of neuroanatomy was that the brain was divided into
autonomous "centers" which performed various functions such as memory, speech. or
aggression. With clinical study of various disorders and with neuroanotomical study of the
connections each structure has with other structures in the brain, the "centers" theory was
seen as inadequate. Instead, the brain is seen as an integrated system of interdependent
processes, which show some localization and specialization of structures, but nevertheless
do not act in isolation.
The anatomy of the CNS as interrelated systems corresponds with its evolutionary
development. Isolated centers could not have evolved in a piecemeal fashion, such that
motor systems developed independently of sensory systems. The brain evolved according
to a certain "theme," the survival, or self-maintenance of the organism in its environment
This process we have called adjustment. The brain evolved not in terms of separate
functions, but rather increasingly complex and elaborate ways for the organism to adjust to
occurrences in its surroundings. Higher functions of the brain, such as those of the
neocortex, provide certain unique capacities, but in many ways, the "highest" functions of
the CNS are simply elaborations or enhancements of functions which were present from
the beginning of the CNS. Even the most advanced capacities, consciousness and
symbolic language, seem to share with all other life forms qualities of the basic process of
adjustment. A study of how the brain evolved, then, would demonstrate the composition
of the brain as interrelated parts, and elaborations of various aspects of the adjustment
process, allowing organisms to better perceive, interpret. and handle changes in their
surroundings, and this goes on in the social world as well. Discussion of brain evolution
will show the interrelatedness, connectivity, and dynamics of many of the structures of the
brain described above. The discussion will proceed with a general introduction to the
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development of the CNS in various species, then a presentation of MacLean's triune brain
model which shows the hierarchical yet integrated relationship of the hindbrain, midbrain,
and forebrain. The forebrain, especially the neocortex and limbic system, will be the focus
of the final section of the chapter. This discussion will describe the origins of the
neocortex, and its connections and dynamic relationship with the limbic system.
Tracing the development of the nervous system from its earliest roots shows its role
in the adjustment process in increasingly complex life forms. The predecessors of the
nervous system incorporated three basic functions, sensing changes in their external and
internal environment, response in these changes. and integration of these processes in the
maintenance of the organism's metabolism. With early single-celled organisms, these
functions were diffused among the activity of the whole organism, which functioned as
autonomous units. The first clusters of such cells began to lose some autonomy in favor of
the adaptive benefits of symbiosis, in which various groups of cells specialized for tasks
which supported others. As multi-cellular organisms continued to develop, communication
and integration of the various processes of different cells required a more specialized
system of coordination. The cells which specialized in these functions were the
predecessors of the nervous system. The early systems developed around two functions,
sensation of the environment and motor response. This system eventually developed into
the first primitive nervous system, the spinal cord (Figure 4). The spinal cord was at first a
simple tube which received sensory fibers from various parts of the body and sent motor
fibers for response to the environment (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 9).
As the rostral end of the spinal cord became specialized for sensory functions, the
brainstem developed. Three enlargements in the spinal cord developed for more adaptive
analysis of the sensory world, more efficient and flexible response, and better integration
of sensation and response, which is also crucial to adjustment. Olfaction and taste were
located in the prosencephalon at the front of the brain stem. Vision and hearing were
located in the mesencephalon, the second enlargement, and the rhombencephalon became
specialized for vestibular functions, such as equilibrium and balance, necessary for better
coordinating motion and a sense of location within the environment. These structures
comprise the brains of fishes and amphibians, and form the basis for development of the
mammalian brain (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 9). The primitive brain continued to develop
in a similar pattern, with sensory areas located dorsally, motor areas located ventrally, and
areas for coordination and integration medial, by the base of the spine. As the mammalian
brain evolved, the prosencephalon developed into the diencephalon and telencephalon
which included the cerebral hemispheres. Ventrally, the rhombencephalon formed two
divisions as well, the metencephalon, and the myelencephalon (Kolb and Whishaw,
1985:9 - 10).
The central nervous system, thus developed through both a structural and functional
elaboration of basic adjustment processes present in the nervous systems of predecessors;
these are the sensory processes, motor response processes, and integrating processes.
Further, the functions of the older areas were not abandoned in favor of more recent
developments. Many of the basic structures of the hindbrain and midbrain were left
relatively unchanged, or were adapted to new developments to become part of systems
involving more recent evolutionary developments. There are several several reasons for
this. Though new levels added to various capacities for adjustment and adaptiveness to the
environment, they developed from the brains of earlier species, and therefore, had to be
integrated with the processes which maintained earlier organisms. Once these new systems
evolved, however, they could re-organize the lower structures to become pan of newer
systems. Bipedal locomotion, for example, as a means of watching for enemies on open
plains, could also leave the front paws free for manipulating objects. There is not a clear
hierarchy of control, however, between upper and lower levels because no level is truly
autonomous. Though upper levels may do more sophisticated processing of information,
without the contribution of the lower levels they have nothing to process. The different
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levels of the brain, therefore, are structurally and often chemically different. but maintain
both interdependence and a degree of autonomy.
The "triune brain" model of evolution corresponds, to an extent. to this view of
new capacities added to old, maintaining interdependence. The model was developed by
Paul MacLean, a neurophysiologist who headed a laboratory for the study of brain
evolution and behavior in the 1970's (Jantsch, 1980: 165). The "triune brain" expressed
the phylogenetic development of the brain as comprised of three brains in one, each level
chemically and structurally different, but each highly interconnected and interdependent.
The three divisions he proposed are the protoreptilian brain, the paleomammalian brain or
limbic system, and the neomammalian brain. These three structures had increasingly
complex interaction with the "neural chassis," the spinal cord and brain stem which handled
autonomic functions such as respiration, and relayed information to and from higher
structures. Though these early structures once functioned autonomously in early
organisms, the three levels of the brain developed as "drivers" of the neural chassis,
influencing these basic survival functions and each other in increasingly complex ways.
The protoreptilian brain (or R-Complex) forming the core of the nervous system,
consists of parts of the hindbrain and midbrain, the diencephalon, and the basal ganglia
(Isaacson, p. 240) The Rccmplex originated approximately 250 or 280 million years ago
(Jantsch, p. 166) and maintains many of the functions found in early reptiles (though R
complex structures in the mammalian brain are quite different than the brain structure of
today's reptiles.) The Rcomplex manages many autonomic and metabolic functions of the
nervous system, and thus represents a level of control over, and autonomy from, these
systems. MacLean also associated certain stereotyped behavior patterns with the reptilian
brain, such as territoriality, ritual fights, greetings, primitive social hierarchies, and other
behaviors exhibited by modem reptiles. R-complex structures, however, are slow at
learning and adapting to new situations, and thus have limited flexibility. (Jantsch, 166)
These functions, however, are still crucial for upper-level systems. In fact. many
studies of decorticate animals, animals which have had portions of their brains removed.
are able to survive without their neocortex or limbic system. If the animals possess basal
ganglia, for example, they are able to link voluntary movements and automatic movements
sufficiently well to maintain themselves, with such behaviors as eating and drinking in a
simple environment. Linking voluntary and involuntary movements involves the inhibition
or excitation of these behaviors. For example, they can see food, move toward it. stop
their movement, and eat the food; thus they are able to modify their behavior and act on
new information in their surroundings. Decorticate cats display some normal feline
behaviors. but many behaviors are poorly executed and often inappropriate, which
suggests the role of higher areas in integrating and sequencing behaviors (Kolb and
Whishaw, 1985: 154). These studies, however, should not be taken to suggest that higher
areas are independent from lower areas, since removing the conex creates artificial
conditions in which what is left of the nervous system reorganizes and, thus, the functions
of these areas may change as well. Also, human beings born without cortices do not
survive. 1 These decorticate studies, then, can be taken only as a general example of the
role of the cortex in nonhuman animals.
The second level in MacLean's model is the paleomarnmalian brain. The
paleomammalian brain is essentially the limbic system, containing those structures listed
above, and the limbic cortex. The limbic system originated in mammals TOughly 165
million years ago. (Janisch, 1980: 167) It provides more flexibility and control over the R
complex structures, yet it is also interrelated with the functions of the neocortex in
significant ways. The limbic system receives information from both the outer and inner
1 There has, of course, been DO systematic study of the effects of removing various portions of the human
brain, so there is no clear understanding of the functional relationship among various evolutionary levels
leading to human beings.
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world. and may, as MacLean suggests, provide a primitive form of self-awareness as it
relates the outer environment with information of internal conditions. This awareness takes
the form primarily of emotions or feelings which can be used to guide behavior, integrated
with the motivation for carrying out the behavior, though the response may be sequenced
mainly in the neocortex. (Isaacson: 241)1 Certain structures in the limbic system such as
the hippocampus are also important for learning, which allows more efficient utilization of
past experiences in adapting to new experiences. With the more complex integration of
information, the stereotyped behaviors of the R-complex can be overridden by a more
complex interaction of outer and inner models of the world
The neomammalian brain, which originated perhaps 50 million years ago, includes
the most recently developed structures of the brain which have become predominant in
primates, the neocortical structures, MacLean considers neocortical structures to provide
abstract, non-emotional analysis of the environment (Isaacson: 241). Abstract images of
language, logic and mathematics are superimposed on a "neural screen" upon sensory
information which reaches the primary sensory cortices. MacLean proposes that the
neocortex operates "unhindered by signals and noise generated in the internal world"
(Isaacson: 242) Recent studies of cortical connectivity between the neocortex and limbic
system, however, dispute MacLean's description of the relationship of these two areas.
The neocortex is not isolated from the limbic system, either in function or connectivity;
rather, all the most complex "higher" processes of the neocortex, such as consciousness,
reflexive intelligence, and symbolic communication, seem to require for their functioning
the interaction of the limbic system. This conclusion will be detailed below; however, we
can consider the importance of memory, emotion, and motivation of voluntary behavior as
necessary contributions of the limbic system. The neocortex in combination with the limbic
system, however, allows a far more complex, flexible. and faster adjustment for survival
and adaptation. With the neocortex, learning and memory become more complex. as well
as the ability to select and adjust to significant events from both the organism's
surroundings and its internal conditions. The organism can also sequence voluntary
motions for a more complex manipulation of things. The neoconex also provides the
animal with a more complex representation of the world. one which includes, in addition to
emotions, objects with both the past and anticipated future, and location in three
dimensional space (Kolb, 156-157). With most animals, these capacities are rudimentary,
but the evolution of social interaction, it seems, has further elaborated these capacities, and
also added awareness of self and others and physical things as conscious objects (in
Mead's sense), the capacity for symbolic interaction with others and oneself, reflexive
intelligence. and construction and coordination of a social world.
As a brief aside, we might consider whether the functional differences between
human brains and other neomammalian brains correspond to structural differences. The
major structures described at the beginning of this chapter are more-or-less present in all
other mammals. and MacLean's triune brain is common to all higher mammals. In our
own order, the primates, there are no qualitative differences at all. In other words, all the
structures described above (and those not described) are found in all Old-World and New
World monkeys and apes, in roughly similar configurations. The major difference between
our brain and a chimpanzees' is size. The ratio of the human brain is 6.3 times larger than
expected given the average ratio of brain size to body weight among other mammals. The
chimpanzee's are 2.48 times larger than average for its weight (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985:
88). Thus size is the major difference between human brains and those of other primates.
A comparison of brain size across species found that the relative size of the brain increased,
with humans having the largest brains following this trend, having the most neocortex.
This increase, however, did not result in any marked structural changes, nor did certain
III is possible for the limbic system itself to be the primary source of certain actions. such as emotional
gestures,
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areas increase in size in greater proponion than others, with the exception of association
cortex, but not much more than predicted given the amount of neocortex in human brains
(Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 90). Thus, Kolb and Whishaw conclude "there is no
compelling evidence that there is a qualitative difference between the brains of humans and
those of other mammals" (1985: 91).
The anatomical studies by which these conclusions were reached did not consider
differences in connectivity among humans and other primates. Our knowledge of the
connectivity in human brains is limited. however, by the techniques of mapping
connections which require destruction of areas of the animal's brain. There may be no
homologue for certain speech structures, such as Broca's area (Passingham, in Kolb, 90),
but such evidence is not clear. Would functional changes resulting from the evolution of
social interaction reorganize the structure or connectivity of the brain? There seems to be
no reason why some structural differences would not be possible, but more study is
needed. Mead's system, then, started with the social. and it may be that the social process
is the main ingredient to the functional differences, aside from more association cortex.
This would be an area for further study, requiring new technology for study of the brain.
Given the similarities in structure, however, we can still infer much about the evolution of
the brain using monkey models. These inferences imply much about human information
processing that need not wait for verification by new technology to be relevant to our
analysis of action.
From the presentation above, it is clear that major structures in the brain did not

evolve in isolation, but instead, developed as increasingly complex systems, which
provided new capacities, but which were highly integrated with the systems which existed
before. They are integrated functionally. in that the processes of "higher" structures such
as the neocortex depend upon information and support from "lower" systems. but the
higher systems can also redirect lower systems. They are also integrated structurally. The
lower regions of the brain, such as the limbic system, are the phylogenetic source of higher
regions, such as the neocortex. As new regions evolve, they maintain relationships with
their structures of origin through axonal connections by which different areas
communicate. It is this communication which allows different areas to act as systems, and
is what makes the CNS itself an integrated system which functions in the adjustment to
new conditions. These evolutionary trends in the development of the CNS can be seen in
recent studies of the evolution of the neocortex. Pandya and Yeterian (1985; 1988) have
recently summarized data on the evolution and connectivity of the neocortex. Their own
studies of cortical connectivity show how the neocortex has evolved from the limbic system
and how the limbic system maintains a "hold" on neocortical information processing 1
Pandya and Yeterian follow the evolutionary approach to studying the development
of the neocortex. This approach was developed primarily by Friedrich Sanides, who
compared across several species the cytoarchitectonic changes in cellular composition in the
telencephalon. From these studies he found that evolutionarily older areas of the brain shift
to newer areas of the cortex through a progressive differentiation of conical
cytoarchitecture, the characteristic patterns of cell structures. The differentiation was seen
best in the layering of the neuronal cell bodies found in the grey matter of the conex. 2 In
the neocortex there are six layers of cell bodies, each with characteristic connections to
other layers. The composition of limbic system structures such as the hippocampus,
however, shows less differentiation among the cell bodies. This was noted in the late 19th
I Most of their findings presented here were taken from two sources."Architectonic Features of the Primate
Brain: Implications for Information Processing and Behavior" (Yeterian and Pandya, 1988). Dr. Yeterian
presented a simplified version of these findings in "MakingSense of the Cerebral Cortex", an unpublished
presentation. The discussion below follows his presentation, which outlines lhe essential aspects of the
model
2 The white matter is composed ofaxons going to and from neocortical grey matter,
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century by a German neuroanatomist, Vogt. Vogt named these undifferentiated areas
allocortex, meaning "other cortex" (Yeterian, 1985: 2). and named the six-layered
neocortex, isocortex. Sanides found that cell layering from the allocortex to isocortex
followed very systematic shifts. Proceeding from the allocortex to the limbic areas, the
cortical layering shifted progressively in the region of the limbic cortices to less than six
layers which lacked clear definition, to a clearly defined six-layered neocortex, culminating
in the primary cortices. This shift, Sanides concluded, followed an evolutionary trend
from the allocortex, through intermediate stages of the periallocortex and pro-isocortex in
the paralimbic region, and finally to isocortex in the association and primary cortices
(Figure 5) (Yeterian and Pandya, 1985: 5). Sanides found that there were two such trends
in the cortex which had their source in the allocortex of the limbic system. From these two
sources, which Sanides called the "prime moieties," the entire neocortex evolved. The two
moieties are the hippocampal (or archicortical) and the olfactory (or paleoconical) moiety
(Figure 5). Interestingly, each moiety was the source of both motor and sensory cortices,
as well as association cortex. The hippocampal moiety is the source of certain limbic
cortices. including the cingulate gyrus. From there, this trend developed into the
somatosensory cortices and the motor cortices from which served the trunk and limbs.
These include the 'dorsal premotor and dorsal prefrontal areas, the supplementary motor
area (MIl), and the supplementary somatosensory cortex (MII). From these areas arose
the primary motor and primary somatosensory areas respectively. The olfactory moiety is
the source of other sensory cortices, including visual, auditory, gustatory, and vestibular
cortex, and the primary sensory cortices. This moiety is also the source of somatosensory
cortices serving the neck, face and head region and the ventral motor, premotor, and
prefrontal areas in the frontal lobe. The olfactory moiety proceeded through the insular
region of the limbic cortex (near the medial temporal lobe), and from there to the secondary
sensory area (Sm.
To summarize, Sanides' studies of the progressive architectonic shifts show that
each of the major sensory and motor areas of the cortex evolved systematically from the
limbic system. The sensory and motor areas, however, did not evolve along single
pathways; rather, each of the two moieties in the limbic system branched into motor and
sensory areas. In general terms, these two areas handle different aspects of activity. The
hippocampal trend leads to areas which deal with manipulation of the lower half of the
body and somatosensory experience had by that manipulation. From the olfactory trend
evolved areas subserving central vision and audition which handle distant sensory objects,
and also the motor and somatosensory functions serving the head, neck, and face.
Yeterian and Pandya supplemented Sanides' work with studies of the cortical
connectivity of the neocortex and limbic system. Their findings support the"notion that the
neocortex evolved from the limbic system by showing that patterns of connectivity
correspond to these architectonic patterns. Their studies involved two sorts of connections,
"intrinsic connections," and "long connections." Intrinsic connections describe the axon
fiber bundles which connect adjacent areas of the cortex within each lobe of the cerebrum;
for example, the intrinsic connections of the auditory cortex (Figure 6). Long connections
are fiber bundles which connect distant areas of the brain. such as the connections between
sensory association cortex and the frontal association cortex (Yeterian and Pandya, 1985:

6).
The intrinsic connections within functional areas of the neocortex parallel the
architectonic development of these areas. Each major sensory area shows a stepwise
progression of intrinsic connections. The auditory cortex. for example, has sequential
connections from the primary areas to association areas down to the proisocortex of the
olfactory moiety at the temporal pole; thus they follow the trend from the olfactory moiety
(Figure 6b). There are a/so sequential reciprocal connections flowing from proisocortex
back to the primary auditory area. These reciprocal connections show that information
flows in both directions between the limbic system, the primary areas, and all points
between. Connections in each direction also follow a pattern of "laminar specificity" in that
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each connection begins and terminates in a specific cell layer. The forward connections
from the primary areas originate from the third layer of the isocortex and terminate
primarily in layer IV, while those connections flowing back from the proisoconex originate
in layers V and VI and terminate in layer I, the outer-most layer of the isocortex. These
patterns of intrinsic connections and laminar specificity are present in all the sensory
cortices, visual, auditory, and somatosensory, and are also found in frontal association
cortex (Figure 6) (yeterian, 1985: 9). Thus both evolutionary trends are integrated with a
sequential, bi-directional flow of intrinsic connection between limbic areas and cortical

areas.
Two sorts of long connections are also consistent with Sanides' evolutionary
trends, the connections between the limbic cortex and frontal and sensory association areas
and between various areas within the neoconex itself. In addition to the short intrinsic
connections relating limbic cortices to the neocortex, there are also long connections which
relate sensory and motor association areas and the limbic cortex directly (Figure 7). For
example, the cingulate gyrus located above the corpus callosum in the hippocampal trend
has direct connections to the dorsal motor areas, such as MIl, and to somatosensory areas
such as SIT (Yeterian and Pandya, 1985: 6). As with the intrinsic connections, these long
connections are also reciprocal; thus information can flow in and out of the limbically
related cortices to all sensory and motor association areas. The limbic system, therefore
can influence and be influenced by these areas (Yeterian and Pandya, 1985: 29).
Direct connections between association areas, called. "cortico-cortical connections,"
relate the different sensory association areas to the frontal association areas. Like other
connections, these connections are bi-directional. Thus information can flow from sensory
to motor areas, but information can also flow from motor areas back to sensory areas. This
backflow of frontal lobe information is called "re-afference," which allows sensory areas to
adjust directly to what occurs in motor areas (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 431).
An interesting feature of the long cortico-cortical connections is that the most
heavily interconnected sensory and frontal association areas are those which occupy the
same evolutionary position within their respective regions. Thus, the orbital frontal cortex
and the rostral auditory cortex which are both close to their evolutionary source in the
limbic allocortex are most heavily interconnected; similarly, the areas far from their limbic
source such as the caudal auditory association cortex and the premotor cortex of the frontal
lobe are interconnected (Figure 7b) (Yeterian, 1985: 11).
The primary areas are the major exceptions to these patterns of connectivity. They
receive long connections from neither the limbic areas nor other association areas. Their
only connections are the intrinsic connections to adjacent cortex, and the direct connections
to the thalamus, mentioned above. The primary motor and sensory cortices, then, are
relatively isolated from the heavy interconnections seen in the association and limbic areas.
The architectonic and connectional data show that the two evolutionary trends did
not evolve in a piecemeal fashion, such as the development of a visual system in isolation
from a motor system; instead, the neoconex evolved from limbic cortex through the
gradual layering of whole integrated systems, including sensory, motor, and associational
systems. The primary areas seem to be the latest to evolve, since they are the furthest
removed from the limbic system and have the least direct interconnections with limbic
areas. The primary areas, however, can still receive limbic influence indirectly through the
intrinsic connections. The limbic system, therefore, maintains its grip, so to speak, on the
entire neocortex.
These data show that the neocortex evolved in a similar fashion as the rest of the
eNS, as described by MacLean's model. The brain evolved. through addition of integrated
layers, each of which deal with sensory input, integration and interpretation. and motor
output. These recent findings, however, disagree with MacLean's notion that the
neocortex was isolated from the influence of the limbic system. Whereas MacLean
proposed that the neocortex performed higher cognitive functions in relative isolation from
the swvival functions of the limbic system, Pandya and Yeterian have shown the limbic
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system to have either direct or indirect connections to the entire neoconex.! Also, these
connections are reciprocal, so limbic areas have access to motor and sensory information
and, in tum, can influence sensory and motor processes.
These data allow some interesting speculation about the significance of the limbic
system in "higher" cognitive functions. All cortical areas have access either directly or
indirectly to limbic influence, and the interaction is more intense the closer one gets to the
limbic conices. Figure 8 shows a schematic representation of the degree of limbic
connectivity and influence as one moves further away from primary areas in the sensory or
frontal lobes. The primary areas, then, are furthest removed from limbic influence, and
the association areas show the most intense interaction with limbic information. These
areas in the neocortex with increasing limbic influence will be called the "limbic diamond"
areas, with areas high in the limbic diamond being those with the most complex interaction
among limbic and association areas. Figure 8 shows a schematic representation of the
increasing limbic connectivity among frontal association cortex, sensory association
cortices, and limbic cortices.
Yeterian and Panda (1988), and Yeterian (1985: 12-14) have proposed a model of
information processing and behavior based upon their data. They propose that the higher
cognitive functions, including consciousness, thinking, language, and planning of action
may rely most heavily upon the interaction of areas with heavy limbic influence. This is
implied by the relationship of the primary areas to those of the limbic diamond-the
neocortical association areas, and limbic cortices (Figure 8). As mentioned, the primary
sensory areas receive sensory data in its "raw" form, as discreet signals for heat, pressure,
or pain in the primary somatosensory areas, for instance. These sensations are elaborated
as they move toward association cortices, into gestalts of sensations at various points on
the body. However, as the information moves beyond the primary areas, it involves
increasingly more limbic influence, as well as influence from other association areas via the
long cortical-cortical connections. Likewise, motor information interacts with limbic and
sensory areas before being released as behavior. There is also a backflow of information
from the motor areas to limbic and sensory areas via both intrinsic and long connections.
Therefore, the most intense and most complex information flow, and the most possibilities
and directions, occurs where two-way interaction among the limbic diamond areas is most
intense. The most complex elaboration of information occurs where limbic connectivity is
highest. Where the limbic system has the least influence, in the primary cortices, the
information processing is rudimentary (Yeterian, 1985: 13).
The functional significance of limbic connectivity with both sensory and motor
processing is that limbic influences are necessary for most "higher" cognitive functions to
rake place. The limbic system interacts with the sensory association cortices that are
involved in memory of objects, used in identifying objects, and forming cognitive
representations of our surroundings (including imaginative representations). The frontal
association areas with high limbic influence include the prefrontal and supplementary motor
areas which are involved with planning and sequencing behaviors, or, in short, thinking.
Areas important for language are also located in areas of high limbic influence. The limbic
system itself can contribute important elements to this process. The cingulate gyrus seems
to provide the motivation necessary for plans of action to be carried out, The temporal pole
and orbital frontal cortex can add to action and emotional context, by drawing from sensory
information and influencing motor behavior as well. H experiences are to be remembered,
they must reach the hippocampus. These are just a few suggestions of how the limbic
areas are involved in action and cognition.
1 Certain other subcortical structures are highly interconnected with the neocortex as well. The thalamus,
especially, sends connections to all points of me neocortex. It thus serves as a relay station for other
subcortical structures, as does me limbic system. Many of theexact functions of the thalamus, however, are
unknown.
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There are also more direct lines of evidence that the limbic system is crucial to
higher forms of cognition. in the deficits present when different limbic areas are cut off
from the cortex. I mentioned above that people who lose connections from the cingulate
gyrus to the motor cortex are able to plan behaviors, such as getting out of bed in the
morning, but are unable to carry them out H.M:s loss of the hippocampus and amygdala
limited his experience of the immediate past to the minute or so that his short-term memory
lasts (Yeterian, 1985: 13). Relatively little is known about the exact functions of the limbic
system in action and cognition; however, it is clear that no aspect of sensory or motor
function is ever totally separate from limbic influence.
What is interesting is that these limbic structures seemingly so crucial to higher

cognitive processes are a/so those which coordinate most of the organism's behaviors for
survival, such as feeding, reproduction and excretion. These "survival functions" were
traditionally considered far removed from abstract thought and consciousness (c.f.
MacLean above). This implies that higher cognitive activity has evolved not as independent
processes, but as extensions and elaborations of "lower" functions. Higher cognitive
processes exist as systems which maintain interdependency with their evolutionary origins.
Limbic influence in the neocortex also implies that survival and self-maintenance priorities
lie behind much of what goes on in higher cognitive processes, in selecting significant
information, in adding emotional and motivational tone to experience, and in remembering
experiences for future action. This is not to say that everything we do is explicitly for
survival. The evolution of the neocortex in humans (and the capacity for social interaction
which it allows) allows actions as rich in complexity and as indirectly removed from
immediate concerns for survival as we observe in our own lives. Keep in mind, however,
that Mead considered the act as a process of adjustment by which the organism maintains
itself in a changing environment. This similarity will be considered funher in the next
chapter.
As the organism adjusts to increasingly complex situations, and human beings deal
with the most complex situations, it seems that the intensity of interaction between sensory
input and motor output must also be more complex. It is out of this complexity, however,
that our highest capacities for organizing reality are possible. These capacities are realized
furthest by our creation of and interdependence with a social world. After half a century of
research in neurophysiology and neuroanatomy, we can still retain Mead's belief that
symbolic interactionist social psychology and neural systems are not incompatible, but
complementary. In the next chapters I will explore to what extent both perspectives
support a more unified understanding of action and human conduct
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Consistencies between Symbolic
Interactionism and Neurophysiology

Though the presentations of symbolic interaction and neurophysiology may have
seemed to touch upon some similar points, the reader may have found the two realms of
description to be quite unrelated. The thesis of this paper is to show that the
neurophysiological description of human action, and that of symbolic interactionism are
more than distinct specialties, but instead hold consistent perspectives of the nature of
reality and of the human being's active relationship to that reality. This can be shown
without reducing one level of analysis to the other. Both positions describe a common
topic, the action of human beings. Drawing from both the realm of human group life and
social psychology and also upon recent findings in neuropsychology, we propose that
Mead's symbolic interaetionist position of action is consistant with the structure and
functions of the central nervous system.
This chapter will present the "meta-theory" by which we find these two descriptions
linked. In chapter four, I will speculate upon several specific similarities between the two
perspectives through an integrated analysis of Mead's act. In this chapter I will consider
the following theoretical consistancies between symbolic interactionist and
neurophysiological conceptions of action: (1) The neurophysiological and the symbolic
interactionism position view reality as a process, and the relationship of a living organism
to reality as one of adjustment. (2) The organism deals with emergent reality through a
process of interpretation in which both the action and the environment of the organism is
built up in a co-determinant process . (3) Both perspectives support similar rejections of
dualistic conceptions of mind and body, subjectivity and objectivity, and the organism and
environment. (4) Both perspectives describe this adjustive relationship as an active process
as opposed to the passive model of action proposed by the stimulus-response approach.
(5) Both also reject the mechanistic and deterministic dimensions of the stimulus-response
model of action. (6) The alternatives these perspectives propose are also similar in that
action is viewed as a co-determinant and formative process which involves both serial and
parallel processes occurring simultaneously. These two processes are interdependent, and
consistent with a common dynamics principle, that of action as a process of adjustment to
an emergent reality.
I will start with the theoretical and rather cosmic assumptions of the nature of reality
as applicable to both the individual organism and its central nervous system. Both facets of
the living system hold two common assumptions. The first assumption is that all that
exists is in process. This is the accepted assumption that the universe is fundamentally
dynamic in nature, and there is nothing truly static. No element of human activity,
therefore, can be described as a static processes, but must fit a dynamic conception of
reality (Morrione, 1988). The second assumption is that reality is emergent. Emergence
describes the fundamental indeterminacy in the relationships of matter and energy through
time. At any moment, everything in the universe has an essentially novel relationship with
everything else, since no two isolated moments can be numerically identical and all that
exists is in a process of change. Because of the changing relationships and the increasing
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complexity of relationships if we consider conglomerates of particles, we cannot assume
that matter and energy change as determined cause and effect; rather there is a basic
indeterminacy in the direction of change. Heisenberg's principle of non-linearity confirms
this position. Thus emergence expresses the indeterminate process of changing
relationships characteristic of all that exists, including living organisms.
Though all is in emergent process, there is also structure in the universe, which can
be described by theories of system dynamics. Physics describes various forces which bind
particles, or restrain their motions within probabilistic parameters; and system theories,
such as thermodynamics describe how various dynamic structures of matter and energy
persist over time. A piece of iron persists by the coherency of its bonds and the proximity
of its surrounding particles. The law of thermodynamics would describe the rock to be at
equilibrium in relationship to its surroundings. At equilibrium, the amount of entropy, or
random unusable energy, has gathered in the given system which dampens its kinetic state.
Heat the iron, and its kinetic state changes, until the bar begins to melt. Remove the heat,
and the iron eventually returns to equilibrium with its surroundings.
Living systems operate by the laws of thermodynamics as well, but maintain a more
complex dynamic relationship to their surroundings than do most non-living things.
Herben Blumer and George Herbert Mead use the term "adjustment" to describe the
dynamic relationship characteristic of living systems. Adjustment is the process by which a
living system actively reorganizes its own past conditions in the present to confirm
emergent, or novel occurrences.
In order to persist. living systems maintain a dynamic state which is far from
equilibrium, and they do so by actively importing energy and exporting entropy which
builds in their system.l If entropy accumulates in the system. its kinetic state slows down
as it approaches equilibrimn and the living system dies. The living system, therefore, must
be constantly active through both change and persistence in order to survive and maintain
its dynamic state far from equilibrium. The adjusting system handles emergent occurrences
differently than non-living systems. The equilibrium system responds passively to change,
such as the iron bar which is heated externally. The adjusting system. however, actively
confronts emerging reality. The adjusting system persists by maintaining a dynamic
balance between two processes. novelty and confirmation. Novelty is emerging reality,
and confirmation is the adjustive process by which novel occurrences are handled. If there
are more emergent or novel occurrences than the system can handle, the system is
destroyed by a state of chaos. On the other hand, if the organism adjusts completely to all
emergent conditions entropy would build up bringing the system to equilibrium, or death .
By constantly importing novelty as energy and matter, and exporting entropy or unusable
confmned energy. the living system persists. Thus an adjusting system requires both
change and persistence to survive. As Mead puts it. the living system is always "living in
the future" because present conditions are inadequate to sustain life once confirmed and
therefore the present must constantly be reorganized (Miller. 1973: 30).
Adjustment describes a dynamic principle common to all living things. The concept
therefore applies directly to Mead's description of the acting individual and to the central
nervous system. both of which are composed of countless adjusting systems. The
significant point of this concept to our analysis of action is that no living thing can exist by
a passive relationship to its environment, therefore no adequate model of action can
presuppose passive relationships. Both the neurophysiological and the interactionist

1 The description of life processes as far-from-equilibrium systems is taken from a relatively recent
paradigm in system sciences. the "self-organization" paradigm. Erich Jantsch (1980) in his book "The Self
organizing universe" gives a comprehensive study of the paradigm and the system dynamicscharacteristic of

living systems. Though Mead's writings predate the empirical study of far-from-equilibrium systems. his
concepts are very consistent with this current theory of system dynamics. The similarities between Mead's
concepts and the self-<Jrganization paradigm deserve further study.
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positions describe active adjustive relationships between the organism and emergent reality.
Symbolic interactionists, Mead and Blumer especially, have constructed their theories
according to this principle. and the neurophysiological position also follows the dynamics
of adjustment. 1 I will describe a sample in which adjustive dynamics apply to both
perspectives.
As mentioned in chapter one. Mead's act is an expression of the adjustive processes
as a basic unit of activity. The countless component processes of the act, however. are
themselves adjustive processes, which include the activities of the CNS. The impulse
serves as an example of adjustive dynamics which embodies the processes of self
organization and interpretation as elements of activity. In Mead's view, the impulse rather
than the stimuli is the primary organizing factor in the act. "We cannot interpret the act in
terms of stimuli. If we do. we miss its significance. Rather, an impulse or a tendency to
act is present. and it makes use of stimuli or selects stimuli to act. and this is characteristic
of all life forms. Stimuli are the means, but the tendency. the impulse, is essential for
anything to be a stimulus" (1927: 109). By tendency, Mead seems to refer to the dynamic
flow of adjustment and emergence described above. The impulse occurs with the
fluctuation in this flow, the emergent event which the organism must handle to maintain
itself, The impulse, then, begins the process of confirming novel or emergent occurrences
in a given situation. The novel occurrence may be the block in one's line of action which
OCcurs with the problematic situation, such as the discovery that one's car has stalled in
traffic; or the impulse may be "internal," such as the lack of glucose in the cell. Mead
seems to include even the cellular components of organisms as dealing with impulses of
their own.
At the impulse, the organism selects from its surroundings what it needs to sustain
itself There is therefore a goal or direction present with the impulse. ''The act reduces to
energy ready to express itself. but along lines determined by the character of the structure
of the body" (1927: 114). The adjustive system "knows," in effect, what it needs to
maintain itself. The cell knows it requires less carbon dioxide and more glucose,
knowledge which is expressed in the active exchange of these materials. The hungry dog
knows its needs food. which manifests in the act of eating. Mead calls this self-organizing
process "intelligence. "Intelligence is the selection by the organism of stimuli that will set
free and maintain life and aid in rebuilding the form. (1927: 109). This is not the same as
reflective intelligence or conscious knowledge (though both involve these selective
processes), but is common to all living systems. In acquiring what it needs to sustain
itself, the system expends energy, but only when it actually processes something. "Food
does not exist as an object till there is an animal that can select and react to carbons and
proteins. For something to be food. it must be in relationship with an organism" (1927:
115). Thus a stimulus is only relevant to action if it is selected. "Stimuli are the means,
but the tendency, the impulse, is essential for anything to be an impulse." For the stimulus
to be related to action, therefore, it must be incorporated into the ongoing activity of the
organism. Novel events are incorporated through the interpretive process.
From Mead's description of the impulse can be derived how organisms act on the
basis of an interpretive process rather than by the causal force of stimuli themselves. In
other words, organisms act on the basis of the meaning of things, and not on the basis of
stimuli alone. Action is built up through a selective process of adjustment to the impulse.
The adjusting system organizes with each emerging impulse the criteria for selecting the
II

II

1 The adjustive process as I have described it. however, is not often acknowledged by interactionists. and it
is probable that many have DOt understood the system dynamics which Mead and Blumer had in mind.
Likewise, I have discovered only a small amount of literature that refers to adjustive, self-organizing
processes in the CNS (c.f. Jantseh, 1980). I am therefore extrapolating Mead's dynamic perspective to the
neurophysiological level. I consider this a valid extrapolation because Mead's perspective is meant to apply
to all living systems, It is not certain. however, that adjustive dynamics apply uniformly to every system
in the CNS.
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stimuli needed for its maintenance. The hungry dog's impulse begins to organize the act of
getting food. The neuron's lack of a neurotransmitter sets the criteria for its selection
through the cell membrane. The stimuli emerge in an environment which is both within
and outside of the organism. The stimuli may be energy, matter, or information, such as
the significant symbol (which reduces to both energy and matter). The emergent stimuli
release the energy of the impulse in the sense that they meet or confirm the prior
organization which selects them. The impulse, however, does not determine the course of
action in this process, since the tendency to act does not predict ex.aetly what stimuli it will
receive. Thus the neuron which is prepared to receive acetylcholine, a transmitter
substance may take in curare, a poison which mimics acetylcholine. The hungry dog may
find that the plastic toy steak it chews does not satisfy its hunger. Action therefore is
indeterminate. The organism prepares for the future but the future it receives is never
exactly as predicted. Actions, however, emerge from the interaction of both the prior
organization and whatever stimuli it is able to select. This is the interpretive process of
action. For human beings, meaning as an organization of future action is part of this
interpretive process.
Through this interpretive process the organism builds up both the actions it carries
out, and the environment it experiences. Its environment is constructed continually of the
interaction between the organization it brings to experience and what it receives as emergent
stimuli. "Thus every form maps out its own environment, its line of influence and so gives
rise to other objects existing in relationship to the form itself. The environment emerges,
and forms create environment, be they nests or homes" (I 927: 115). Thus, the organism
selects the stimuli which sustain it, and and in turn recreates the environment. Action,
therefore, involves a codetermination of the organism and its environment. In simpler
organisms the environment is merely the dynamic chemical exchange of the organism and
that which it selects, such as the amoeba in relation to its food. With human beings, the
environment, as such, includes conscious objects which can be physical, social, and
abstract, including others and the self.
To summarize the interactionist conception of reality, the relation between living
and non-living systems is one of active adjustment The adjustment process describes an
organism as a self-organizing system which confronts emergent reality by actively selecting
what it needs to maintain itself. In doing so, the act is built up as emergent reality is
interpreted. This is an indeterminate process since both the criteria of selection and the
stimuli received are emergent in that neither predetermine the course of action. The
interpretive process organizes both the form of response and the environment which the
organism experiences. In other words, the interpretive process of adjustment organizes the
meaning of things. Organisms act then, not on the basis of stimuli alone, but on the basis
of the meaning of things.
This rather abstract discussion of the interactionist conception of reality is relevant
to OlD" discussion because it is consistent with the neurophysiological model of information
processing described in chapter two. The brain processes information through an
interpretive, adjustive process and action, insofar as it is mediated by the eNS, is built up
by the brain's interpretive processes. Indirect evidence for this claim comes from the fact
that the brain consumes a great deal of energy and thus maintains a far-from equilibrium
state. The brain, for example, comprises only two percent of the body weight, but
consumes twenty percent of the available oxygen (Carlson, 1986: 116). This implies that
the brain is actively maintaining a far-from-equlibrium state through adjustive, self
organizing processes. This assumption is supported, however, by evidence that stimuli
which reach the primary sensory areas are not passively linked to a response, but are
actively selected by other areas. This is evident in the connectivity of the primary sensory
and motor cortices to the association cortices and limbic system. The primary sensory
areas have no direct connections to motor output areas. Data must first go through areas in
the "limbic diamond" where interconnections and, thus, the complexity of processing is
most intense among limbic and association cortices. It is in the limbic diamond areas where
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information is elaborated, related to past and anticipated future conditions, and where some
sort of response is organized. It is also where the success of these responses is monitored
and modified continuously.
This highly interactive form of injormmion processing is essentially an adjustive
process of the same sort essential to Mead's position. From among the total spectrum of
sensory experiences reaching the primary areas, the limbic diamond areas select the
information which is relevant to the situation at hand. Various areas and systems within the
brain deal with only the information relevant to their own functions. Visual areas deal with
visual information and auditory areas with auditory information. I It is not known exactly
how the information is selected or exactly how it is processed; however, we can assume
that with the intensity of bi-directional connections in these areas there is opportunity for
the sorts of processes Mead has assumed to occur. Even routine acts, such as looking for a
snack in the refrigerator, involve highly interactive processing in the brain. Limbic
influences contribute processes such as emotional experience, motivation of action, and
also select those experiences which are preserved as memory. The act begins with the
impulse such as the pang of hunger which mobilizes the action of finding food; therefore,
the impulse as the energy or tendency to act corresponds with the evidence that the limbic
system is a source of motivation. The limbic system also has access to both sensory and
motor cortices, and the multimodal forms of memory, including motor memory, and thus
may be instrumental to organizing the direction of action. One remembers what son of
food may be found in the refrigerator, such as leftover cake. Motor response may also be
sequenced in this highly interactive process; thus an environment of objects is built up, as
well as related forms of response. The various items in the refrigerator are meaningful in
terms of being good snacks. This manipulation, when released, is monitored by sensory
areas, which allows the act to be continuously modified. One does not find the cake, but
takes fruit instead. Through these complex processes, information flows simultaneously
through millions of pathways flowing in different directions, and the brain deals with
countless stimuli simultaneously. It is clear, therefore, that action does not follow a linear
path from stimulus to response. The brain adjusts to the information it processes, and
action is emergent and indeterminate.
We have seen that both the interactionist and neurophysiological perspectives share
a common dynamic principle that action in living systems is a result of an interpretive,
adjustive process. From this approach, both Mead's and the neurophysiological
perspectives are able to account for the physical processes of psychical phenomena, such as
subjective experience, consciousness, mind, and self. Models which do not acknowledge
the interpretive, adjustive processes of action cannot be applied adequately to living
organisms, and therefore, cannot adequately describe psychological processes. I will
describe briefly how the stimulus-response model of action fails in this regard. The S-R
model can be shown to be a passive. dualistic, mechanistic, and deterministic model of
action. Focusing upon these arguments will reveal further similarities between the
interaetionist and neurophysiological models of action.
Any model of action which applies adequately to living systems must describe an
active rather than passive relationship between the organism and emergent reality; thus the
stimulus-response model of-action can be rejected, because it holds that action is a passive
response to the stimuli which strike us. There is no prior organization to receive stimuli;
the stimuli themselves organize the form of response, setting off some conditioned
reflexive sequence. The passive system is otherwise at equilibrium until it receives some
stimulus from the environment. Given the necessity of a living thing to maintain an active
adjustment relationship to its surroundings, it is clear that action cannot occur in living

1 Multimodal areas, however, process information from several sensory modes. Il is unknown exactly what
each system and area selects; we can only assume that systemsare selecting infonnation of some sort.

D.S. Fearon. Jr.

Symbolic Interaction and Neurophysiology

56

systems through the causal force of the stimulus alone. Therefore, any description of
action driven by stimulus or by some other linear, causal chain, should be rejected.
The construction of action through the interpretive process and the codetermination
of the organism and its environment are the criteria Mead uses for rejecting dualistic
concepts, particularly the split between mind and body, subjectivity and objectivity, and the
stimulus and response. Mead rejects the mind/body dualism by showing that mind is a
physical process rather than a separate "substance" transcending the material world.
Consciousness arises from a certain form of the adjustive process in which the human
being indicates the meaning of objects with significant gestures or symbols in interaction
with oneself or others. Consciousness, then, is not a static property but an active process
emerging from a certain dynamic relationship with emergent reality in the course of .
adjusting to situations. This rejection of Cartesian-type dualism also serves to bridge the
gap between subjective and objective experience. This form of dualism is imposed by
those who assume primary qualities to be the causal source of secondary qualities such as
color, shape, and sound (c.f. ch. 1). Without a concept of the selective process of
interpretation there is no means by which objective occurrences can become subjective
experience. In the interactionist position subjectivity and objectivity are always linked.
since the organism is actively creating its environment while being created by it. The
organism brings to the primary qualities of the physical world the conditions for selection,
and subjective experience is one result of the physical processes of interpretation. In this
functional description, the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity blurs. Likewise,
in the neocortex there is the "raw" experience of primary qualities registering in the primary
ares of the cortex, including the experience of contact resistance.! This basic experience as
sensation is not significant for forming action until it is processed and elaborated further,
and it is from this complex elaboration that subjective experience arises, in whatever forms
it may take.
In addition to rejecting these traditional philosophical dualistic concepts, both
interactionist and neurophysiological approaches reject dualistic analyses of action. These
forms of analysis are held by those who consider action to result from chains of cause and
effect, the worst offenders, again, being the S-R model. In the S-R model, the stimuli
come from the environment-generally from outside the organism and cause a response
through a relation of processes inside the organism. Even if one assumes that some stimuli
have an internal source, such as the stimuli for hunger, there is still a dualistic assumption
being made. The stimulus is separate and distinct from the response because it is the causal
source of the response.
The causal relationship between stimulus and response is mechanistic rather than
interpretive, and therefore is not a process characteristic of living systems. In a mechanistic
process, the stimulus X causes some change in the system which links X to response Y,
which is the output A soda machine, for example, receives a quarter which initiates the
sequence by which it releases the soda. The interpretive process, in contrast, is not one of
cause and effect The selection of stimuli on the basis of self-organized criteria comes prior
to the stimulus, intervening between cause and effect, and adding a degree of complexity in
which such direct causality is lost. The activity of the organism and the eNS, therefore,
does not occur through passive mechanistic processes, but through interpretive, adjustive
processes. The soda machine does not maintain itself as it receives quarters and releases
beverages, while the person drinking the soda is quenching his or her thirst By failing to
account for the adjustive relationship between the organism and emergent reality. those
who use S-R models cannot adequately describe psychological processes and purposes for
action in physical terms.

1 This information bas already been "translated" twice, in the sense organs, and in the synapse of the
thalamus, There are also several other subcorticalpaths which sensory information may take.
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The stimulus-response model is also flawed in that it assumes a determinant
sequential path ofaction from a specific stimulus to a specific response. The interactionist
model, in contrast, allows active modification of the act as it occurs, and thus is more
consistent with the connectivity of the brain. As described above. action is built up as the
organism anticipates future conditions in organizing present conditions. This process is
indeterminate because the organism continuously interacts with the novel conditions of the
present. The act, therefore. is not simply the release of a response but is instead an
ongoing process of modification. We modify immediately how much strength we use to
lift a tea kettle as we discover how heavy it is. The course of action does not follow a
predetermined path but fluctuates with emergent reality and can be redirected. Openness to
modification also gives the act flexibility. where the response to stimuli is largely inflexible
and determinant in the S-R model. It is not clear, for example, how the same stimuli can
have different meaning in different situations, whereas in the interpretive model the
meaning can be built up fairly independently from the specific nature of the stimuli. When
one is hungry, the box of breakfast cereal is a source of food. When one has just eaten, the
box is something to put back in the cupboard. Though the box itself looks the same in both
instances, its meaning depends upon what we are going to do with the object. In the brain,
different sources of sensation, limbic involvement, and memory are organized differently in
both actions.
Perhaps the most significant link between the neurophysiological and interactionist
concepts of action is that both account for the simultaneous occurrence ofboth sequential
and parallel forms of information processing. This link makes possible the integrated
model of action which is the primary thesis of this paper. For action to be anticipated yet
monitored and modified simultaneously, both parallel and sequential forms of information
processing are necessary. Purely sequential models of action, such as the stimulus
response model, cannot account for the parallel processing which is readily observable in
behavior. Typing is an example of sequential and parallel processes operating
simultaneously. We type a given sequence of words from left to right, but at the same time
monitor what we type, such that mistakes stand out as objects which we indicate. Mead
describes the act as requiring parallel and sequential processes. The four phases of the act
often follow a sequential pattern from impulse to consummation; however, as described in
chapter one, each phase is present in some form throughout the act. The impulse. for
example, calls out both sensory and motor images which anticipate both what one perceives
and what one may do in the future. Manipulation and perception also occur simultaneously
as we monitor what we do. Likewise, the symbol calls out the result of the act before it
occurs allowing us to consciously guide our line of activity. All of these capacities require
parallel processing of information in order that they can occur simultaneously as well as
sequentially.
The ability to handle parallel and sequential processes simultaneously is reflected in
the anatomical and functional organization of the neocortex, especially with the reciprocal
flow at the peak areas of the limbic diamond. As described in chapter two. in addition to
sequential connections between sensory and motor areas of the cortex, there are also
connections flowing from motor areas in the frontal lobe back to sensory areas. There are
also parallel, reciprocal connections between the limbic system and both sensory and motor
areas. Other nuclei, such as certain thalamic nuclei, have reciprocal connections with only
a specific area of the brain, such as a specific motor area. These feedback loops could
modify, inhibit. or intensify communication among different brain areas. For example,
cortical connections with the limbic system allow a two-way flow of information from both
sensory and motor areas. Thus the limbic system can influence and be influenced by both
sensory and motor areas. These connections operate in parallel because they have separate
axonal pathways in the brain. and they can operate simultaneously since separate groups of
neurons can fire at the same time. This is seen in metabolic scans of cortical activity.
These scans show entire regions of the cortex to be more active than others depending upon
the task. When subjects are asked to imagine walking down a street, for instance, the
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prefrontal areas and the visual association areas become more active. though other areas of
the brain are also active.
The presence of parallel and sequential processes in both neurophysiological and
behavioral facets of action calls for a new model for describing hwnan conduct. A model
of action for both humans and other animals must acknowledge holistic, interpretive, and
adjustive processes involving non-determinant, bi-directional flow of activity from which
action emerges. A purely sequential model of action would not make sense given such
connectivity. This is especially true for models which presuppose that information flows in
one direction only, from sensory input to motor output 1 An arrow from sensory to motor
areas in the frontal lobe might represent the flow of sensory stimuli to motor response.
However, an accurate model would also have to show arrowsflcwing back from motor to
sensory, or from limbic and subcortical areas, and the arrows themselves would be
modified through various reciprocal feedback loops. Thus anyone area of the brain could
have millions of arrows of connectivity and could potentially be influenced by most other
areas in the brain either directly or indirectly. Any attempt to fmd strict sequential relations
between stimulus and response in such a system is futile. The model of action which can
account for such connectivity cannot do so by imposing causal sequential relations among
the organism and its environment.Z
Serial and pa.rallel processes are evident both in action and in the structure and
functions of the neocortex. The necessity of both processes in action, however, show that
both symbolic interactionism and neurophysiology support a consistent perspective of the
nature of reality. Both parallel and sequential processes are necessary and interdependent
in a model ofaction as adjustment between a living system and its surroundings. Activity
is handled in and modified by an interpretive process by which the organism deals with
novel events in its surroundings. The organism, in order to maintain itself, requires both
an emergent structure and an openness to novel events. Acts are built up in this co
determinant process. The emergent structuring that confirms novel events is accomplished
largely by sequential processes. The organism confirms novel events by sequencing a line
of activity which both anticipates future occurrences and handles immediate occurrences.
The organism also must be open to novelty. such that ongoing action can be modified.
This requires a simultaneous monitoring of activity while it occurs, which is possible
through parallel processing of information. The organism maintains itself by keeping a
balance between novelty and confirmation at a dynamic level which is far from equilibrium.
Shifts in this balance are, generally speaking, the impulses which organize further activity,
the fuel which keeps activity going. The combination ofparallel and sequential processes,
therefore, is characteristic of the common dynamics by which ail living things persist, the
I The idea that infonnalion flows primarily from sensory to motor areas is still a fairly predominant view
in the neurosciences, even though most grant that information may follow parallel pathways to the frontal
cortex and other areas. Relatively liuIe attention in the study of behavior has been given to the function of
reaffereace from motor areas, though interest in these connectionsseems to be increasinglately.
2 I have used the stimulus-response model as a running example of the sort of passive, dualistic,
mechanistic,and deterministic model of action which both symbolic interactionism and neurophysiology
reject. The S-R model has been the scapegoat here, as it often is in Mead and Blumer's writings. The flaws
of tbe S-R model, however, may apply to any model of action of living organisms, human or otherwise.
which presupposes a causal or sequential chain of action, a dualistic distinction between the organism and
its environment,or which fails to account for interpretive.adjustive relationship between Lhe organism and
its surroundings. Such models of action are found in most fields of the social and biological sciences.
Some sociobiologists, for example, attempt to reduce social action to genetic determinants. Some
sociologists often propose social forces which determine behavior, and some psychologists look: for
"attitudes" which determine behavior. The alternative model proposed here has many implications for
comparative studies with other theories, as weU as methodological issues; however, such discussions are
DO( within thescope of an introductory theoretical paper.

D.S. Fearon. Jr.

Symbolic Interaction and Neurophysiology

59

process 0/ adiustmem. Thus the most intriguing link between symbolic interactionism and
neurophysiology is that both hold a consistent view of reality as an adjustive process.
Furthermore, there seems to be several elements of action where Mead seems to have
anticipated both the connectivity and function of the eNS as well as its evolution, despite
over half a century of new research in neuroscience. We have explored the major
theoretical similarities in this chapter. In the chapter four I will suggest how serial and
parallel processes and limbic diamond interaction in the brain can be integrated with Mead's
description of the act

Chapter 4: An Integrated Analysis of the Act

Since this paper serves as a research proposal rather than a compendium of research
in its own right, the theoretical similarities between the neurophysiological and symbolic
interactionist perspectives is perhaps more relevant at this stage than extensive specific
examples of neurophysiological components of social psychological processes. A
theoretical framework can guide future study of both perspectives, especially since so few
attempts have been made to integrate these approaches to the study of human action. In this
light, the final chapter of this proposal will serve as a sample of the wealth of insights
possible through an integration of symbolic interaction and the neurosciences. In this
chapter I will discuss several specific similarities between Mead's description of the act,
and the neurophysiological model presented in Chapter two. I will focus particularly upon
the role of reciprocal connectivity and interaction in the "limbic diamond" area of the
neocortex, and more specifically upon the role of the limbic system in the act.
The impulse
The limbic diamond connectivity and the limbic system is implied throughout
Mead's description of the act I will introduce the relation of limbic diamond influence to
the act with a discussion of the impulse, and will note other possible roles for this
connectivity in the other four phases of the act. The impulse relates to the limbic diamond
connectivity along two general aspects introduced in chapter one; the origin of impulses in
the ongoing process of adjustment, and the role of the impulse in sensitizing all phases of
the act. For the first aspect, it is speculated that, at the conical level, the impulse arises
from the complex interaction of the limbic system and limbic diamond areas, rather than
from the stimuli received in the primary sensory areas" Second, Mead's description of the
impulse implies several aspects of limbic output. An impulse with a limbic source could
sensitize both motor and sensory cortices, and be instrumental to projecting future lines of
activity. The act which begins with the limbic diamond interaction differs from serial
information processing or S-R type models, which would propose that the act begins with
sensory information reaching primary conices. OUf physiological model, though
speculative, would support Mead's concept of action is an interpretive process of
adjustment rather than a passive model of stimulus and response.
The impulse as an adjustive process is a tendency to reorganize, to various degrees,
lines of activity which confirm novel events. Since novel events take many forms, from
headaches to street riots, the organism must have an ongoing capacity for some form of
active adjustment to all changes in its world if the organism is to survive. Therefore. for
adjustment to take place, a complex representation of the world must be maintained to meet
and handle novel events. It is possible that interaction in the limbic diamond area is where
the most complex processes of adjustment to changing situations takes place, insofar as
cortical activity is involved) Further, the impulses which begin the act may arise primarily
IMany acts and processes of adjustment, such as autonomic functions. maintaining posture, or repetitive
actions such as walking, may rely largely on subcortical interaction. Subcortical interaction can certainly
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from limbic diamond interaction. There are several factors supporting the position that
limbic diamond interaction begins the act First, the limbic diamond area constructs the
most complex representation of ongoing activity such that it is able to adjust to novel events
reaching any sensory area, as well as internally generated events. Primary areas do not
have this capacity for adjustment on their own. Emergent events must be made relevant to
the entire organism if the entire organism is to adjust to them. Information reaches primary
areas in its least elaborate form and in the form distinct for the particular sensory mode.
Only visual information reaches visual primary areas, only auditory information reaches
auditory primary areas. For information to be useful, it must undergo elaboration in
association areas, where information from different sensory modalities is mixed with
information from the limbic areas and frontal association areas. The limbic diamond areas,
therefore, are where the most complex processing of novel stimuli occurs at the conical
level. With complex reciprocal connectivity in these areas, all major cortical and subcortical
functions can be "represented," Sensory information is available as mulrimodal gestalts of
the external sensory world and as sensory imagery, such as visual imagery of imagined
objects. Symbolic information, such as auditory or written words, is also processed in the
limbic diamond area. Subcortical information such as hunger or sleepiness, and emotional
information may also be present in the ongoing representation of the world in the limbic
diamond area
Limbic diamond interaction also carries past experience into the present, and thus
orients the organism to new stimuli. Binding the past to the future to organize present
experience is the essence of the adjustive process. Binding one moment to the next
includes the reconstruction of distant past experiences, or long-term memories; however, it
is the short-term memories of the immediate past, perhaps, which maintain the ongoing
orientation toward situations over time. The immediate past is always oriented toward the
future as a projected line of activity one constructs continually to meet situations. For
example, the perception of distant objects involves projecting a future contact relationship
on the immediate sensory experience. The individual anticipates a future hypothetical
relationship with the object on the basis of which novel information is organized. As
mentioned, the adjustive process is the essential dynamic of living organisms, and is
therefore a continuous process. The adjustive process, then, involves monitoring or
interpreting incoming information according to the internal representation of the world
which is constructed continually. At the neocortical level, this process occurs between the
limbic diamond areas adjusting to unelaborated. information from the primary areas and
subcortical areas.
It isfrom the interaction between the complex, ongoing representation of the world
and the emergent conditions or novel stimuli thai impulses arise. The impulse arises out of
fluctuations in this ongoing adjustive process. These fluctuations are possible where
interaction is highest, where the sensory and internal world has its most complex
representation, and where the past is bound to a future line of activity. Emergence of the
impulse is a capacity essential for the organism's self maintenance, since an impulse is
necessary for changing one's line of activity to meet emerging situations. The more
complex the representation of the situation, the more likely and more discriminating the
fluctuations may be, making impulses more likely to occur. The organism can adjust to
these discrepancies with more complex and finely organized action. The complex limbic
interaction in human beings, therefore, is adaptive for acting in a more complex social
world, and also allows the social world itself to evolve. Thus out of the highest complexity

influenceaclivity at the neocortical level. and thereforecarries on some of the functions to which I ascribe
to the limbic diamond area. I will mention some aspects of subcortical interaction below; however, I will
focus discussion on neocorticaland limbic system adjustment processesand leave implicit that subcortical
systems, in fact the entire organism,are involved in adjustmentas well,
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of interaction comes the most order, through the more adaptive interpretation of emerging
conditions.I
The impulse itself seems to have its source, for the most part, in the limbic system.
Though the impulse arises out of the interaction of the limbic diamond and the rest of the
eNS, impulses have effects similar to limbic influences on activity and information
processing described in chapter two. This suggestion gives Mead's concept of impulse a
significant link to neuroanatomy and physiology. Mead's concept of impulse has two
similarities to limbic influence on interaction. First, if impulses originate largely through
limbic processes, it can be seen how the impulse can mobilize action and sensitize all parts
of the act in building a new line ofaction. Second, the limbic system's generalfunctions in
survival processes are similar to Mead's concept of the impulse as geared toward self

maintenence.
According to Mead, impulses reorganize the organism's line of action by sensitizing
all phases of the act-perception, manipulation, and consummation. He suggested that the
tendency to act calls out "imagery," both motor and sensory imagery, which orients the
organism toward selecting certain stimuli, and simultaneously begins to organize the form
of manipulation, both processes referring to the goal or consummation of the given act
(Baldwin. 1986: 56). The limbic system is a likely source of the impulse in this respect.
since it has heavy reciprocal connections to both sensory and motor areas. The limbic
system receives information from cortical and subcortical areas in building up the "inner
world" which can serve as source of the impulse; but it is, perhaps, in the outflow of
limbic influence that the previous line of action is reorganized and the new act begins. For
the impulse to sensitize all parts of the act, it must interact with both motor and sensory
activity. The limbic system has access to both motor cortex and sensory cortex
simultaneously through parallel pathways. Both the hippocampal and olfactory trends of
connectivity branch out to all sensory areas, especially association areas where elaboration
of information occurs; they also send two-way connections to motor cortices, especially
the supplementary and prefrontal cortices where planning and sequencing of behaviors
occurs. Thus an impulse of hunger, arising primarily from the hypothalamus and reaching
the cortex via the limbic system, can branch out to prime sensory areas for the selection of
stimuli relevant to the act of eating. The hunger impulse can simultaneously prime the
motor areas to begin sequencing lines of response. For human beings (if they should
decide to act on the impulse), objects related to finding food become meaningful toward
this goal, including objects emerging from memory. Complex motor sequences for
attaining the food can be formulated. simultaneously. Though it is not known exactly how
such "imagery" from the limbic system interacts with neocortical areas, it seems that Mead
had correctly assumed the connectivity involved in this process.
Mead's description of the impulse is also similar to limbic system's functions in the
self-maintenance of the organism. I argued in chapters two and three that the whole of the
organism, and the CNS especially, is involved in the process of self-maintenance. As the
brain evolved, later stages developed mainly as elaborations of the self-maintaining
adjustive processes. This is not to say that the complexity of activity, especially human
activity, reduces to survival behaviors alone, but rather, self-maintenance expresses the
dynamic exchange of confirmation and novelty characteristic of the self-organizing
adjustive process.2 Mead implies that similar processes of self-maintenance lie behind the
I The evolutionary trend toward more complex adjustment processes may be one reason why the primary
cortices emerged most recently and are subjected !he least amount of limbic influence. The primary sensory
areas add the luxury of more precise sensory information that would make discrepancies between the
anticipated and actual sensory experiences more likely: With!.hese fluctuations, impulses arise which can
mobilize action around small changes in one's surroundings, This would be very useful for manipulating
physical objects, and corresponds to the primary motorareas which allow precise movements.

2c.f. chapter 3
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act t'We assume that there are impulses, the tendency of the organism to act in a certain
way due to the sensitizing of the organism or to the organization of action that will set free
the tendency to act and to replace the energy expended in the act. This is intelligence"
(Mead, 1927: 112). Mead speaks here of the intelligent selection of matter, energy and
information for self-maintenance. The limbic system and other subconical areas such as
the hypothalamus handle many of these self-maintaining processes, such as feeding,
excretion, blood pressure, and reproduction. The limbic system is also a "driver," to use
MacLean's term, of the subcortical autonomic functions (Isaacson, 1982: 240). In
addition to regulating subcortical survival functions, the limbic system may also give self
maintenance "priorities" to information processing in the neocortex. The limbic cortices,
for example, infuse the act with emotional tone, and relay feelings from subcortical areas
such as pain, hunger, and sleepiness. Human beings can choose to ignore such feelings as
hunger, but will generally act upon the messages from limbic areas which alert the
organism to what it needs to maintain itself. Similarly, Mead describes the impulse in
terms of feelings. "[Acts] start with the impulses seeking expression, impulses manifested
as feelings such as hunger" (Mead, 1927: 108).
According to Mead, the impulse reduces to energy ready to express itself as the
organism adjusts to emerging stimuli (Mead, 1927: 112). This suggests that the impulse
as energy is similar to the limbic system's function of "energizing" various systems in the
neocortex (Yeterian and Pandya, 1988). This relationship is another aspect of the limbic
system as impulse sensitizing the entire act. The impulse as "energy" may drive such
processes as memory association and creative association that are crucial to the selection of
stimuli. In the motor areas, the impulse energizes the process by which behaviors are
organized and future ines of action are projected Limbic influence also extends to
subcortical areas that are also crucial in reorganizing the current line of activity with the
impulse. The impulse as energy is seen in both the inhibitory and excitatory interaction
among the limbic system and other areas.
Mead described the impulse orienting the selection of relevant stimuli. The
selection process will be discussed further in the context of perception. The energy of the
impulse from the limbic interactions (or possibly from other subcortical areas) may drive
processes of memory association and also the creative association of ideas. This emergent
property of the association process may account in pan for the indeterminacy in the
formation of action. Memories may take the form of imagery, including visual imagery and
auditory imagery such as spoken words or music. Ideas or thoughts may also involve
imagery or symbols which are reorganized creatively. Both memories and ideas, however,
are similar in that they are constructed in the present. It is the process by which they are
constructed or called out that may be relevant to the energy of the impulse. Memories and
ideas tend to emerge in relation to the situation at hand; however. they do not arise in a
causal linear fashion such that the causal source of a particular idea is obvious to us. Think
of a word at random, and there is no way to determine why you associated that thought
rather than another. Similarly, we often get ideas or flashes of memory completely
unrelated to the situation at hand. This suggests that memory and creative association
emerge in a non-linear fashion; they may follow the general parameters of the situation at
hand, but also have a random, indeterminate element which makes it impossible to predict
exactly what thoughts may emerge in any situation. The non-linearity in the process by
which thoughts arise suggests that the memory association areas are "driven" by other areas
which energize the non-linear organization of memory images. This process applies to
motor association as well, and the emergent organization of motor sequences. The source
of this energy may be the limbic system or other subcortical systems, and most likely
several systems are involved. The cingulate gyrus, for instance, energizes activi ty in the
supplementary frontal cortex. but also has connections to the sensory association cortices
(Yeterian and Pandya, 1988). The exact mechanism of the association process is
unknown. The relevant point here, however, is that since association is driven in a non
linear fashion, there is always an element of indeterminacy in the process of using past
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experiences to interpret present situations and project future lines of action. Thus the non
linearity of the interaction among limbic diamond and other areas adds to our previous
arguments that acts are formative, and are built up as an emergent, indeterminate process.
The energy of the impulse, in addition to driving association processes, relates to
the motivation of the sequencing process by which future lines of activity are projected.
The cingulate gyrus, for example, is seen as motivating the sequencing of plans taking
place in the prefrontal areas such that responses can be carried out (Yeterian and Pandya,
1988). The cingulate gyrus does not actively plan motor sequences on its own, but may
give a direction or tendency to these plans of action in relation to the holistic representation
of the situation in the limbic diamond interaction. Limbic influence, therefore, may
contribute to the process whereby furore lines of action are projected and carried out
The impulse as expressed by limbic influence is a crucial part of the process by
which activity is organized at the conical' level. The limbic system, however, also
influences subcortical systems. The reorganization of the line of activity at the subcortical
level is crucial for changing and modifying one's line of activity. The limbic system can
have various inhibitory and excitatory influences on subcortical areas, and in this way can
drive subcortical elements of action on the basis of the representation of the situation
maintained by interaction in the limbic diamond areas. The basal ganglia., for instance,
must receive a signal from the limbic system to inhibit the current direction of motion. A
break in connectivity between the basal ganglia and higher cortical regions results in
obstinate progression in which the animal cannot avoid walking into obstacles it clearly
perceives.
Mead's concept of the impulse seems, in many ways, similar to the functions of the
limbic system in organizing behavior. Mead may also have implied a reason why the
limbic system is so heavily interconnected with the neocortex, The limbic system has
access to conical and subcortical information concerning the activity of the entireorganism,
and thus could signal problems in adjustment occurring at both the conical and subcortical
level. The limbic system's general role in survival functions supports this hypothesis.
Further, the limbic system can reorganize the course of activity at subcortical and cortical
levels through its outflowing connections to these areas. At the cortical level the limbic
system could sensitize all pans of the act, in giving direction to the selection of stimuli,
driving memory association and projecting future forms of manipulation in the frontal
lobes. A limbic impulse could reorganize all of these areas simultaneously, thus allowing
immediate response to problematic situations. A serial model which begins the act with the
stimulus in the primary areas would require the relevant stimuli to be perceived and
elaborated before being acted upon by motor areas. With the limbic impulse as the
beginning of the act, the prefrontal areas could be sensitized such that the line of action
could be planned out before relevant stimuli are discovered and perceived. The
neuroanatomical and physiological model of action, therefore, suggests significant parallels
with Mead's concept of the impulse.
Perception
Mead's concept of perception shows two aspects of the influence of the limbic
system and the reciprocal connectivity of the limbic diamond; in the selection of stimuli,
and in the construction of an environment of objects. These two processes are important
for relating sensory stimuli to the line of activity one constructs to handle situations. I will
discuss here the neurophysiological aspects of the selection process and the process by
which perception leads to the construction of meaningful objects.
Mead describes the selection and interpretation of stimuli as essential for the process
of perception. The process of selective interpretation is plausible the from
neurophysiological perspective, although the 'mec hanisms of this process are not well
understood. The impulse, as expressed by limbic influence, was described above as
sensitizing sensory areas to certain stimuli by calling out sensory imagery related to the
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resultant of the act at hand. This orientation to stimuli is necessary for the selection
process. Even with unexpected events, the organism must be prepared in some way to
receive and interpret the stimuli. "In the instance of a firecracker exploded behind the chair,
the stimulus is largely from the outside, but it depends on the organism itself as well. The
more complex the organism, the more definite the stimulus must be" (Mead, 1927: 113).
Though the interpretation of stimuli is only possible by the interaction of stimuli with the
orientation brought to it by the organism, the mechanisms in the association cortices which
make this possible are not understood.. One clue may be the patterns of connectivity to the
six cell layers of the neocortex described in chapter two. One layer of cells receives
information coming from the outside world through the primary cortices. Other layers
receive information flowing out oj the limbic and association areas toward the primary
areas (ci. Figure 6). Thus in the association cortices, information from both the external
sensory field and "internal" representation of the world maintained in the limbic diamond
interaction are superimposed (Yeterian, 1985). The interaction of these layers, however, is
not understood, but these panerns of connectivity show that internal and external
information flow in close proximity, and thus some sort of selection mechanism may be in
operation.
From this selection process, an environment of objects is built up. The perceptual
environment one experiences combines what is "out there" in the form of sensory
information reaching the primary areas with what the organism adds to this raw sensory
information in the interpretive process of selection. The neurophysiological model
suggests that perception does not occur in sensory areas alone, in isolation from the rest of
the eNS. Limbic and frontal association also play a role in perception; and this is
consistent with Mead's description of the object. It is not possible to conclude here exactly
what the neural representation of objects may be, both physical objects and especially social
objects. Mead's description would suggest, however, that the limbic system and frontal
areas are involved in the construction of objects.
We can assume that limbic influence is involved in perception simply from the
degree of connectivity one finds in sensory association areas. I described the possible role
of limbic influence "driving" the processes of memory and creative association and sensory
imagery that meet and interpret incoming sensory stimuli. The limbic system may also
convey information about the general tendency or direction of the given act as expressed by
the impulse; for example, an impulse of fear may direct perception toward objects related
to a path of escape. Similarly, the limbic influence may add emotional tone to our
perception of objects, not necessarily as a distinct sensory experience, such as "seeing red"
when one is angry, but in terms of how we interpret stimuli in terms of future action.
Affective information, then, may also contribute to selecting relevant stimuli and
constructing objects. Depending, to an extent, on one's mood, a rainy day can be
refreshing, or miserable.
Information processing within the sensory areas is also an increasingly interactive
process in which the specific modalities such as sight, hearing, and odor may blend into
various multi modal representations of the world. This occurs primarily in the multimodal
association areas in the sensory association regions which receive connections from several
modalities. Such a blending of sensory information would occur in parallel to our
experience of distinct modalities. Sensory information, then, becomes increasingly
interactive with limbic and multirnodal information. Sensory information also interacts
with motor information.
The motor areas, especially prefrontal association areas, interact with sensory areas
via reciprocal long connections, and are increasingly interconnected approaching the limbic
areas (Yeterian and Pandya, 1988). Since the impulses from the limbic system can
sensitize motor as well as sensory areas to the general direction of the act, the form of
manipulation may be organized at the same time that sensory information is received.
Through these two-way interactions, sensory information becomes increasingly interactive
with the anticipated manipulation one will have with the object Thus, in the limbic
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diamond area, what is experienced is related to what one will do with an object in the
future. This is essentially what Mead has termed the meaning ofan object, a combination
of both the sensory experience of a thing and its relationship to future action. With
perception of the distant object, the addition of future manipulative or contact information to
distant experience gives the relevance of the distant object to future action. This future
quality, as mentioned. is the hypothetical nature of the distant experience which guides the
developing act
This physiological model of perception seems quite consistent with Mead's
description. It also offers an alternative to serial models which propose that sensory
information flows in one direction, from perception in the sensory areas to further
processing in the limbic areas and output as behavior in motor areas. If perception took
place exclusively in the sensory association areas, it is difficult to see how meaning could
be so thoroughly mixed with what we perceive. Models which do not consider the
relevancy of reciprocal interaction among frontal. limbic, and sensory association areas,
then, are left essentially with the stimulus-response model of action.
Manipulation
Similarly to perception, manipulation at the cortica1level is not limited to the activity
of the frontal motor areas. Manipulation involves both sensory and motor cortices as well
as limbic and subcortical structures. Mead shares the idea that manipulation has both
sensory and motor components. Manipulation involves not only the behaviors which
accomplish an act. but the monitoring of those behaviors through the contact experience.
As described in chapter one, contact confirms the hypothetical nature of the distant object.
The capacity of manipulation to confirm the distant experience is seen in the connectivity
between motor and somatosensory areas. Heavy reciprocal interconnections are seen
between motor areas and somatosensory areas including primary, secondary, and
association areas; for example, the primary motor areas which control each muscle in the
body correspond to the receptors for somatosensory information from those same areas.
The hands have among the greatest cortical representations in both the somatosensory and
motor areas (Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 176).
Such heavy interconnection is necessary because movement requires simultaneous
somatosensory feedback to modify the amount of force applied by the muscles. One may
anticipate how heavy a coffee cup may be. for example, but the muscles adjust to the actual
weight upon contact. Direct somatosensory feedback is also necessary for motor
sequences such as walking or drumming one's fingers on the table . The resistance of the
table tells the motor areas when to start lifting the fingers. Contact experience of resistance,
therefore. can have an immediate influence on the form and force of manipulation being
applied.
Contact experience, however, can reach beyond the motor and somatosensory
areas. Both areas are either directly or indirectly interconnected with other sensory and
motor association areas and the limbic system. With such feedback the entire line of action
can be modified by contact experience. Similarly, the hypothetical nature of the line of
action based on perception of distant objects can be confirmed and modified by contact
experience feeding from the somatosensory and motor areas. Thus the cortical areas
involved in manipulation are able to confirm the hypothetical nature of the distant
experience, which, in Mead's terms, gives the reality of the physical thing.
Mead took a different approach to describing sensory and motor functions when it
was common during his time to keep motor and sensory functions separate, with sensory
lobes handling perception alone. and frontal lobes handling all aspects of behavior. In
Mead's analysis, both perception and manipulation have motor and sensory aspects. Motor
aspects of perception include the active orientation of the body to stimuli and also the
implications of future lines of activity involved in giving contact qualities to distant objects.
Manipulation has a sensory aspect in somatosensory feedback, and also in the influence of
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perceptual information in guiding the form of manipulation. Mead did not divide the world
into sensory input and motor output, but into contact experience and distant experience. In
doing so, Mead predicted very closely Sanides' (1972) model of neoconical evolution.

Mead's description of sensory and motor functions as contact and distant

experiences closely parallels the evolutionary development of the neocortex. In chapter two
I described the two trends in the limbic system from which the neocortex evolved, the
hippocampal and olfactory moieties. Both trends evolved into motor and sensory areas;
however, each trend specialized for handling either distant or contact objects. The
hippocampal trend leads to areas which deal with manipulation of the trunk and limbs and
somatosensory experience had by that manipulation. From the olfactory trend evolved
areas such as central vision and audition which handle distant sensory objects, and also the
motor and somatosensory functions serving the head, neck, and face. The implications of
these relationships between contact and distant experiences and the evolutionary patterns of
the brain have yet to be worked out. There are, however, many tantalizing implications
which warrant further investigation. For example, the olfactory trend which handles
distant experiences also include Broca's area in the ventral prefrontal lobe and Wernicke's
areas in the temporal lobe, both of which have a role in language.
Given the consistencies between Mead's description and neurophysiological data,
the analysis of human action in terms of distance experience and contact experience rather
than separate sensory and motor functions may be fruitful approaches for both symbolic
interactionism and the neurosciences. In fact, in the neurosciences there has been much
attention given in recent years to the problems of distinguishing sensory and motor
functions in the CNS and in behavior.l Mead's description of the act may suggests an
alternative line of inquiry for the analysis of motor and sensory processes of action.

Consummation
Where Mead's descriptions of perception and manipulation relate fairly clearly to
neurophysiological processes, the physiological elements of consummation are less clear,
even in terms of speculation. Nevertheless, I will discuss here the relationship of the
limbic system to Mead's concept of consununation. Limbic influence seems to be involved
in giving the "value" of the act, as Mead described it, and also in coding significant
experiences into long term memory for future use. The limbic system may also be involved
in relating the complex interaction of emerging stimuli and various elements of the act into a
more global experience of a situation.
Mead describes consummation as defining the value of an act (Mead. 1938: 445
453). He suggests that there is an experienced emotional dimension to consummation,
such as satisfaction. "Consummation is satisfaction and, if you like, happiness... "
(M~ 1938: 136). The implications of an affective dimension to consummation suggest
the involvement of the limbic system. Mead's view would make sense in light of
suggestions that impulses arise partly from fluctuations in the limbic system's interaction
with limbic diamond areas. When the discrepancy of the fluctuation is resolved, the limbic
system may inform the rest of the brain with some sort of affective signal . The existence of
such affective signals is certainly speculative, but corresponds somewhat with our
introspective experience of the feelings which accompany the completion of an act. Even if
an act does not always result in a feeling of satisfaction, there seems to be a perceived shift
as one changes from one act to another, or one train of thought to another.
A cue from the limbic system which signals the end of a given act, however, would
also be adaptive in organizing increasingly complex actions. If the neocortex operates by
the rapid and abstract association of memories. ideas, and multimodal sensory and motor
information, there may be need for a less rapid, global cue which signals when the given
I c.f. Kolb and Whishaw, 1985: 137-138.
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act is complete and when attention should shift elsewhere. The limbic system is a likely
candidate for this function since it has full access to cortical and subcortical information,
but seems to operate less rapidly than information flowing at the cortical level. Moods and
emotional states. for example, tend to shift less rapidly than ideas and memory images.
There are two implications for such limbic influence in consummation; first, that
consummation may be related to the coding of long-term memories; and second, that the
limbic system may help the organism develop and maintain a global experience of
situations. If consummation gives the value of an act it may also give the act's value for
use in future action. In other words, the consummation of an act may label what
experiences in the act are significant for memory. Recall from chapter two that the coding
of long term memory occurs in the limbic system, primarily in the hippocampus and
amygdala. Though it is not certain that the coding of all memories is driven by the
consummation of acts, this may hint at why memories are often value-laden. Past
experiences are not just flashes of imagery but are good, bad, successful. pleasurable. and
so forth. These value-laden qualities of past experiences are useful for anticipating furore
lines of activity and defining the meaning of objects. Mead gives a similar description of
the use of value-laden memories. "In terms of these values we can analyze the act" (Mead,
1938: 452).
The limbic system's involvement in consummation implies that limbic influence
may help to bind the complex interaction of memories. ideas, and changing sensory
information into a more global experience of a situation. There are three factors supporting
this conclusion. First, I have suggested that impulses sensitize all phases of the act, and
that the limbic system is a major source of these impulses affecting both neocortical and
subcortical areas. Also, impulses continue throughout the act adjusting to emergent
conditions; thus. limbic influence is also present throughout the act Second, since it
seems that information in the limbic system is processed more slowly and shifts more
gradually than the rapid interchange of information in the neocortex, limbic influence may
regulate the flow of neocortical information. The limbic system may dampen minor
fluctuations in the rapidly changing sensory information, ideas, and memory associations
which may conflict with each other and disrupt the line of activity at hand. The difference
in processing speeds may therefore coordinate the different phases and sub-components of
activity around a globally organized goal or purpose of the act This relation between
limbic and neocortical information flow, then, may contribute to our awareness of reality as
situations rather than random streams of events. A third factor in this argument, however,
is that limbic and neocortical interaction is still open to any major fluctuations which
warrant a change in the organism's line of activity. Such fluctuations result in the impulse
for a new act The dynamic thresholds which dampen impulses fluctuate as well. One may
be more sensitive to sudden noises in a dark house than during the day. Impulses for new
acts then may arise with some major fluctuation such as a problematic situation, or may
arise as previous acts are consummated and give a limbic signal that the act is through and
that attention may shift. In either case, activity is continuous as the organism handles a
continual stream of new situations.
The limbic system seems to be involved in maintaining the impulse of adjustment
throughout the act, dampening minor fluctuations in cortical activity and reorganizing action
to handle major fluctuations. Through these processes the limbic system plays a major pan
in organizing the individual's reality into situations rather than unrelated streams of acts and
stimuli. Neurophysiology, therefore, may offer one explanation of how we experience
action as situated.

Sumrmu:v
In this chapter I have added to the general theoretical links described in chapter three
some specific links between Mead's description of the act and the neurophysiological
model of action. I have focussed primarily upon the role of the limbic system and the
reciprocal interaction among the limbic diamond areas which include frontal association and
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sensory association areas and the limbic cortices. For the impulse, I suggested that the
limbic system is involved in monitoring the ongoing interactions with the world represented
at the conical and subcortical levels, and also in initiating impulses directed toward
resolving fluctuations in the adjustment process. The limbic source of the impulse can
reorganize activity in both sensory and motor areas and thus sensitize all phases ofthe act.
Links to neurophysiology in the process of perception include the relation of impulses to
the selection and interpretation of stimuli. Limbic diamond interaction in general was
related to the process of constructing and environment of meaningful objects. The
discussion of manipulation suggested how contact experiences can confirm hypothetical
distant experiences, and how the description of sensory and motor functions as distance
experience and contact experience correspond to the evolution ofthe neocortex. Finally, I
speculated upon the roles of the limbic system in consummating the act, in terms of
signaling the completion of an act, and adding value qualities I() experiences relevant I()
memory. I also suggested the limbic system's general role in organizing experiences and
action into situations.
There are many more possible links between neurophysiology and the interaetionist
perspective of action which were not discussed here. They include such issues as
indication, symbolic interaction, mind, thinking, role-taking, the self, and social
coordination. There are many specific issues in neurophysiology and symbolic interaction
which would warrant further research. Funher integration of interactionist concepts in the
neurosciences would suggest the following lines of research:
1) The development of models of action and information processing which take into
account the bi-directional flow of information among the frontal association. sensory
association, and limbic cortices. Models which proposes a serial and sequential flow of
information from sensory input to motor output should be reevaluated.
2) Funher exploration of the relation of contact experience and distance experience
to sensory and motor functions in neurophysiology and behavior, especially from an
evolutionary perspective.
3) The study of reafference, or the reciprocal connections from the frontal lobe to
sensory areas, and their relation to thinking and symbolic interaction.
4) The general study of the limbic system and its relation to higher brain functions
and behavior.
Researchers continuing the integration of neuroscience with the interacrionist
perspective might explore the following issues:
I) George Herben Mead's perspective of neurophysiology. evolution. and the
system dynamics of the act, especially adjustment and the impulse.
2) The process of indication and its relation to mind, self, and symbolic interaction.
3) The implications of the limbic system's role in behavior and its relation to human
group life, including such issues as emotions, motivation. and the management of behavior
in social situations.
4) Child development and the relation of symbolic interaction in children to the
development of the brain.
Finally, both perspectives may benefit from continuing the evolutionary approach in
the study of brain, human conduct and group life, and the system dynamics of adjustment
common to all living things .
Even a cursory study of these topics would be inexhaustible; also, it is difficult and
perhaps fallacious to pin these social processes to specific functions of the central nervous
system since these are as much products of symbolic interaction as they are physiological
processes. Further, the processes of symbolic interaction and of the central nervous
system hold many unanswered, perhaps unanswerable, questions which may limit our
efforts to integrate the two fields. I hope to have shown, however, that the similarities
between the symbolic interactionist model of action and that of neurophysiology make the
effort of developing a unifying theory worthwhile.
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